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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to understand how corruption affects the attraction of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Studies of corruption and its relationship with FDI 
have yielded mixed results; some have found that corruption deters FDI others have 
found no relation between the two factors, while others have found a positive one. In 
order to further the knowledge of how corruption affects FDI this study argues that it 
is not only the level of corruption what might affect FDI but also the distance 
between host and home countries. This study presents two sections, the first one 
concentrates on a macroeconomic level analysis of corruption and how it affects FDI 
to Latin America. The second section analyses how corruption affects the decision-
making process of allocating FDI to a highly corrupt host country at the firm-level. 
After controlling for institutional and transaction cost variables, results show that 
corruption distance has an asymmetrical impact. Host countries enjoying “positive” 
corruption distance compared with home countries as sources of FDI experience no 
significant increases or reductions in levels of inward FDI. However, “negative” 
corruption distance suffered by host countries is associated with significantly lower 
levels of inward FDI. Conversely, firms from home countries with high corruption 
are undeterred by high corruption in host countries. This study also analysed how 
corruption affected foreign investors at the firm level. To do so, this study researched 
the decision making process of allocating FDI into a highly corrupt host country. The 
results of the analysis show that corruption amongst bureaucrats, judges, and 
members of the government elite do not seem to have an impact on the decision 
making process of allocating FDI in the country because foreign investors are aware 
of the problem. However, firms from more corrupt countries seem to have an 
advantage when operating in a highly corrupt foreign location because they may 
possess knowledge of how to cope with the arbitrariness dimension of corruption. 
High corruption levels in the host country seem to have an effect on the entry mode 
utilised by firms from countries with lower levels of corruption. Based on the results 
presented on this study, MNEs from less corrupt countries might opt to enter a highly 
 
 





corrupt host country via wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) rather than joint ventures 
(JVs). This might be explained by the fact that these investors prefer to have more 
control over their firms’ operations in a highly corrupt country. Also, these managers 
need to protect their image and not to be associated with local partners that are 
perceived as corrupt. Finally, even though this study found evidence that all firms 
operating in Guatemala might participate in corrupt deals, those headquartered in 
highly corrupt countries are more willing to do so. This claim is based on the fact 
that firms from less corrupt countries might face stronger pressures from their 
headquarters to not engage in corrupt deals, whereas firms from more corrupt 
countries might not encounter such pressures.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to analyse how corruption affects the attraction of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to a highly corrupt host location. Even though the study of 
FDI has been a popular topic in the international business (IB) discipline (Buckley, 
2002), the recent surge in FDI flows to developing countries, generally experiencing 
high levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2011), requires new attention 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002) because this phenomenon generates an empirical 
anomaly that seems to contest existing theoretical arguments regarding this issue 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
Corruption is considered to at least damage operations of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) when conducting businesses abroad (Rodriguez, et al., 2005). However, 
countries considered as highly corrupt still receive large amounts of FDI. Therefore, 
it can be inferred that high levels of corruption do not totally deter FDI to these 
locations. Hence, developing knowledge of how to cope with corruption can be 
considered as a basic activity in IB that can offer an advantage to individual firms 
(Rodriguez, et al., 2005).   
Despite its popularity, the study of FDI is a complicated endeavour because of the 
number of variables that intervene. Amongst the variables used to explain FDI there 
are some that are measurable and accessible, such as economic indicators. On the 
other hand, variables such as the quality of the human resources, government 
participation, and the competitive environment are much less obtainable. Among the 
most difficult variables to quantify is the level of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
However, recently organisations like Transparency International have made available 
a measurement of corruption in the host country that although not perfect has 






Understanding how corruption affects FDI is important because corruption reduces 
efficiency and raises costs (Mauro, 1995). Corruption also introduces distortions by 
affording some MNEs special access to profitable activities. Moreover, when 
analysing how corruption affects FDI by taking into account only the corruption 
level of the host country is not enough. Instead, the difference in the corruption 
levels of home and host countries should be taken into account since some foreign 
investors might not have experience in coping with corruption abroad. Furthermore, 
analysing how corruption affects foreign investors after the decision of investing is 
also important since the majority of FDI flows are part of reinvested profits.  
1.1 Background of Research 
Corruption is usually defined narrowly as the abuse of public office for personal gain 
(Roy & Oliver, 2009). This definition is reflected in reported measures of the 
perceptions of national corruption levels (Transparency International, 2010). Such 
public corruption may have a corrosive effect on the integrity of a nation’s entire 
system (Pope, 2000; Voyer & Beamish, 2004): it may reduce operational efficiency, 
distort public policy, slow the dissemination of information, negatively impact upon 
income distribution, and increase the poverty of an entire nation (Chen, et al., 2010; 
Gupta, et al., 2002). In international business (IB) studies, corruption gained 
prominence as firms from developed countries engaged in operations in emerging 
and transition economies (Habib & Zurawicki, 2001; Rodriguez, et al., 2006). 
Corruption was considered to deter foreign direct investment (FDI) because it may 
create additional uncertainty and costs of operating in a foreign country, acting as a 
tax on businesses (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Gastanga, et al., 1998; Mauro, 1995; Zhao, 
et al., 2004).  
However, a contrary view saw corruption as a necessary evil, a lubricant for 
transactions (Meon & Weill, 2010) particularly when ‘institutional voids’ are 






Cazurra (2008, p. 13), corruption can be “sand or grease.” The recent surge in FDI 
flows into and from developing countries (often with high levels of corruption), each 
accounting for 50 per cent of total inflows and outflows in 2010 (United Nations, 
2011), calls for a reconsideration of corruption in the IB literature. 
Firms may prefer a familiar environment (Davidson, 1980) and the costs associated 
with corruption may vary depending on the country of origin of the foreign investors 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Firms from countries with low corruption levels may not be 
used to dealing with this phenomenon at home (Pajunen, 2008), and hence they are 
likely to be deterred by levels of corruption as well as by its unfamiliarity (Driffield, 
et al., 2013). On the other hand, firms used to operating in highly corrupt 
environments at home may not be as sensitive to high corruption levels abroad. 
Furthermore, it has been explained that the relative differences between corruption 
levels in home and host countries may influence FDI (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). 
However, current literature has not explored whether such an influence may be 
asymmetrical according to whether “corruption distance” is positive or negative. 
Therefore, this study attempts to close this theoretical gap by analysing if the 
corruption distance between a highly corrupt host country and a home country with 
either higher or lower corruption levels than the host country has a different effect to 
the FDI received by such location. 
However, analysing how corruption affects FDI at a macroeconomic level does not 
fully explain how corruption affects the decision-making process of FDI allocation 
and further operations in a highly corrupt foreign location. For this reason, a firm-
level analysis based on the levels of corruption of the home and host countries is 
needed to understand how not only corruption but also its different dimensions affect 








1.2 Context of Research: Why Latin America? 
Since the 1990s Latin America has seen a surge in FDI inflows. After several 
decades of almost non-existing foreign investment in the region due to strict 
regulations, the region experienced market-oriented reforms in order to attract more 
investment to the region (Trevino, et al., 2004). The deregulation Latin America 
experienced during the 1990s attracted important flows of FDI to the region.  
According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) (2010), FDI flows to Latin America in 2009 reached US$77.675 billion, 
which makes the region one of the most important recipients of FDI in the world 
(ECLAC, 2010). 
Latin America is also a suitable region for the study of how corruption affects the 
attraction of FDI due to its high corruption levels. Corruption in Latin America has 
been defined as one of the most important threats to the region (Selingson, 2006). 
Also, Weyland (1998) argues that countries in the region are threatened by a 
staggering growth in corruption that has arisen since the dictators of the past left 
power. Moreover, since corruption is deeply rooted in the institutional environment 
of a nation, Latin America provides an ideal location to study its effects on FDI since 
the region’s institutional environment is fairly homogeneous. 
Finally, in order to conduct an in-depth firm-level analysis a Latin American country 
was chosen. Guatemala was identified as a suitable country for this analysis since it it 
is considered to be highly corrupt and because of its rising influx of foreign 
investment (Banguat, 2012). These two circumstances offer incentives to local 
officials to make corrupt deals for their personal gain (Rose-Ackerman, 2008). Lastly, 
Guatemala offers adequate grounds to investigate how corruption affects FDI and 
subsequent operations in a highly corrupt country since MNEs from all parts of the 








1.3 Research Questions 
This thesis was motivated due to the need to have a better understanding of how 
corruption affects the attraction of FDI. Therefore, the central point of this study is to 
understand whether or not high levels of corruption in the host country have similar 
effects on foreign investors based on such investors’ corruption levels at home. In 
order to research this issue the two main research questions are: 
a) How does corruption distance between home and host country affect the attraction 
of FDI to emerging markets?   
b) Why are some foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high levels of 
host country corruption when investing abroad? 
1.4 Research Process 
This research was conducted in two sections: a macroeconomic level to analyse how 
corruption and corruption distance affect FDI flows to Latin America; and a firm-
level analysis conducted to examine how corruption affects the decision-making 
process of allocating FDI and subsequent operations in a highly corrupt host country. 
The rationale behind the inclusion of a macroeconomic and firm-level analysis is to 
compensate for the shortcomings inherent to each process individually.  
The second chapter of this thesis provides an overall overview of existing literature 
on the determinants of FDI, corruption, and how corruption affects the attraction of 
FDI to highly corrupt foreign locations. The first chapter also provides a theoretical 
framework to analyse the two research questions of a) How does corruption distance 
between home and host country affect the attraction of FDI to emerging markets? 
And b) Why are some foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high 






After a description of relevant literature on corruption and its effects on FDI, the 
third chapter provides a description of FDI flows, its determinants, and corruption in 
Latin America. The chapter also offers an explanation for studying how corruption 
affects the attraction of FDI to Latin America. The second section of the second 
chapter presents an overview of FDI flows and its determinants as well as an 
overview of the issue of corruption in Guatemala to this issue at the firm-level.  
The fourth chapter presents the methodology that was followed by this study to 
analyse how corruption affects the attraction of FDI to a highly corrupt host location. 
In order to answer the two research questions this study draws on two different 
approaches: macroeconomic and a firm level. The first section of this chapter uses a 
quantitative approach to study whether or not the distance and corruption’s sign 
between the corruption levels of two sets of foreign investors (investors with either 
higher or lower corruption levels than the host location) have an effect when 
investing in a highly corrupt area. The second utilises a mixed method approach to 
examine how corruption affects the attraction of FDI and further operations at a 
highly corrupt host country location.  
In chapter five the results of the study are presented. The first section of the chapter 
deals with the question: a) How does corruption distance between home and host 
country affect the attraction of FDI to emerging markets? To answer this question 
this section studied FDI flows and the corruption distance of 12 Latin American 
countries from the years of 2006 to 2009. The results were obtained by analysing 
panel data with the aid of a random effects model. On the other hand, to answer the 
question b) Why are some foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high 
levels of host country corruption when investing abroad? A firm-level analysis was 
utilised. The results were obtained from a mixed methodology that used semi-
structured interviews and questionnaires administered to managers responsible for 






In chapter six the answers to the two research questions are assessed. Firstly, this 
study argues that corruption distance has a negative effect on FDI when the home 
countries have a lower level of corruption than highly corrupt host countries. On the 
other hand, when the home country has higher levels of corruption than a highly 
corrupt host country, corruption distance does not have a significant effect. These 
results can be explained because firms located in highly corrupt home countries 
might have developed knowledge of how to cope with corruption abroad, whereas 
their counterparts based in less corrupt countries might not. The second section of 
this chapter presents that firms from countries with high levels of corruption have 
developed knowledge not only to cope with overall corruption abroad but also with 
its different dimensions.  
Finally, chapter seven presents a conclusion for this research. In the conclusions 
answers to the two research questions are provided. Firstly, to answer the question of 
a) How does corruption distance between home and host country affect the attraction 
of FDI to emerging markets? This study argues that it is not only the corruption 
levels of the host country what affects FDI. Instead, the interaction between 
corruption levels of both the home and host countries is what might deter FDI to 
highly corrupt foreign locations. However, this study also argues that corruption 
distance deters FDI only when the home country has lower levels of corruption than 
a highly corrupt host country. On the other hand, firms located in highly corrupt 
home countries are not affected by high levels of corruption abroad.  
The second section of the conclusions, offers an answer to the second research 
question b) Why are some foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high 
levels of host country corruption when investing abroad? The answer to this question 
is that firms located in highly corrupt home countries are less affected by high levels 
of corruption abroad because they have developed knowledge of how to cope with 
corruption and its different dimensions abroad. Also, these firms might not face 






home countries with lower corruption levels than a highly corrupt host nation might 
not have knowledge of how to deal with corruption abroad and/or might face strong 


























CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE ON DETERMINANTS OF FDI, 
CORRUPTION, AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECT ON FDI 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general overview of the relevant literature on the 
determinants of FDI, corruption, and how corruption affects the attraction of FDI. 
This chapter seeks to provide answers to the following questions: a) How does 
corruption distance between home and host country affect the attraction of FDI to 
emerging markets? and (b) Why are some foreign firms less negatively affected than 
others by high levels of host country corruption when investing abroad? 
In order to answer the questions, this chapter reviews previous research on corruption, 
its causes, and consequences. Secondly, this chapter provides a theoretical analysis 
of the definition of FDI and its determinants. This chapter also analyses how 
corruption affects the attraction of FDI depending on the levels of corruption of the 
home country as compared to the host country. Finally, two hypotheses are proposed 
to provide an answer to the two research questions. 
2.2 Corruption 
Corruption is usually defined narrowly as the abuse of public office for personal gain 
(Roy & Oliver, 2009). This definition is reflected in reported measures of the 
perceptions of national corruption levels (Transparency International, 2011). Such 
public corruption may have a corrosive effect on the integrity of a nation’s entire 
system (Voyer & Beamish, 2004): it may reduce operational efficiency, distort public 
policy, slow the dissemination of information, negatively impact upon income 
distribution, and increase the poverty of an entire nation (Chen, et al., 2010). In the 
international business (IB) discipline, the study of corruption only recently gained 
prominence as firms from developed countries engaged in operations in emerging 
and transition economies  (Rodriguez, et al., 2006). However, despite the popularity 







investment (FDI) to a highly corrupt location is still not fully evaluated in the extant 
literature. 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) may use care when choosing host countries for 
their foreign subsidiaries because of their concern for the additional uncertainty and 
operational costs associated with corruption (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Corruption 
has, consequently, been considered as deterrence to FDI (Judge, et al., 2011). A 
contrary view, however, does exist and has seen corruption as a necessary evil, a 
lubricant for transactions (Meon & Weill, 2010) particularly when “institutional 
voids” are prevalent in developing economies (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). The 
‘‘grease the wheels” hypothesis, for example, asserts that corruption may improve 
efficiency by alleviating the distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions and 
inefficient bureaucracy (Huntington, 1968). 
With more MNEs investing in developing countries (often with high levels of 
corruption) and with more MNEs from developing countries trading with each other, 
institutional differences must be acknowledged when analysing interactions between 
the these groups (Peng, et al., 2009). Moreover, due to the recent surge in FDI flows 
into and from developing countries, each accounting for 50 per cent of total inflows 
and 30 per cent outflows in 2010 (United Nations, 2011), calls for a reconsideration 
of corruption in the IB literature.  
Corruption varies widely across different locations in its scope in an economy as well 
as in the level of uncertainty it creates (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). Also, not all MNEs 
perceive and respond to corruption in the same manner. In that sense, the degree of 
uncertainty and the costs associated with corruption may vary depending on the 
country of origin of the foreign investors (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). For this reason, 
recent studies have concluded that MNEs located in countries with low levels of 
corruption would avoid investing in highly corrupt countries (Habib & Zurawicki, 







(Pajunen, 2008), they are more likely to be deterred by high levels of corruption as 
well as their unfamiliarity with it abroad (Driffield, et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
firms which originated in highly corrupt environments may not be as sensitive to 
high corruption levels abroad; they may be attracted by the environment and even 
take advantage of corrupt activities (Suchman, 1995; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006).  
2.2.1 Determinants of Corruption 
Corruption can be found in all economies but in different degrees. However, for 
corruption to flourish certain conditions need to be present.  Early studies analysing 
corruption assumed that firms where relegated to just react to their environment 
(Judge, et al., 2011). Nowadays, however, scholars have acknowledged that for 
corruption to exist both public servants and firms play important roles (Kwok & 
Tadesse, 2006).  
Therefore, for corruption to exist there needs to be at least two parties benefitting 
from it. Firstly, the principal, or the firm, must have a motive to engage in a corrupt 
deal. Secondly, this agent should have enough information regarding how to 
participate in corrupt deals to maximise their rents and minimise the possible 
consequences (Svensson, 2005).   
On the other hand, the agent, public official, has to have information regarding three 
elements. Firstly a public official has to have discretionary power. Roughly defined, 
discretionary powers include the authority to devise and administer regulations. 
Secondly, this power must be associated with possible economic rents. Thirdly, the 
probability of being caught and punished for the illicit acts must be low (Myint, 
2000). In other words, corruption exists when higher rents are associated with 









2.3 Transaction Cost Theory 
The transaction cost approach to the theory of the firm was created by Ronald Coase 
in 1937. In his work, Coase identified the existence of costs of conducting 
transactions. This line of thinking marked a departure from neoclassical economics 
that asserted that transactions occurred within efficient markets on which transaction 
costs were assumed to be non-existent (North, 1990). Building on Coasean thinking, 
Williamson intersected the theory’s economic roots with law and organisation by 
posturing “the problem of economic organisation as a problem of contracting” 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 20). The transaction, which “occurs when a good or service is 
transferred across a technologically separable interface” (Williamson, 1985, p. 1), 
was then utilised s TCT’s basic unit of analysis. Therefore, the organization of 
economic activity is thus to be understood in transaction cost terms (Scott, 1995). In 
this sense, TCT is concerned with the costs of integrating of operation within the 
firm as compared with the costs of using an external market to act for the firm in an 
overseas market (Williamson, 1985).  
In this study, transaction cost analysis will be used to analyse how high corruption of 
a host country affects FDI allocation in such location. This analysis will analyse 
transaction costs incurred by foreign investors based on the corruption level of the 
home country compared to that of the host country.  
2.3.1 Causes of Transaction Costs 
The TCT outlines the main sources of transaction costs as an array of particular risks 
and the attempts of MNEs to reduce them. The risks outlined in the TCT are: 










2.3.2 Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality argues that the behaviour of economic actors involved in 
transactions is intendedly rational but only limitedly so (Simon, 1961, p. 24). 
According to Miles, et al., (1978), human actors have limited capacity to process 
information, cope with complexity, and make optimal choices because of the limits 
of the human mind and the incompleteness of available information. Therefore, 
bounded rationality has an effect on the ability of economic actors to make rational 
decisions especially when asset specificity is encompassed.  
Bounded rationality is believed to increase transaction costs if information 
asymmetry is present (Williamson, 1975). According to North (1990), information 
asymmetry exists when one party has complete information that cannot be found out 
by the counterparty costlessly. Furthermore, information asymmetry might increase 
the risk of investing abroad if the investor does not have information to evaluate the 
costs associated to conduct business abroad. Therefore, when analysing how 
corruption affects FDI it is possible that foreign investors face different transaction 
costs due to bounded rationality. This argument is based on the information they 
possess about how to cope with corruption abroad. 
2.3.3 Asset Specificity 
Asset specificity, in the TCT, means that particular assets (organisational, physical, 
or human) included in a transaction or set of transactions cannot be easily 
reorganised abroad without a significant loss of economic value (Verbeke & Kano, 
2012). Furthermore, differences in the degree of asset specificity are mainly 
responsible for differences in transaction costs. In other words, the more specific the 
assets, the pricier the transaction since more safeguards should be introduced to 
protect the proprietor of such asset against possible economic loss. Furthermore, in 







not only increases the costs of contracting but also leads to interdependence between 
partners (Williamson, 1996). 
The concept of asset specificity can be applied to physical assets that are used for a 
single transaction (Williamson, 1985) or technical knowledge on how to operate a 
business. However, Rugman and Verbeke (2002) argue that transaction costs can be 
reduced not only by possessing knowledge such as R&D or marketing, but from the 
MNE’s ability to deploy their firm specific advantages to serve foreign markets. 
2.3.4 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty in the TCT context means that organisations might encounter uncertain 
environments beyond their control and that might affect the costs of operations. 
Researchers have used a wide arrange of variables to research perceived 
environmental uncertainty in a foreign location. These variables include government 
policy, availability of infrastructure, macroeconomic features, and the variability of 
demand. However, one of the most important aspects creating uncertainty in a 
foreign location is corruption and is one of the least understood. However, 
uncertainty is measured differently by different foreign investors (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006). Therefore, analysing how corruption increases uncertainty to foreign investors 
depending on how they perceive corruption in a host country is necessary to 
understand how corruption affects the attraction of FDI. 
2.3.5 Opportunism 
The concept of opportunism is derived from human nature and denotes to the 
incomplete or distorted release of information, especially to the deliberate efforts to 
mislead (Hill, 1990). Firms are populated by human agents and those human agents 
are assumed to have an intrinsic tendency towards opportunism (Verbeke & Kano, 
2012). Opportunism was defined by Williamson as “self-interest seeking with guile” 







efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 
1985, p. 1547). This means that an opportunistic behaviour will induce individuals to 
seek the maximisation of their own welfare at the expense of others. Therefore, 
transaction costs will rise when parties try to protect themselves from risks generated 
by the uncertainty generated by opportunism. Opportunism is comparable to the 
condition of moral hazard used by Knight (1921) since it assumes that humans have 
an inherent propensity towards opportunism. Opportunism has a specifically harmful 
effect on transaction costs when asset specificity is higher (Williamson, 1985, p. 
1545). This can be attributed to the fact that affected parties cannot discard a 
transaction without sustaining high costs from attempting to recover and reassign the 
assets committed (Williamson, 1993).  
In this sense, opportunism is the decisive behavioural driver of market failure and the 
rise of hierarchy (Williamson, 1993). Moreover, problems resulting from 
opportunism are further complicated by the suspicion arising from low levels of trust 
caused by cultural differences, corruption levels being one of them. This is propelled 
since some practices that might not be seen as harmful in the host country might be 
so in the host country. As a result, MNEs will allocate FDI where laws and 
regulations provide safeguards to conduct operations and therefore, helping MNEs 
economise in transaction costs (Sara & Newhouse, 1995). Nonetheless, if the 
practices abroad resemble those than at home, an MNE might have an advantage 
even though such practices might seem harmful to other investors. 
Therefore, when analysing how corruption affects the costs of operating abroad, it is 
necessary to separate foreign investors from home countries with low corruption 
from those with high corruption. This separation is needed to study how corruption 
affects foreign investors not only because of the corruption level of the host country 
but because the interaction of the home and host country corruption levels might be 







2.4 Expected Perceived Costs from Foreign Investors from Different Relative 
Home and Host Country Corruption Levels  
The transaction cost theory presents a framework to predict how firms may react to 
the causes of costs in terms of governance of individual transactions and their 
organisation structure. Therefore, when transaction costs are perceived to be too high 
a firm is expected to decrease the number of market-mediated transactions 
(Williamson, 1975). In the case of how the perception of corruption affects the 
allocation of FDI from companies, the perceived costs incurred by corruption of the 
host country will vary depending on how different firms react to corruption. 
Therefore, this study claims that those firms headquartered in countries with high 
levels of corruption will perceived the costs of operating in another highly corrupt 
country low. On the other hand, those firms not used to operating in highly corrupt 
home countries will perceive the costs associated with operating in a highly corrupt 
foreign environment considerably high. 
2.4.1 Transaction Costs and Individual Transactions  
Firms have to choose to carry individual transactions in the market or to internalise 
them and the choice will be decided based on how efficient those options seem 
(Williamson, 1975). Therefore, firms will try to minimise the costs of individual 
transactions and for this they have to decide whether to use the market or internalise 
such transactions (Williamson, 1985). However, firms will use market structures 
when assets are not specific, transactions are not frequent, neither party has more 
market power than the other, and most eventualities are known. Therefore, terms can 
be spelled out and no adaptation or dispute is foreseen.  
Nonetheless, when firms are less certain and such eventualities are more difficult to 
predict, the transaction cost theory argues that the preservation of relationships 
between transacting parties should take precedence (Williamson, 1985). Nonetheless, 
when analysing how corruption affects transaction costs the individual transactions 







an uncertain environment on which firms cannot only choose between arms-length or 
internalised transactions, but actually between carrying out the transaction or not. 
2.4.2 Combined Causes of Transaction Costs when Investing in a Highly 
Corrupt Host Country  
While it is important to study individual transactions and how they are affected by 
corruption, considering the interactions between causes of risk increase and the costs 
of transactions can provide a better picture of how corruption affects transaction 
costs. The transactional, behavioural, and environmental characteristics of a 
transaction are described jointly by what Williamson (1975) calls atmosphere, 
meaning that their separable effects, technically, are not necessarily so. Therefore, 
Williamson proposes to study the influence of these factors and their effects on 
transactions to be considered as a whole. 
In the study of how corruption affects transaction costs, it can be said that an 
individuals bounded rationality can limit her or his knowledge relative to other 
parties’ and therefore, this restrains his or her ability to predict outcomes 
(Williamson, 1985). This means that different parties might have more information 
regarding how corruption might affect their operations abroad. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that firms headquartered in countries with high levels of corruption might 
have more information about how to deal with corruption than those firms from 
home countries without such high levels of corruption.  
If opportunism, that causes parties to choose an inclusive contract, is combined with 
bounded rationality that would lead to an incomplete contract, acute contractual 
difficulties occur (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, since perfect contracts do not exist, 
the partiers are exposed to greater risks of opportunistic behaviour from their 
counterparts (Luo, 2007). Therefore, if firms want to protect their reputation they 
should remove incentives for opportunistic behaviours. However, not all firms react 
to opportunistic behaviour in the same manner, and this would depend on how they 







might cause more costs to those firms not used to operating under corrupt conditions 
at home. On the other hand, those firms used to dealing with corruption at home 
might not see their costs increased due to opportunistic behaviour created by 
corruption in a highly corrupt host country.  
Corruption increases uncertainty to foreign investors. Therefore, if opportunism is 
added to any relational contract arising from uncertainty, effective monitoring of 
such contract will need to be aided by social sanctions (Carson, et al., 2006). 
Nonetheless, not all foreign investors react differently to uncertainty (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006), and this includes corruption. This means that some foreign investors 
might need more safeguards to protect their investments and/or might perceive the 
risk of doing business in a highly corrupt foreign country as too high. On the other 
hand, firms used to operating in a highly corrupt home country might not see high 
corruption abroad as a source of increase to their costs. 
While opportunism and uncertainty can be found in small degree in any contracting 
situation, they will require small adaptations from both parties involved, and this will 
lead to relational governance to promote a longer-term relation (Artz & Brush, 2000). 
However, when high asset specificity is present, this changes. Furthermore, when 
foreign investors of firms with high asset specificity perceive opportunism and 
uncertainty derived from high corruption, this might lead to not even locate 
operations in such location. On the other hand, firms used to operating in highly 
corrupt home countries might not perceive that their costs increase in a foreign 
country that resembles their home country even if there is high asset specificity.  
The following table shows how the combined causes of transaction cost and 
corruption in the host country affect foreign firms headquartered in countries either 








Table 1: Expected perceived corruption costs for foreign investors in different 
relative home and host country corruption levels 
 
    Causes of  Perceived Costs   
Type of 
Investor 
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Perceived costs will 
increase significantly 
due to safeguards  
needed to protect 
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2.5 Criticism of the Transaction Cost Theory to Analyse Corruption and its 
Effect on FDI 
Even though the TCT has the ability to study much of the FDI decisions, it still has 
its share of deficiencies. First of all, the TCT assumes that the main goal of the 
economic actors is to minimise transaction costs related with operations abroad 
(Madhok, 1997) but it does not take into the influence of local or foreign competitors 
in such firm’s operations (Dunning, 1981). Also, since the TCT’s unit of analysis is 
the transaction, variables concerning the evaluation of the potential foreign location, 
such as the levels and dimensions of corruption, are not included in the analysis.  
Furthermore, the TCT approach to analyse FDI bases its assumptions on 
transactional market imperfections and explains internationalisation based on the 
boundaries of the firm. Therefore, the main argument of this theory explains why 







instead as determined by the market. In other words, the TCT theory argues that 
MNEs will undertake FDI up to the point where the benefits of further internalisation 
are surpassed by the costs (Buckley, 1988). Nonetheless, this approach does not take 
into account the characteristics of the foreign location as compared to the advantages 
an MNE might have. For that reason, Dunning (1981) argued that in order to 
understand FDI activities three elements should be analysed: ownership-specific, 
Internalisation, and Location advantages. 
2.6 Explaining How Combinations of Corruption levels (low vs. high) in the host 
and home countries Affect the Attraction of FDI Using Dunning’s OLI 
Paradigm 
Dunning used the transaction cost theory as a predictive model by proposing that the 
form and competitiveness of an MNE’s international operations depend crucially 
upon the configuration of three elements (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). The three 
elements of the transaction cost theory of the multinational enterprises are: 
Ownership, Locational, and Internalisation advantages. 
Dunning’s (1980; 1981; 1988; 1992) eclectic paradigm might be the most 
comprehensive framework to explain reasons for FDI (Ramasamy & Yeung, 2010). 
The eclectic paradigm, also known as the OLI paradigm, asserts that there are three 
factors that determine international activities of MNEs. These factors are: Ownership 
(O) advantages, internalisation (I) advantages, and locational (L) advantages. Within 
this context, the OLI paradigm explains outward FDI and by suggesting that MNEs 
must develop unique and competitive O advantages at their home countries and then 
transfer them to a foreign market (based on L advantages) via FDI, which permits the 
MNE to internalise such O advantages (Rugman, 2010). In other words, the O 
advantages explain who will undertake FDI; the I-advantage explains the mode on 
which international production will occur; and the L advantage explains where FDI 







The eclectic paradigm further claims that each of the three firm-specific advantages 
and the arrangement among them is likely to be context specific (Dunning, 2000). 
Dunning also states that the significance of these advantages may vary depending on 
the industry, region, and country that is being analysed. For this reason, Dunning 
(2000) argues that the eclectic paradigm would be best regarded as a framework for 
analysing FDI activities instead of as a predictive theory of the MNE. Furthermore, 
there has been said that no single theory can fully incorporate all kinds of MNE 
foreign activities since their motivations and expectations of such activities will be 
different for different firms (Verbeke, 2009). Therefore, Dunning (2000) 
recommends that when conducting research with the help of the OLI paradigm such 
research should specify the context in which the relationship between the OLI factors 
is being examined. 
The eclectic paradigm, according to Luiz and Charalambous (2009), is particularly 
useful to analyse MNEs FDI activities because it offers a synthesis of other models 
and in addition, it emphasises the ownership ‘O’ and location ‘L’ variables central to 
the study of the internationalisation of firms. The OLI paradigm also provides a 
holistic framework to analyse the importance of factors that influence the initial 
internationalisation of MNEs and their later activities (Dunning & Robson, 1987). 
The framework also enables comparison between different theories by creating a 
common ground between various approaches and explaining specific questions that 
scholars have asked (Cantwell & Narula, 2001).  
2.6.1 Ownership Advantages  
In order to explain international production several threads of economic and business 
theories affirm that for MNEs to begin operations abroad they must possess some 
kind of specific, unique, and sustainable competitive advantages. These unique 
ownership (O) advantages (also called competitive or monopolistic advantages) 
might compensate for the added costs related with setting up and running operations 







order to exploit these O advantages abroad MNEs should choose to transfer them 
within their own organisation rather than selling them or the right to use them to 
foreign-based firms (Dunning, 1988). This suggests that MNEs notice that foreign 
markets are not the most appropriate settings for transacting intermediate services or 
goods (Dunning, 1988). 
Since the eclectic paradigm was first proposed it was assumed that O advantages 
reflected the resources and capabilities of the home countries of investing MNEs. 
Based on this it can be said that FDI would only happen when the benefits of 
exploiting O advantages from a foreign location offset the opportunity costs of doing 
so (Dunning, 2000).  
Dunning (2000) says that since the 1960s, the literature has identified three main 
types of O specific advantages: 
 Advantages relating to the ownership and exploitation of monopolistic power, 
as described by Hymer (1976). These advantages, according to Dunning 
(2000), are supposed to arise from creating barriers to entry to final product 
markets by MNEs that do not possess them. 
 Advantages unfolding from the proprietorship of a bundle of rare and 
sustainable resources and capabilities that reflect a superior technical 
efficiency of a particular MNE relative to those of its competitors. These 
advantages are supposed to arise from creating a kind of barrier of entry to 
intermediate or factor product markets by MNEs that do not possess them 
(Dunning, 2000). 
 Advantages related to the know-how of managers to recognise, evaluate, and 
exploit capabilities and resources from around the world and coordinate them 
with existing resources and capabilities under their authority in a manner that 







Even though Dunning received criticism that the OLI paradigm was being used as a 
shopping list (Dunning, 2000), the eclectic paradigm is still useful to analyse a firm’s 
specific advantages that allow it to compete overseas. One of the most important 
advantages a firm must possess is managerial know-how. In that same line of thought, 
the eclectic paradigm argues that some of these O advantages should also include 
technological knowledge and possession and/or access to finance. According to 
Dunning (1988), before deciding to invest abroad, firms must have such unique 
advantages to allow them to overcome the costs of operating in a foreign 
environment. 
Based on the above definitions of O advantages, this particular research claims that 
firms based on highly corrupt home countries might have a particular O advantage 
when deciding to invest in highly corrupt host countries when compared to MNEs 
without such knowledge. On the other hand, firms from home countries with lower 
corruption levels than the host country might not have such advantages. Therefore, 
firms from home countries with lower levels than the host country might see their 
transaction costs increase when operating in such countries, whereas firms with such 
advantages might not.  
Furthermore, while creating knowledge of how to operate in a highly corrupt 
environment might be an O advantage to firms, another aspect that should be taking 
into account is the damage that the image of a company might suffer from operating 
in a highly corrupt foreign environment. Even though it can be argued that any 
company might be able to develop and transfer knowledge of how to deal with 
corruption, those firms headquartered in home countries with low corruption levels 
might be more concerned about the potential costs to their image if they operate in a 









2.6.2 Internalisation Advantages 
Internalisation, I- specific, advantages arise when a firm has developed a set of 
competitive O specific advantages, and the immobile attributes of a foreign location 
(L advantages) permit finding value-added or asset-augmenting activities in such 
place and this firm decides to undertake such activities within itself rather than 
letting another firm to perform them (Dunning, 2000). In other words, internalising 
production will occur when an MNE believes that it is more convenient to transfer its 
O advantages within the firm across borders than selling it to a third-party (Stoian & 
Filippaios, 2008). In the words of Dunning himself, the internalisation of O 
advantages will occur when the international market is not the most appropriate 
method for transacting intermediate goods or services (Dunning, 1993). 
The internalisation theory has provided a dominant explanation of why MNEs 
choose to participate in FDI rather than sell or buy intermediate products via a third 
party. The Internalisation theory, as proposed by Buckley and Casson (1976), 
Rugman (1981), and Hennart (1982), is a theory at the firm-level that explains why 
MNEs will exercise ownership control over an intangible knowledge-based, firm-
specific advantage (Rugman, 2010). Such knowledge advantage, according to 
Rugman (2010), result from a transaction cost economics explanation on which the 
public good nature of such knowledge is alleviated by means of the hierarchy of an 
MNE overcoming this situation of a market failure.  
Building on earlier studies, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) propose a model based on 
transaction costs analysis in order to explain why an MNE would own and manage a 
facility in a foreign location instead of using other supply agreements with local 
firms already operating in such market. Their model blends components of contract 
law, industrial organisation and organisation theory. Based on their study, Anderson 
and Gatignon (1986), assert that MNEs will use a low level of control to operate in a 
foreign location unless the risks and transaction costs related with this option are too 







For this reason, this study proposes that the intangible knowledge that MNEs 
headquartered in highly corrupt countries can be internalised and exploited in a 
highly corrupt foreign location. On the other hand, firms without such knowledge 
might struggle to adapt to generate the knowledge to cope with high levels of 
corruption abroad. 
2.6.3 Locational Advantages 
Until recently neither the economics nor the business literature had paid much 
attention to how a specific location affected the emergence and growth of MNEs 
cross-border activities (Dunning, 1998). Instead, research was focused on explaining 
production within a specific location or how this location affected the 
competitiveness of investing MNEs. However, some context-specific theories of 
geographical distribution of FDI and the placement of particular value-added 
activities of MNEs have been developed since at least the 1930s (Dunning, 2000). 
Dunning (2000) explained that some of these ‘partial’ theories include the locational 
component of the product cycle theory (Vernon, 1966), the ‘follow my leader’ theory 
(Knickerbocker, 1973), and the risk diversification theory (Rugman, 1979). 
Despite such early attempts to describe the location of FDI the question of where 
FDI is located based on a MNEs O and I advantages was not fully explored until the 
eclectic paradigm was put forward. The OLI paradigm acknowledged the importance 
of locational (L) advantages of countries as determinants of foreign production of 
MNEs taking into account a firm’s particular advantages (Dunning, 1998). 
Nevertheless, the rise of the knowledge based global economy and asset augmenting 
FDI has required scholars to re-visit the issue of the placement of MNE activities and 
to the competitive advantages of regions and/or nations. According to Buckley et al., 
(2007), FDI location is determined by three primary motivations: 
1. Foreign-market-seeking 







3. Resource-seeking (this includes a subset also known as strategic-asset 
seeking) 
This suggests that different selection criteria pertain for projects with different 
motivations. Therefore, identifying the variables that influence the most particular 
investment is paramount (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Based on this premise, this 
study argues that the level of corruption of the host country is an important aspect for 
firms to take into account when establishing activities abroad. However, the level of 
corruption of the host country alone might not be enough to analyse how corruption 
affects the attraction of foreign investment to certain location. Instead, this study 
argues that the ‘distance’ between the corruption levels of home and host country 
might be more important indicator to see whether or not corruption has an effect on 
FDI when investing in a highly corrupt foreign country. 
The L advantages play an important role when analysing cross-border activities since 
they can define the attractiveness of a foreign market for a particular MNE (Dunning, 
1998). Issues such as institutional differences, size of the market, purchasing power, 
the rate of inflation, unemployment, and corruption gain more importance when 
doing business abroad than domestically. Moreover, advancing the knowledge of the 
L advantages and their influence on FDI will expand our knowledge of international 
activities of the MNE in an ever-increasing international business context. This study 
seeks to advance the knowledge on the L advantages and their influence on FDI. To 
do so, corruption and corruption distance are included among the factors of the 
attractiveness of certain location. 
2.6.3.1 Foreign Market Attractiveness 
The role of market attractiveness refers to the preconception that MNEs seek foreign 
markets that offer a strong potential for growth (Eaton & Tamura, 1994). According 
to Grosse and Trevino (1996), FDI theory proposes that FDI will go primarily to 







for production. This statement explains why FDI goes primarily to developed 
countries since most FDI has been historically market seeking (Grosse & Trevino, 
1996). However, when testing determinants for FDI into Latin America, Trevino et 
al., (2002) found that host country GDP was a significant predictor of FDI in the 
region. Moreover, a study conducted by UNCTAD found that market size was the 
main determinant of FDI into the region (UNCTAD, 1994).  
How attractive a foreign market is can be a very important determinant when 
analysing whether or not to establish operations abroad, but so is the level of 
corruption of the host country (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). However, based in the 
premise that not all foreign investors perceive risk in the same manner, it may be 
possible that some firms are not as concerned by corruption than others. This study 
argues that firms headquartered in countries with high levels of corruption might not 
suffer an increase in transaction costs due to corruption abroad. On the other hand, 
those firms headquartered in countries with low levels of corruption might see an 
increase in transaction costs when operating in highly corrupt foreign countries. 
2.6.3.2 Corruption Distance 
The perceived cultural distance between a home and host countries can also be 
named ‘psychic’ distance. According to Nordstrom and Vahlne (1992, p. 3) psychic 
distance is comprised by “the factors preventing or disturbing the flow of 
information between potential or actual suppliers and customers.” One of the most 
widely accepted forms of psychic distance in the IB discipline is the difference in 
national cultures between the home and host country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
This difference in culture or the ‘cultural distance’ between home and host countries 
can have been a significant effect on an MNE when conducting operations abroad  
since it rises the transaction costs and risks associated with operating in an ‘unknown’ 







While analysing the effects of cultural distance on MNEs most studies propose that 
as the cultural differences among a home and host country increase, the abilities of 
the MNE to operate in the host country decrease (Hennart & Larimo, 1998). These 
propositions are based on the argument that the greater the cultural distance between 
a home and host country the more difficulties a foreign manager will have to 
understand the values and norms of the foreign market (Tihanyi, et al., 2005).  
In the case of corruption, current literature has explained that the greater the 
difference in corruption levels between a home and host country, the more FDI will 
be deterred (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). However, we argue that it is not only the 
distance in corruption levels what might deter FDI but the direction of such distance. 
In other words, we argue that corruption distance might have a negative effect on 
FDI when the home country has lower levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host 
country. On the other hand, corruption distance might not have a negative effect on 
home countries that are considered more corrupt than a highly corrupt host country. 
This can be explained by the smaller psychic distance between highly corrupt home 
and host countries that are used to operating in these conditions, as opposed to the 
greater psychic distance between a highly corrupt host country and a home country 
with lower corruption levels that not only has less experience operating in a corrupt 
location but also might face higher pressures from their stakeholders to not engage in 
corruption abroad. 
2.6.3.3 Inflation Rate  
The currency value of a country might be weakened by monetary policies or by 
economic instability. Currency devaluation might be the result of such policy 
variations and foreign investors should cover the costs to avoid transaction losses 
when the host country currencies devaluate. Hence, ceteris paribus a stable real 
exchange rate is preferred by foreign investors to minimise exchange rate risks 
inherent to investing in a foreign location (Ciccarelli & Mojon, 2010). Furthermore, 







market-seeking MNEs would avoid a foreign location experiencing high inflation 
(Kahai, 2004). Also, high rates of inflation can be a signal of economic uncertainty 
and of the host government’s lack of capacity to impose an adequate monetary policy 
(Arbelaez & Ruiz, 2013).  
Scholars have argued that high inflation, usually found in countries with high 
corruption, might have negative effects on the attraction of FDI (Asiedu, 2002). 
Moreover, high inflation rates have been presented as deterrents of FDI (Trevino, et 
al., 2004). In this study, we could see that an instable rate of inflation might increase 
costs of operating abroad to firms based in home countries with either higher or 
lower corruption levels than the host country. 
2.6.3.3.4 Unemployment Rate  
Multinationals interested in establishing operations abroad should have in mind the 
characteristics of the local workforce they need to employ in the proposed area. 
However, the association between unemployment rate and FDI inflows to a region is 
mixed. According to Billington (1999), one of the most important variables 
explaining the attraction of FDI is the availability of labour. In order to test his 
proposition, Billington (1999) argues that the greater unemployment rate of a host 
location, the greater the FDI inflows since the foreign MNE can have a greater pool 
of possible employees. Also, the unemployment levels will make people have a 
higher value on their existing employment or any potential future job. On the other 
hand, Ray (1989), the unemployment rate in a foreign location decreases the degree 
of FDI. Pearson et al., (2012) also argue that high unemployment rates are related to 
socio-economic issues such as high crime rates that might deter FDI since MNEs 
may not be allured to having a lasting interest in such an environment. Despite the 
debate of whether or not the unemployment rate encourages or discourages FDI, its 
importance as an MNE determinant is rarely disputed in current literature (Tsai, 1994; 
Tuman & Emmert, 2004; Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003) and might have an equal 







2.6.3.3.5 Quality of Infrastructure 
Researchers have used the number of fixed telephone lines and mobile telephones 
per 1000 people in a location as a proxy for the quality of infrastructure of a country 
(Kahai, 2011). The rationale explained for using the number of telephones used in a 
location to represent the quality of infrastructure is because countries with an 
adequate telecommunications infrastructure usually have similar quality in other 
aspects such as roads, and the Internet. Infrastructure, in this sense, covers several 
dimensions of physical assets such as roads, sea ports, and telecommunications, to 
institutional ones, such as accounting and legal services (Kahai, 2011).  
Nevertheless, nowadays due to the increase of internet users and the decrease of 
telephone lines, it might be appropriate to use a number of internet users as a proxy 
for quality of infrastructure. The rationale for taking the number of internet users as a 
proxy for infrastructure obeys to the fact that nowadays communications via internet 
are perceived as more important than traditional telephone ones (Choi, 2003). 
Furthermore, a region that does not have an appropriate access to the internet might 
deter FDI due to the problems for managers for communicating with their foreign 
subsidiaries.  
2.6.3.6 Education Levels  
Education is a central element of a country's institutional environment since it offers 
socialising practises that prepare individuals to be a part of a society (Meyer, 1977; 
Trevino, et al., 2008). Education is also an important aspect that central in the 
transmission of societal norms and beliefs from generation to generation (Turner, 
1997). According to Trevino, et al., (2008), educational levels in a location have two 
main impacts on FDI inflows: to act as a proxy for quality labour because foreign 
investors should be interested in establishing operations in locations with available 







attracted to locations with high levels of education since their operations often need 
more skilled labour than the rest of the economy. 
While analysing the determinants of FDI educational attainment proved to be an 
important factor (Trevino, et al., 2008). Furthermore, Boresztein, et al., (1998) argues 
that developing countries are not attractive solely on the basis of low cost labour, but 
instead, they needed a minimum educational level of their human capital to attract 
inward FDI. In fact, Latin American countries that offer high levels of skilled labour 
receive larger amounts of FDI (Blanton & Blanton, 2007). For example, the decision 
of Intel to set up a plant in Costa Rica was partially motivated by the high levels of 
skilled labour available in the country (Jensen, 2006). 
Therefore, a large pool of qualified labour force might be a strong determinant of 
FDI for companies headquartered at home countries with higher or lower corruption 
levels than the host country. 
2.6.3.7 Human Development Index 
Scholars have long argued that measuring the attractiveness of a foreign location 
based solely on GDP does not capture the whole picture of such place. Instead, it has 
been claimed that focusing solely on GDP can come at the expense of other 
important factors that are needed to evaluate the attractiveness of a possible 
investment location (Stiglitz, 2006). Therefore, studies have used the United Nations 
Human Development Index (HDI) to capture the value of an array of factors that 
have been found to attract FDI (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). This index measures 
not only GDP, population, and literacy, but also life expectancy at birth, all of which 
have been tested to be determinants of FDI in developing countries (Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2003). However, since firms located in home countries with high levels of 
corruption have operated in their local markets with low human development index, 







average HDIs might see their costs of operating abroad increase abroad in countries 
with low HDI due to the lack of experience operating in such conditions. 
2.6.3.8 Rule of Law  
Besides a strong host economy, multinationals require a stable environment on which 
to conduct operations outside their home country. However, several developing 
countries lack the development of regulatory institutions that protect the interests of 
foreign multinationals (Meyer, 2001), which results in ambiguity of the rules to 
follow (Roy & Oliver, 2009) and thus, decreasing FDI inflows. Furthermore, 
underdeveloped institutions do not provide strong enough bases for fostering 
financial, organisational and technological resources that MNEs need to compete in 
foreign markets (Hitt, et al., 2000). Therefore, MNEs prefer to invest in those 
countries where their basic rights are protected by an adequate rule of law.  
In the case of corruption, it can be argued that the weaker the rule of law the stronger 
the corruption level of a country. Therefore, it also could be argued that a weak rule 
of law can decrease FDI flows to certain location. However, this might be partially 
true since firms operating under similar conditions at home might not be as impacted 
as firms without such problems when operating abroad. 
2.6.3.8 Economic Freedom  
Even though researchers agree that variables such as market size and educational 
attainment are significant determinants of FDI, the role of economic freedom has 
seldom been tested. However, according to Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), the 
economic freedom variable is of utmost importance when researching FDI to Latin 
America. Furthermore, Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) found that the Economic 
Freedom Index is a significant predictor of FDI to Latin America. This result is based 
on the idea that the more economic freedom a country enjoys the better institutional 









According to Globerman and Shapiro (2003), government effectiveness (the 
measurement of time spent dealing with red tape and bureaucracy) in a foreign 
location is one of the most important factors when studying FDI inflows, especially 
when the host country or countries is considered developing. This can be explained 
because the time spent dealing with bureaucratic procedures in a foreign location 
delays the expected utility that potential profits can provide (Baniak, et al., 2005). 
Therefore, Bénassy-Quéré, et al. (2007) argue that the time spent dealing with 
bureaucratic procedures in a foreign location has a strong negative influence on FDI 
flows and it might serve as an incentive to MNEs to engage in corrupt deals to 
circumvent such bureaucratic procedures. However, since some firms have 
developed expertise about operating under highly bureaucratic systems at home, they 
might not be as affected when operating abroad as compared to those firms without 
such knowledge.  
2.7 Explaining How Combinations of Corruption levels (low vs. high) in the host 
and home countries Affect the Attraction of FDI Using Dunning’s OLI 
Paradigm (Ownership Advantages) 
As mentioned previously, Dunning proposed that firms needed three variables to 
explain the internationalisation of a firm’s activities. The first of those advantages, 
according to Dunning, are ownership specific advantages (Dunning, 1988). Dunning 
argued that to internationalize a firm must possess O-specific advantages related to 
asset advantages and transaction costs minimising advantages (Dunning, 2000). 
When analysing these O-specific advantages according to the corruption level of the 










2.7.1 Ownership Specific Advantages when Host Corruption and Home 
Corruption is Low 
When analysing O-specific advantages of firms with home countries with low 
corruption levels investing in foreign locations with similar corruption levels, it can 
be argued that the transaction costs associated with those activities are minimum. 
This assertion can be justified because those firms might have developed managerial 
know-how, technological knowledge, access to finance, and the ability to recruit 
employees in a foreign country. Moreover, since both home and host countries have 
low corruption levels, the investing firms do not face increase in possible transaction 
costs due to transacting with partners in highly corrupt foreign countries, which can 
minimise costs in protecting the reputation of the company, deal with uncertainty, 
and cope with opportunism abroad. 
 
2.7.2 Ownership Specific Advantages when Host Corruption is Low and Home 
Corruption is High 
While firms from countries with low corruption levels investing in similar foreign 
countries do not have to develop many O-specific advantages, if they decide to invest 
in countries with high levels of corruption they do need to do so. Since these firms 
are generally from developed countries, scholars argue that they have developed 
managerial know-how, technological knowledge, sound financials, ability to transfer 
knowledge and to recruit foreign workforce that can be exploited in other countries 
with lower development levels (Asiedu, 2002). Nevertheless, these firms might be 
deterred from investing in host countries with high levels of corruption due to the 









Table 2: Explaining How Combinations of Corruption levels (low vs. high) in 
the host and home countries Affect the Attraction of FDI Using Dunning’s OLI 
Paradigm 
Ownership Specific Advantages 
Dunning Factor ‘O’ 
A Corruption:  
Host Low Home 
Low  
B Corruption:  
Host Low Home 
High 
C Corruption:  
Host High Home 
Low 
D Corruption:  
Host High Home 
High 
Host Country         
Managerial know-how 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm does not have 
it  
Increase in TC 
Firm does not have it 
but does not need it 
No effect on TC 
Technological knowledge 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm does not have 
it  
Increase in TC 
Firm does not have it 
but does not need it 
No effect on TC 
Possession and access to 
finance 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm does not have 
it  
Increase in TC 
Firm does not have it 
but does not need it 
No effect on TC 
Creation of Knowledge 
of how to  
operate in a highly 
corrupt environment 
Firm does not have 
it but does not 
need it 
No effect in TC 
Firm does not have 
it  
Increase in TC 
Firm has it but does 
not need it 
No effect on TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Transferring of the 
knowledge of how  
to deal with corruption 
Firm does not have 
it but does not 
need it 
No effect in TC 
Firm does not have 
it  
Increase in TC 
Firm has it but does 
not need it 
No effect on TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Reputation of the 
company (image created  
and in need to be 
maintained) 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it  
Increase in TC 
Firm does not have 
it but does not need 
it 
No effect on TC 
Firm does not have it 
but does not need it 
No effect in TC 
Ability to recruit 
employees in a  
foreign country 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Use of local collaborators 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Knowledge of how to 
deal with the  
uncertainty inherent to 
developing countries 
Firm does not have 
it but does not 
need it 
No effect on TC 
Firm does not have 
it  
Increase in TC 
Firm has it but does 
not need it 
No effect on TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Knowledge of how to 
cope with opportunism  
from local partners and 
government officials in 
developing countries 
Firm does not have 
it but does not 
need it 
No effect on TC 
Firm does not have 
it  
Increase in TC 
Firm has it but does 
not need it 
No effect on TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
 
The reasons for these firms from headquartered in countries with low corruption 
levels to be deterred by high levels of corruption in foreign countries can be 







Cazurra, 2006) that raise the perceived transaction costs associated with such 
operations (Driffield, et al., 2013). Such lack of knowledge, or O-specific advantages, 
can be created due to the lack of experience in operating in a highly corrupt foreign 
environment and the lack of knowledge of how to deal with opportunism. It can also 
be argued that firms from home countries with low corruption levels might be 
deterred to investing in highly corrupt foreign countries by the possible detrimental 
effect on their reputation that they may suffer by conducting business in such highly 
corrupt foreign countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
2.7.3 Ownership Specific Advantages when Host Corruption is High and Home 
Corruption is Low 
The international business discipline has a long tradition of analysing how firms 
internationalise. However, the studies tackling this issue have generally analysed 
firms from developed countries investing in other developed countries and later in 
developing ones (Brouthers, 2013). This point of view is explained because this is 
how the patterns of investment was (Rodriguez, et al., 2006). However, in the last 
decades a new phenomenon has emerged and that is firms from developing countries 
investing in countries considered developed. 
While analysing how corruption in the host country might affect firms investing in 
foreign locations with lower levels of corruption than their home country might seem 
unimportant, important issues still arise. Several studies argue that firms from 
developing countries, usually highly corrupt, have not developed enough O-specific 
advantages to operate abroad; however, these studies have taking into account only 
O-specific advantages that emanate from developing technological and managerial 
know-how, and the possession and access to finance. Nevertheless, it can be argued 
that these firms have developed certain O advantages that might not be traditional 
such as the knowledge of how to operate in highly corrupt foreign environments. 







home country might not take advantage from such knowledge and should develop 
other O advantages; nonetheless, this issue is beyond the scope of this study. 
2.7.4 Ownership Specific Advantages when Host Corruption and Home 
Corruption is High 
As previously mentioned, the IB discipline has only until recently begun to analyse 
the internationalisation process of firms from developing countries, and this includes 
the now called ‘South-South’ FDI. South-South FDI refers to firms from developing 
countries investing in other developing countries. This issue has been popular with 
scholars due to the fact that these firms do not always follow traditional patterns of 
internationalisation. In this sense, current literature has not yet fully explained how 
high levels of corruption in the host country might affect a firm from a highly corrupt 
home country. 
According to Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008), firms from developing countries 
might not have traditional O-specific advantages such as managerial and technical 
know-how or they might lack financial strength, but these firms may possess specific 
knowledge of how to operate in other countries with a similar institutional 
environment. However, the extant literature has not yet fully explained if the same 
situation can be said specifically about corruption. However, based on existing 
literature it is plausible that firms from highly corrupt home countries might not face 
an increase in transaction costs when investing in other highly corrupt countries due 
to the knowledge they have developed regarding how to operate under such 
conditions. 
2.7.5 Overall effects of Host and Home Corruption on Ownership Specific 
Advantages 
While there have been several studies analysing how firms internationalise, there is 
still a lack of understanding regarding how firms react when corruption is present in 
foreign host countries. Dunning’s OLI paradigm argues that firms must develop O-







compete against indigenous firms. Such O-advantages can be seen in the form of 
asset advantages, or transaction cost minimizing advantages. Taking into account the 
corruption level of the home country as compared to that of the host country, this 
study argues that firms from home countries with lower levels of corruption than the 
host country might perceive the costs of operating in a highly corrupt host country 
very high. On the other hand, those firms based in highly corrupt home countries 
might not perceive the costs of operating in other highly corrupt country to be a 
deterrent for investment.  
This assertion can be made based on the O-specific advantages that different firms 
have developed and how they use them when operating abroad. While firms from 
countries with low levels of corruption, usually developed countries, have developed 
O-specific advantages in areas as managerial and technical know-how, and in the 
access to finance, they might perceive that operating in a highly corrupt foreign 
country might increase their transaction costs. On the other hand, firms from highly 
corrupt home countries might not have such know-how or such sound financials; 
they might have developed knowledge of how to operate in a highly corrupt home 
country and might have been able to use that knowledge when operating in a foreign 
country with a similar environment.  
2.8 Explaining How Combinations of Corruption levels (low vs. high) in the host 
and home countries Affect the Attraction of FDI Using Dunning’s OLI 
Paradigm (Internalisation Advantages) 
The internalisation theory, as developed by Buckley and Casson (1976) and Rugman 
(1981) is a theory that explains at the firm level why an MNE will exercise 
proprietary control over an O-specific advantage when operating overseas. 
According to the internalisation theory, all the O-advantages emerge from a 
transaction costs explanation, on which the public nature of knowledge is “remedied 
through the hierarchy of a firm overcoming this situation of market failure” (Rugman, 







Table 3: Internalisation Specific Advantages 
 
Dunning Factor ‘I’ 
A Corruption:  
Host Low Home 
Low  
B Corruption:  
Host Low Home 
High 
C Corruption:  
Host High Home Low 
D Corruption:  
Host High Home High 
Host Country         
Lower transaction costs 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm does not have it  
Increase in TC 
Firm does not have it  
Increase in TC 
Protection of property 
rights 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Increase in TC 
Firm does not have it 
but does not need it 
No effect in TC 
Firm does not have it but 
does not need it 
No effect in TC 
Protection of know-how 
Firm has it 
Decrease in TC 
Firm has it 
Increase in TC 
Firm does not have it 
but does not need it 
No effect on TC 
Firm does not have it but 
does not need it 
No effect in TC 
 
2.8.1 Internalisation Specific Advantages when Host Corruption and Home 
Corruption is Low 
Since the internalisation part of the OLI paradigm deals with the transaction costs of 
the firm when operating abroad, it is important to analyse how corruption affects the 
MNE’s decision of internalising an operation or transact it within the market. When 
an MNE from a home country with low corruption levels invests in foreign country 
with a similar corruption level, such firm does not face increased transaction costs 
due to this institutional factor abroad. Therefore, the firm can focus on lowering its 
transaction costs by internalising as many operations as possible without worrying 
too much about how to protect their proprietary rights or their know-how due to 
corruption.  
 
2.8.2 Internalisation Specific Advantages when Host Corruption is Low and 
Home Corruption is High 
As previously stated, firms headquartered in countries with low corruption levels 
investing in similar countries with low corruption do not face the need to incur in 
high costs to protect their proprietary assets due to corruption abroad. Also, the same 







in countries with low corruption levels. For that reason, table 3 presents that firms 
based in highly corrupt countries do not face high transaction costs due to corruption 
in home countries with low corruption. Nevertheless, other institutional aspects of 
the host country will affect internalisation costs, but those are beyond the scope of 
this study. 
2.8.3 Internalisation Specific Advantages when Host Corruption is High and 
Home Corruption is Low 
Studies focusing on how high corruption in the host country affects FDI have 
generally agreed that corruption deters FDI (Judge, et al., 2011). These conclusions 
have been reached through various lenses, but mainly because of the increase in real 
and perceived transaction costs that MNEs face when operating in locations 
considered as corrupt (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). These studies have analysed this issue 
studying how MNEs from developed countries react to the additional costs imposed 
by corruption abroad. 
Therefore, FDI from home countries with low corruption levels would decrease FDI 
to locations with higher corruption because of the high costs needed to internalise 
such firm’s operations abroad. These costs include transaction costs needed to 
protect a firm’s proprietary rights, which are responsible for a firm’s competitive 
advantage. Also, these costs include higher costs in protecting a company’s know-
how. This means that since firms with low levels of corruption at home do not need 
to take into account these costs when operating in a similar environment abroad, they 
need to do so when operating in a highly corrupt host country (Rodriguez, et al., 
2006). 
2.8.4 Internalisation Specific Advantages when Host Corruption and Home 
Corruption is High 
While the IB discipline has not yet fully explained the South-South FDI phenomenon, 
various studies have shed light to this process. One of the most intriguing aspects of 







able to develop many I-specific advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
Nevertheless, this claim has been made by comparing I-specific advantages of ‘South’ 
firms to their counterparts based in developed countries. However, this study argues 
that while it may be true that ‘South’ firms have not developed I-specific advantages 
when operating abroad, they might have developed others. These I-advantages for 
‘South-South’ FDI can be that these firms are used to operating in highly corrupt 
home countries, and therefore do not face an increase in their transaction costs when 
internalising operations in foreign countries with similar corruption levels. 
2.8.5 Overall effects of Host and Home corruption on Internalisation Specific 
Advantages 
The internalisation section of the OLI paradigm deals with an MNE’s mode of entry 
to a foreign market. In other words, the I specific advantages explain whether a 
foreign firm has developed knowledge of how to internalise their operations abroad 
as opposed to transact within the market. When analysing how high corruption in the 
host country several studies have argued that corruption deters FDI (Judge, et al., 
2011). However, this claim has been made without considering the corruption level 
of the home country as compared to the host country.  
This study argues that corruption will affect FDI depending on the corruption level of 
the home country as compared to the host country. Therefore, firms that do not have 
internalised knowledge of how to deal with corruption abroad due to the lack of 
corruption at home will see their transaction costs increase when operating in a 
highly corrupt home country. On the other hand, firms based in countries with high 
levels of corruption might have developed I-specific advantages that allow them to 










2.9 Explaining How Combinations of corruption levels (low vs. high) in the host 
and home countries Affect the Attraction of FDI Using Dunning’s OLI 
Paradigm (Location Advantages) 
The third element of the OLI Paradigm, location ‘L’ advantages, has received 
renewed attention because of recent changes in the geographical activities of MNEs 
and because of the linkages of the spatial aspects of the firm value-added activities to 
firm competitiveness (Dunning, 1988; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). This suggests that 
the criteria to select different locations might have different motivations depending 
on how a given firm assesses such locations. Therefore, assessing how corruption 
affects the allocation of FDI might follow the same rationale. In other words, how 
firms assess the risk associated with corruption in a foreign location might depend on 
how such firm has interacted with corruption at home. 
Table 4: Location Specific Advantages 
Dunning Factor ‘L’ 
A Corruption:  
Host Low Home 
Low  
B Corruption:  
Host Low Home 
High 
C Corruption:  
Host High Home 
Low 
D Corruption:  
Host High Home High 




? ? ? ? 
Human development index 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Increase on TC 
High Compared to  
home country 
Decrease on TC 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Exchange rate 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Increase on TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Decrease on TC 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Educational attainment 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Increase on TC 
High Compared to  
home country 
Decrease on TC 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Inflation 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
High Compared to  
home country 
Increase on TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Decrease on TC 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Quality of infrastructure 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Increase on TC 
High Compared to  
home country 
Decrease on TC 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Purchasing power of 
population 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Increase in TC 
High Compared to  
home country 
Decrease in TC 
Similar to home 
country 








Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
High Compared to  
home country 
Increase in TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Decrease in TC 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect in TC 
Corruption level  
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
High Compared to  
home country 
Increase in TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Decrease in TC 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect in TC 
Distance between corruption 
level  
of home and host country 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
High Compared to  
home country 
Increase in TC 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Decrease in TC 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect in TC 
Distance AND direction of 
distance between  
corruption level of home and 
host country 
Similar to home 
country 
No effect on TC 
GAP 
Low Compared to  
home country 
Decrease in TC 
GAP 
 
2.9.1 Location Specific Advantages when Host Corruption and Home 
Corruption is Low 
The IB discipline has agreed that the physical location of a foreign country can be 
considered as an L-specific advantage (Dunning, 1998). Nevertheless, this assertion 
has to be assessed on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. As a consequence, table 4 cannot 
provide a generalised prediction of how different locations affect the attraction of 
FDI when both the home and host countries have low levels of corruption. On the 
other hand, an analytical evaluation of how the different variables interact when 
analysing FDI from host countries with low corruption investing in similar host 
countries can be performed. 
When analysing FDI flows between non-corrupt countries, interesting aspects can be 
observed. Since countries with low levels of corruption are usually considered 
developed (Rodriguez, et al., 2006), it can be assumed that both, the home and host 
countries have similar levels of human development indices, exchange rates, 
inflation rates, infrastructure quality, bureaucracy, and corruption levels. Therefore, 









2.9.2 Location Specific Advantages when Host Corruption is Low and Home 
Corruption is High 
As previously stated, there has been a great deal of studies analysing how high 
corruption affects the attraction of FDI. Usually, those studies analysed FDI flows 
from home countries with low levels of corruption to host countries with high 
corruption. These studies conclude that corruption in the host country has a 
detrimental effect on the attraction of FDI. This claim is made based on the effect 
that the different levels of corruption between home and host countries have on 
specific transaction costs. These costs are presented in table 4 and are explained as 
follows. 
As explained in table 4, FDI from home countries with low levels of corruption 
(usually developed) is deterred by corruption abroad (usually developing countries). 
This is explained by the difference in different variables that increase the transaction 
costs of these activities. These variables see an increase in the transaction costs due 
to the differences in the human development indices, volatility of the exchange rate, 
low educational attainment, high inflation, low quality of infrastructure, low 
purchasing power of the population, high bureaucratic systems, and high corruption 
levels inherent to foreign locations that are considered developing. 
2.9.3 Location Specific Advantages when Host Corruption is High and Home 
Corruption is Low 
Table 4 also presents how variables of L specific advantages are affected when FDI 
flows from home countries with higher levels of corruption than the host countries. 
Since home countries with low levels of corruption are considered developed, 
variables such as the human development index, exchange rate, educational 
attainment, inflation, infrastructure, purchasing power of the population, and 
corruption levels have better levels than the home country. Therefore, these variables 







countries do face high transaction costs when conducting such activities, but that 
topic is beyond the scope of this research. 
2.9.4 Location Specific Advantages when Host Corruption and Home 
Corruption is High 
Even though there have been several studies analysing how corruption in a specific 
location affects FDI, studies dealing with FDI flows from developing countries to 
other developing countries are scarce. However, not all foreign investors perceive 
risk in the same manner (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Therefore, those firms based on 
highly corrupt home countries would not mind high corruption abroad, and thus, high 
corruption in the host country can be perceived as an L specific advantage for firms 
headquartered in countries with high levels of corruption. 
This study argues that high corruption in the host country can be considered an L-
specific advantage due to the low transaction costs faced by foreign investors used to 
operating under such conditions at home. The argument is supported by the argument 
presented in table 4. This table shows how home countries with high levels of 
corruption investing in similar foreign countries have the same levels of human 
development, exchange rates, educational attainment, inflation, infrastructure, 
bureaucracy, and corruption levels. However, this claim has not been fully 
researched by extant literature in the subject. 
2.9.5 Overall effects of Host and Home Corruption on Internalisation Specific 
Advantages 
In the present study, the effect of corruption on FDI was explained depending on the 
level of corruption of the home country as compared to that of the host country. 
Corruption creates Previous studies have argued that corruption, an important L-
specific advantage, discourages FDI. However, by separating home countries by their 
level of corruption as compared to the host country, this study argues that corruption 
does not impact on all foreign investors equally, because foreign investors do not 







with lower levels of corruption at home might be deterred by high corruption abroad 
due to the high transaction costs associated with corruption. However, those firms 
used to operating in highly corrupt home countries might not perceive an increase in 
the transaction costs of operating in a similar foreign country. 
2.10 Lack of a Theoretical Framework to Analyse how Corruption Affects the 
Attraction of FDI to a Highly Corrupt Host Location 
In order to analyse how corruption affects the attraction of FDI to a highly corrupt 
host location based on the levels of corruption of the home countries, an extension of 
the existing theoretical framework is needed. Corruption and its effects on FDI have 
been studied through various theoretical lenses; however, transaction cost and the 
OLI paradigm are considered the two most powerful approaches to study this issue 
(Driffield, et al., 2013). For this reason, this study proposes a reconciliation between 
the transaction cost theory and the OLI paradigm in order to understand how 
corruption affects the attraction of FDI to a highly corrupt foreign location. 
2.11 Reconciling the Transaction Cost Theory with the OLI Paradigm 
Dunning developed his Ownership-Location-Internalization paradigm (OLI) 
Building on the basic tenants of the TCT to analyse FDI activities. As stated before, 
unlike the pure TCT approach, the OLI paradigm embraces a wide variety of 
economic and social variables (Driffield, et al., 2013; Dunning, 1993); specifically, 
the economic costs caused by geographic distance including transport and tariffs and 
social costs arising from the unfamiliarity, relational and discriminatory hazards that 
foreign firms face in the host country (Eden & Miller, 2004; Zaheer, 1995). The 
economic-related costs have been reduced with the development of modern IT and 
globalization (Calhoun, 2002), and thus have been gradually downplayed in the IB 
literature. However, the social content of the costs has been developed in the form of 
the liability-of-foreignness (LoF) stream of research (e.g. Zaheer, 1995), and the 
hazards associated with LoF are viewed through the lens of institutional theory, 







Therefore, this study will utilise the basic premises of the TCT and the three 
advantages of the OLI paradigm to analyse the impact of corruption on FDI 
attractiveness.  
MNEs may use care when choosing host countries for their foreign subsidiaries 
because of greater uncertainty and difficulties, and the costs caused by uncertainties 
may put such MNEs in a disadvantage when competing with local firms. Ownership 
advantages enable MNEs to overcome liability of foreignness and newness; in 
particular, asset specificity, consisting of crucial part of ownership advantages in the 
paradigm (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992) that MNEs enjoy whilst local incumbents do 
not, can be exploited abroad to offset their disadvantages. Location-bound ownership 
advantages (OAs), defined as advantages that an MNE can exploit only in a 
particular location (Birkinshaw, et al., 1998) or set of locations (Anand & Delios, 
1997) cannot be transferred with ease and significant adaptation is needed if an MNE 
would like to utilise them in a different location (Stoian & Filippaios, 2008). 
However, non-location-bound OA can be transferred globally at a low marginal cost 
and can be used in foreign operation without a significant adaptation (Harzing, 2002).  
Analysed through the TCT lens, corruption in a host location can be seen in part as a 
non-location-bound OA (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Therefore, in a cost/benefit 
manner, depending on the causes of transaction costs and the knowledge of foreign 
investors about how to decrease them, corruption will deter foreign investors if the 
costs of the potential deal exceed its benefits (Rose-Ackerman, 2008). This might 
suggest that while some firms with no experience in dealing with corruption at home 
might be at a disadvantage when operating in highly corrupt foreign countries, the 
same might not be true for those firms familiar with operating in highly corrupt home 
countries. For MNEs with knowledge of dealing with corrupt environment at home, 
they may be encouraged by their location-bound-ownership advantages and willing 
to invest in similar locations. Thus, when analysing how corruption affects FDI, it is 







acquired at home, by some firms, and redeployed abroad without incurring in high 
costs.  
Another important factor in Dunning’s OLI paradigm is localisation ‘L’ advantages 
in the host country. MNEs locate foreign operations where operating costs can be 
minimised and firms internalise activities in overseas locations in order to lower 
costs derived from risk and uncertainty (Wang, et al., 2012). Acknowledging the lack 
of institutional content in the paradigm, Dunning (1998) enhanced the location 
dimension by including political risk, policies, regulations, cultural differences and 
exchange rates. MNEs contemplating FDI have to take the host country institutional 
characteristics into account, especially when analysing developing economies (Peng, 
et al., 2009), including the quality of institutions and the existence of corruption.  
The issue of corruption arises when bad policies and/or inefficient institutions are set 
in place and groups or individuals seek to get around them (Svensson, 2005). 
Consequently, corruption can be seen as an outcome that reflects a country’s legal, 
economic, cultural, and political institutions. Murphy et al., (1993) argue that corrupt 
behaviour can be institutionalised and thus becoming a normal practice in certain 
locations. Local levels of corruption are not only determined by the formal institution 
of the law and its enforcement, but also by informal social norms on what is 
acceptable. Research by Ufere et al., (2010) found the bribe-generating behaviour by 
entrepreneurs in Nigeria, which is governed by a well-embedded set of social norms, 
rules, routine, and power relations. Giving and taking a bribe may seem like a simple 
unskilled task, but a foreigner with limited knowledge of local laws and norms may 
risk exposure. The costs involved in establishing and maintaining legitimacy places 
MNEs at a competitive disadvantage (Eden & Miller, 2004). For example, local 
firms are most likely to reach corrupt deals with public officials, and have access to 
legislators; therefore they have an advantage over those without such access 







This study argues that host country corruption has different effects on investors 
depending on their home country corruption level. This means that home countries 
with lower levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host country will be affected by 
corruption in the host country, while home countries with higher corruption levels 
than the host location will not. For MNEs headquartered in countries with lower 
levels of corruption than the host region, host country corruption represents more risk 
and uncertainty (and thus higher costs). Thus, this study contends that the host 
country corruption may have a negative association with inward FDI. Therefore, the 
following research hypothesis is put forward:  
Hypothesis 1: Corruption distance will have a negative association with inward FDI 
when the home country has lower levels of corruption than the host country.  
However, the degree of risk and uncertainty associated with corruption varies by 
different firms. It is possible that foreign investors from highly corrupt countries use 
their knowledge of how to deal with corruption as a competitive advantage (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008) against those without such knowledge. Studies analysing 
MNEs from developing countries have found that the experience of operating in less 
than ideal institutional conditions can be considered to be a location-bound O-
advantage (Buckley, et al., 2007). Furthermore, these O-advantages enable firms 
from developing countries to operate more efficiently in other developing countries 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Therefore, drawing on their O-advantages certain 
firms might prefer to invest in foreign locations that resemble their home 
environment. Building on this premise, corruption can be seen as influencing L-
advantages as either a deterrent or encouragement to inward FDI. Acquiring skills in 
managing corruption may help to develop a certain competitive advantage (Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002) and thus, when they internationalise, they may not be deterred by 
host-country corruption, and they may take advantages of their knowledge about 







First, they may face lower costs of dealing with host country corruption than firms 
from developed countries, based on the causes of transaction costs. Second, they may 
even deliberately select countries with high levels of corruption (but lower than their 
own) due to the similarities in conditions with their country of origin (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006; Buckley, et al., 2007). Third, equipped with advanced knowledge in 
international business and a vast international network, MNEs may have developed 
sophisticated skills of bribery (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Those firms that have 
developed knowledge of how to cope with corruption at home might be able to 
minimise the risks and costs produced by corruption abroad. The experience of firms 
in their home markets does not equip them to deal with host country corruption. We 
therefore propose:  
Hypothesis 2a: Corruption distance will have no association, or a positive one, with 
inward FDI when the home country has higher levels of corruption than the host 
country  
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Figure 1: Model of costs of investing in a highly corrupt host country based on the level of corruption of the home 
country 
                  Home Country                                     Causes of Transaction Costs                                         FDI Allocation 
                      More Corrupt than Host 
                                      O-Advantages 
                         Knowledge how to deal with uncertainty  
                         in developing countries 
                         Knowledge how to operate in corrupt                        
                         locations 
                         Knowledge how to cope with opportunism 
  
            I-Advantages 
                         No knowledge to lower transaction cost 
                         No protection of property rights H1 
                         No protection of know-how                                                                                                                 Factors Impacting Costs                                      Degree of Impact 
                                      
                                         L-Advantages 
                         Similar corruption level than host 
                         Low corruption distance to host country 
                         Direction of corruption distance between  
                         home and host country                                                                                                                        Bounded Rationality   Asset Specificity 
                         Similar HDI than host country 
  Similar bureaucracy procedures 
                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         FDI 
                                        More Corrupt than Host 
                                         
                                       O-Advantages   
                         Lack of knowledge how to deal with 
                         uncertainty  in developing countries Opportunism Uncertainty 
                         Lack of knowledge how to operate in  
                         Corrupt locations 
                         Lack of knowledge how to cope with  
                         opportunism 
  
            I-Advantages  
                      Knowledge to lower transaction cost 
                      Protection of property rights                                                               H2 
                      Protection of know-how 
                                      
                                         L-Advantages 
                        Different corruption level than host 
                        Large corruption distance to host country 
                        Direction of corruption distance between home and  
                        host country                                                                                                                                                                         Causes of Transaction Costs 
                        Different HDI than host country 
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CHAPTER THREE:  OVERVIEW OF FDI FLOWS, FDI  DETERMINANTS, 
AND CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND GUATEMALA 
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter a description of FDI flows, its determinants, and corruption in Latin 
America will be provided. The rationale for analysing how corruption affects the 
attraction of FDI to Latin America is due to the size of the region and its substantial 
FDI inflows, which can provide a clear macroeconomic picture of the issue. Also, all 
the countries in Latin America are considered developing and thus with high levels 
of corruption (Except Chile that does not present high levels of corruption but is still 
considered developing). Therefore, this region represents an ideal location to study 
how corruption affects FDI depending on the corruption levels of the home countries. 
The second section of the chapter presents FDI flows and its determinants as well as 
corruption in Guatemala. The reasoning behind this decision is to analyse how 
corruption affects FDI at the firm-level. Also, since FDI decisions are made at the 
firm level it is paramount to understand hot corruption affects these decisions and 
Guatemala presents a suitable location to conduct this analysis due to the levels of 
FDI that the country receives and its high levels of corruption. 
3.2 Brief History of Foreign Direct Investment to Latin America 
The Latin American region has a long history of FDI dating back to the 19
th
 century 
(Behrman, 1974). Initially FDI was mainly export-oriented, and/or natural resource 
seeking by MNEs from developed countries. After WWII, however, FDI to the 
region shifted towards manufacturing for local consumption (Biglaiser & De Rouen, 
2006). Despite the attractiveness of the region, local governments had a detrimental 
influence on foreign businesses by exercising significant regulative powers and 
enforcing them randomly (Grosse, 1989). It was until the 1980s that local 
governments began opening the region to foreign MNEs fuelled by the need of local 







Figure 2: Map of Latin America 
 
 
Due to the prohibition of most imports and by restricting FDI to the region, many 
countries created an unattractive business climate to foreign MNEs. Exacerbating 
this problem, a shortage in foreign currency created an important crisis throughout 
the Latin American region. These policies led to closed economies that did not open 
to foreign commerce until the 1980s (Trevino, et al., 2004). Nevertheless, during the 
past three decades, several Latin American countries have employed market-oriented 
reforms hoping that such reforms would indicate their good intentions towards 
prospective foreign investors (Rodrik, 1996).These reforms included changes in tax 
laws, liberalisation of trade, privatisation, financial reform, and the removal of 
barriers to international capital flows (Biglaiser & De Rouen, 2006).  FDI flows to 
the area fluctuated up and down in the 1970s and 1980s with no distinctive tendency 
to rise. However, the region saw an explosion of inward FDI during the 1990s. The 
magnitude of this capital flows to the region has been well defined in literature; 
nevertheless, this phenomenon is still quite unusual for any region in the world 
(Rivera-Batiz, 2000). 
Latin America also experienced changes due to the deregulation it experienced 







several reforms that opened its doors to trade with foreign MNEs (The Ecomomist, 
2012). Furthermore, the region has also shown stability during the last five years. 
This stability is shown with the region’s GDP growth averaging 4%, also 
demonstrating its endurance in the face of the global crisis of 2008 when the markets 
bounced back rapidly (The Ecomomist, 2012). 
 
3.3 Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Latin America 
 
According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) (2010), due to the global recession, FDI flows to Latin America in 2009 
reached US$77.675 billion, which represents a 41% decline compared to an all-time 
high in 2008 as presented in Figure 2. In South America FDI decreased 40% to 
US$54.454 billion, being Brazil, Chile, and Colombia the region’s largest recipients. 
Mexico also felt the consequences of the global recession by receiving US$12.522 
billion, which is 47% less FDI than in 2008; however, this made Mexico the third 
largest recipient of FDI in the region after Brazil and Chile. Central America was 
also affected by the recession and FDI to the region shrank 33% compared to the 
previous year amounting to US$5.05 billion. In the region, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
and Panama were the largest recipients of FDI. Finally, the Caribbean also saw a 












Figure 3: Latin America and the Caribbean Inward and Outward FDI, 1992-2009 in 
billions of US$ 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2010 
 
Even though FDI flows to the region decreased drastically in 2009 from the previous 
year, FDI levels to the region were the fifth highest in history (2010). In fact, FDI 
flows to the region have trended upwards during the past two decades, and the post-
crisis recovery was remarkable (2012). This was achieved by steady structural 
characteristics of this kind of investment in the region, comprised mainly of 
commodities and low and medium-low technology manufacturing with investment in 
asset seeking investment that generate research and development (R&D) almost 
inexistent (ECLAC, 2010). This trend means that the region did not suffer from the 
global recession as badly as other regions because firms tend to cut expenses in R&D 
activities first when facing financial problems. However, even though the region 
benefited by the structure of FDI received, Latin America has a strong potential to 
attract more FDI to its technology sector in order to transition to more technological 







3.3.1 Trends and Characteristics of Inward FDI flows to Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
The global financial crisis overturned the rising trend of inward FDI flows to the 
Latin American region. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (2013), even though the region saw a sharp decline in FDI 
inflows in 2009, the average flows were above annual averages for the decade. 
Furthermore, FDI received in the region were the fifth highest ever received and this 
is excluding the main financial centres in Latin America. This section will analyse 
FDI inflows into the region. 
 
Figure 4: Latin America and the Caribbean Inward FDI by sub-region, 1992-2009 in 
billions of US$ 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2010 
 
As presented in Figure 3, the decrease on FDI to Latin America is evident in every 
sub-region despite the different sectors and specialisations that each of these sub-
regions possess. In fact, FDI inflows to South America reached US$54.454 billion in 







received US$23.211 billion in the same year, seeing a decrease of 43% in FDI 
inflows compared to 2008 (ECLAC, 2010). The decrease in FDI to the region can be 
explained by (a) problems in obtaining access to credit and the high levels of 
uncertainty at the time; (b) the abrupt decrease in commodity prices, which caused a 
reduction in natural resource-seeking FDI; (c) the North American recession; and (d) 
the recession in many other world’s countries (ECLAC, 2010). Even though FDI 
flows to South America dropped in 2009 all this sub-region, the sub-region has been 
steadily been one of the most important recipients of FDI worldwide during the past 
three decades. Figure 4 presents the distribution of inward FDI to Latin America 
from 1999 to 2009. 
Figure 5: Latin America and the Caribbean: Sectoral Distribution of FDI, 1999-2009  
               (Percentages) 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2010 
 
In South America, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia have been the largest recipients of 
FDI, even though in 2009 these countries saw a deep decline in FDI inflows. 







compared to 2008. Also, UNCTAD (2013) says that the region receives most of its 
FDI in the primary and services sectors and due to the global recession, the region’s 
economy contracted from a 5.1% growth in 2008, to a-0.2% decrease the following 
year. This contraction in the country’s economy deterred market seeking FDI in 
2009. Mexico and Central America have also been important recipients of FDI in the 
Latin American region. The main investor in this sub-region is the United States, and 
for that reason the recession that hit the North American giant also affected these 
Latin American countries. Nonetheless, similarly to the South American Sub-region, 
Central America has seen a steady increase in FDI flows in the past three decades 
and even though this rise was stopped in 2009, the region still receives considerable 
amounts of FDI especially in export platforms. Nevertheless, according to the 
UNCTAD (2013), the amounts of FDI received by the region are still extremely high 
compared to what the region has historically attracted and compared to other regions 
in the world. Figure 5 presents the country of origin of FDI to the region from 1998 
to 2009. 
 
Figure 6: Latin America and the Caribbean: Origin of FDI, 1998-2009  
 




















3.4 Determinants of FDI to Latin America 
Foreign direct investment has aided in a significant manner the economic 
development of Latin America since the early 1990s because capital in this region is 
limited (Blanco, 2012). Despite some criticism literature on FDI has overwhelmingly 
demonstrated that FDI has positive effects on host countries (Tan & Meyer, 2011) 
especially in Latin America (Wooster & Diebel, 2010). Authors researching the 
effects of FDI in Latin America have stated that this investment helps to growth on 
productivity (Blonigen & Wang, 2005) and thus, might help developing countries to 
begin their road to development. Therefore, scholars have devoted great efforts to 
understanding the determinants of FDI to Latin America and a brief overview will be 
provided in this study. 
As previously mentioned the OLI paradigm is the most known approach utilised to 
study cross-sectional patterns of FDI (Fatehi & Englis, 2012). In summary, the OLI 
paradigm argues that a firm must possess specific or impalpable advantages over 
other firms operating in foreign markets. Such firm can choose to maximise those 
benefits provided by their ownership advantages by allowing another company 
produce its goods or services in foreign markets via licensing. Nonetheless, a firm 
may desire to invest abroad with its own subsidiary, as opposed to licensing, it 
monitoring is difficult and transaction costs are high (Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1993). 
Based on this rationale, the OLI paradigm explains that the decision of investment 
abroad occurs before the decision of where to locate such investment (Graham & 
Krugman, 1995). 
Along these lines, the OLI paradigm the motivations for an MNE to establish 
operations in a particular location through FDI depend on the L-specific advantages, 
or in other words, this decision depends on location-specific conditions of the host 
country. Consequently, the macroeconomic conditions of a location can influence 
FDI choices (Asiedu, 2002; Chakrabarti, 2001). Studies for the particular case of 







Such studies, both empirical and theoretical, on FDI determinants to the region 
suggest that some of the economic variables determining location-specific reasons 
include market attractiveness, inflation rate, unemployment rate, quality of 
infrastructure, education levels of population (Trevino, et al., 2002; Trevino, et al., 
2002; Arbelaez & Ruiz, 2013). In addition to economic determinants for FDI in the 
region studies have identified institutional factors such as the development index, 
rule of law, economic freedom, bureaucracy, and most importantly for this study, 
corruption (Trevino, et al., 2004; Trevino, et al., 2008; Arbelaez & Ruiz, 2013). 
3.5 Corruption in Latin America 
Corruption is increasingly seen as one of the most significant threats that Latin 
America is currently facing (Selingson, 2006). In fact, Weyland (1998) says that 
democracies in the Latin American region are threatened by a staggering growth in 
corruption that has arisen since the dictators of the past left power. Weyland (1998), 
argues that corruption has increased under the new democratic states in Latin 
America due to the dispersion of power that was concentrated in the hands of a few 
during the dictatorships; the liberal reforms that have opened many areas of the local 
economies to bribery; and the prominent role that expensive TV ads play in electing 
candidates to public office who to perpetuate their power seek illegal forms of 
economic support to afford such TV exposure.  
According to Selingson (2006), corruption is increasing in Latin America because 
the people who are in charge of controlling it are in fact benefiting from corrupt 
deals. In fact, in his study, Selingson (2006) finds that throughout Latin America 
members of the government elite, the judiciary system, and the bureaucracy are 
perceived to be involved in corrupt acts in the whole region. Furthermore, the author 
states that corruption corrodes trust and confidence in the political system of the 
Latin American countries he studied. However, this author did not provide an answer 
of whether or not corruption affected the attraction of FDI to the region and if it did 







3.5.1 Market Attractiveness 
The role of market attractiveness refers to the preconception that MNEs seek foreign 
markets that offer a strong potential for growth (Eaton & Tamura, 1994). According 
to Grosse and Trevino (1996), FDI theory proposes that FDI will go primarily to 
markets that are considered large enough to provide the economies of scale required 
for production. This statement explains why FDI goes primarily to developed 
countries since most FDI has been historically market seeking (Grosse & Trevino, 
1996). However, when testing determinants for FDI into Latin America, Trevino et 
al., (2002) found that host country GDP was a significant predictor of FDI in the 
region. Moreover, a study conducted by UNCTAD found that market size was the 
main determinant of FDI into the region (UNCTAD, 1994). 
3.5.2 Inflation Rate  
The currency value of a country might be weakened by monetary policies or by 
economic instability. Currency devaluation might be the result of such policy 
variations and foreign investors should cover the costs to avoid transaction losses 
when the host country currencies devaluate. Hence, ceteris paribus a stable real 
exchange rate is preferred by foreign investors to minimise exchange rate risks 
inherent to investing in a foreign location (Ciccarelli & Mojon, 2010). Furthermore, 
economies experiencing high rates of inflation tend to undermine sales and therefore, 
market-seeking MNEs would avoid a foreign location experiencing high inflation 
(Kahai, 2004). Also, high rates of inflation can be a signal of economic uncertainty 
and of the host government’s lack of capacity to impose an adequate monetary policy 
(Arbelaez & Ruiz, 2013). Therefore, scholars have argued that high inflation might 
have negative effects on the attraction of FDI (Asiedu, 2002). Moreover, high 
inflation rates have been presented as deterrents of FDI flows to Latin America 








3.5.3 Unemployment Rate  
Multinationals interested in establishing operations abroad should have in mind the 
characteristics of the local workforce they need to employ in the proposed area. 
However, the association between unemployment rate and FDI inflows to a region is 
mixed According to Billington (1999), one of the most important variables 
explaining the attraction of FDI is the availability of labour. In order to test his 
proposition, Billington (1999) argues that the greater unemployment rate of a host 
location, the greater the FDI inflows since the foreign MNE can have a greater pool 
of possible employees. Also, the unemployment levels will make people have a 
higher value on their existing employment or any potential future job. On the other 
hand, Ray (1989), the unemployment rate in a foreign location decreases the degree 
of FDI. Pearson et al., (2012) also argue that high unemployment rates are related to 
socio-economic issues such as high crime rates that might deter FDI since MNEs 
may not be allured to having a lasting interest in such an environment. Despite the 
debate of whether or not the unemployment rate encourages or discourages FDI, its 
importance as an MNE determinant is rarely disputed in current literature, especially 
in Latin America (Tsai, 1994; Tuman & Emmert, 2004; Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 
2003).  
3.5.4 Quality of Infrastructure 
Researchers have used the number of fixed telephone lines and mobile telephones 
per 1000 people in a location as a proxy for the quality of infrastructure of a country 
(Kahai, 2011). The rationale explained for using the number of telephones used in a 
location to represent the quality of infrastructure is because countries with an 
adequate telecommunications infrastructure usually have similar quality in other 
aspects such as roads, and the Internet. Infrastructure, in this sense, covers several 
dimensions of physical assets such as roads, sea ports, and telecommunications, to 
institutional ones, such as accounting and legal services (Kahai, 2011). However, the 







Instead of using the number of telephone lines per 1000 people in Guatemala this 
study uses an innovative method to account for infrastructure, which is the number of 
internet users. The rationale for taking the number of internet users as a proxy for 
infrastructure obeys to the fact that nowadays communications via internet are 
perceived as more important than traditional telephone ones (Choi, 2003). 
Furthermore, in Latin America the usage of internet lags most regions in the world, 
which might deter FDI to the region. According to Katz (2009) states that in 2008 the 
average internet usage in Latin America averaged only 5.5% of the population while 
in the industrialised world it surpassed 25%. Therefore, the number of internet users 
may portray a more accurate snapshot of the infrastructure quality of the Latin 
American region.  
3.5.5 Education Levels  
Education is a central element of a country's institutional environment since it offers 
socialising practises that prepare individuals to be a part of a society (Meyer, 1977; 
Trevino, et al., 2008). Education is also an important aspect that central in the 
transmission of societal norms and beliefs from generation to generation (Turner, 
1997). According to Trevino, et al., (2008), educational levels in a location have two 
main impacts on FDI inflows: to act as a proxy for quality labour because foreign 
investors should be interested in establishing operations in locations with available 
qualified human resources (as long as they are not too costly); and MNEs are also 
attracted to locations with high levels of education since their operations often need 
more skilled labour than the rest of the economy. 
While analysing the determinants of FDI to Latin America educational attainment 
proved to be an important factor (Trevino, et al., 2008). Furthermore, Boresztein, et 
al., (1998) argues that developing countries are not attractive solely on the basis of 
low cost labour, but instead, they needed a minimum educational level of their 
human capital to attract inward FDI. In fact, Latin American countries that offer high 







For example, the decision of Intel to set up a plant in Costa Rica was partially 
motivated by the high levels of skilled labour available in the country (Jensen, 2006). 
3.5.6 Human Development Index 
Scholars have long argued that measuring the attractiveness of a foreign location 
based solely on GDP does not capture the whole picture of such place. Instead, it has 
been claimed that focusing solely on GDP can come at the expense of other 
important factors that are needed to evaluate the attractiveness of a possible 
investment location (Stiglitz, 2006). Therefore, studies have used the United Nations 
Human Development Index (HDI) to capture the value of an array of factors that 
have been found to attract FDI (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). This index measures 
not only GDP, population, and literacy, but also life expectancy at birth, all of which 
have been tested to be determinants of FDI in developing countries (Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2003).  
3.5.7 Rule of Law  
Besides a strong host economy, multinationals require a stable environment on which 
to conduct operations outside their home country. However, several developing 
countries lack the development of regulatory institutions that protect the interests of 
foreign multinationals (Meyer, 2001), which results in ambiguity of the rules to 
follow (Roy & Oliver, 2009) and thus, decreasing FDI inflows. Furthermore, 
underdeveloped institutions do not provide strong enough bases for fostering 
financial, organisational and technological resources that MNEs need to compete in 
foreign markets (Hitt, et al., 2000). Therefore, MNEs prefer to invest in those 
countries where their basic rights are protected by an adequate rule of law. 
3.5.8 Economic Freedom  
Even though researchers agree that variables such as market size and educational 







seldom been tested. However, according to Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), the 
economic freedom variable is of utmost importance when researching FDI to Latin 
America. Furthermore, Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) found that the Economic 
Freedom Index is a significant predictor of FDI to Latin America. This result is based 
on the idea that the more economic freedom a country enjoys the better institutional 
framework it offers foreign investors. 
3.5.9 Bureaucracy 
According to Globerman and Shapiro (2003), government effectiveness (the 
measurement of time spent dealing with red tape and bureaucracy) in a foreign 
location is one of the most important factors when studying FDI inflows, especially 
when the host country or countries is considered developing. This can be explained 
because the time spent dealing with bureaucratic procedures in a foreign location 
delays the expected utility that potential profits can provide (Baniak, et al., 2005). 
Therefore, Bénassy-Quéré, et al. (2007) argue that the time spent dealing with 
bureaucratic procedures in a foreign location has a strong negative influence on FDI 
flows and it might serve as an incentive to MNEs to engage in corrupt deals to 
circumvent such bureaucratic procedures. 
3.6 Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Guatemala 
Guatemala, in its modern history, has been open to foreign investment since the late 
19
th
 century. FDI to Guatemala has been devoted to most economic sectors and has 
aided the development of the country. Nonetheless, an internal conflict that spanned 
for 36 years stalled foreign investment until its resolution in 1996, when Peace 
Accords were signed. Thereafter, relative political stability, a strong commitment to 
market-oriented policies, and a stable macroeconomic environment have aided an 
increase of FDI flows until nowadays (UNCTAD, 2011). Guatemala has seen an 
increase in FDI flows in the recent past. This is explained by the size of the 







South America and North America. Nevertheless, the country still underperforms in 
attracting FDI compared to other developing countries in the Latin American region. 
One of the main reasons for this underperformance in Guatemala is the rampant 
corruption that the country has suffered since the Peace Accords were signed in 1996 
(Heritage Foundation, 2013). 
 





Guatemala’s economy began its road to industrialisation in the 1960s when for the 
first time it attracted a significant amount of FDI in the manufacturing sector. This 
new attractiveness of the country for foreign investors was spurred due to the 
Industrial Promotion Law of 1959 and the creation of the American Economic 
Market (CACM) in 1960. As a consequence, FDI flows increased from US$11.2 







industrial sector saw an annual growth of 8.1%, outperforming GDP growth 
(UNCTAD, 2011). However, the economic development happened while the country 
suffered political and social instability and in 1960 junior military officers lead a 
civil war that lasted for 36 years. 
After the Peace Accords were signed in 1996 Guatemala has seen a recovery in its 
economy. Continual economic and political stability and modest GDP growth rates 
averaging 3.9% annually (compared to 4.4% for Central America), have generated an 
increase in FDI flows since 1997 (Figure 6) (UNCTAD, 2011). In fact, Guatemala 
has received the largest amounts of FDI in its history during the last decade. The 
privatisation of several public companies in the electricity generation and 
telecommunications is the main factor for this increase in foreign investment. 
However, other sectors have also seen an increase in foreign investment flows. 
Privatisations aside, FDI flows in the food and beverages, textiles, retail and mining 
have lead the attraction of FDI to the country (Banguat, 2012). 
 
Figure 8: FDI flows to Guatemala from 1970 to 2009 (Millions of US Dollars) 
 







Even though Guatemala presents clear potential for attracting higher levels of FDI 
inflows, several issues need to be addressed to transform investment into 
development. These issues include severe income inequalities since Guatemala is 
ranked within the top 20 countries with most unequal income distribution in the 
world (UNDP, 2009). High levels of crime and insecurity also undermine 
Guatemala’s attractiveness to foreign businesses. According to the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) (2009), both criminality levels and poverty can be 
traced back to the high levels of poverty of the country. Finally, According to 
Transparency International (2011), Guatemala’s inequality, poverty, and criminality 
problems have the same root, corruption. Transparency International ranks 
Guatemala in 113
th
 place out of 176, which means that this issue should be tackled to 
see an improvement in the overall economic and social performance of the country. 
3.6.1 Trends and Characteristics of Inward FDI flows to Guatemala 
Even though the origin of FDI flows to Guatemala has diversified lately, the United 
States of America is still by far the largest investor in the country. According to the 
Guatemalan Central Bank (2012), in average 30% of FDI inflows to Guatemala 
comes from the United States. Companies from the United States operate in several 
sectors in Guatemala, from retail, agriculture, to consumer goods; American firms 
have operations in most major sectors of the Guatemalan economy (Figure 7). On the 
other hand, investment from other countries is not as diversified. Mexican FDI 
concentrates primarily in the food and beverages and telecommunications industries. 
Spanish FDI is concentrated in telecommunications and tourism while Canadian FDI 










Figure 9: Guatemala: Country of Origin of FDI, 2006-2009 
 
Source: Central Bank of Guatemala (2012) 
 
Notwithstanding the investment received in Guatemala due to privatisation, there is a 
strong presence of FDI in the manufacturing, commerce and finance sectors (Figure 
8). In the manufacturing sector, food and beverages is the largest component of FDI 
in Guatemala with 19% in the period of 2006 to 2009. During the same period the 
finance and commerce sector has received 29% of the total amount of FDI to the 
country (Banguat, 2012). However, the agricultural and mining sectors have not 





















Figure 10: Guatemala: Sector of FDI, 2006-2009 
 
Source: Central Bank of Guatemala (2012) 
 
3.6.2 Corruption in Guatemala 
States transitioning after an internal conflict usually have very weak institutions and 
a rising influx of foreign investment. These two circumstances, according to Rose-
Ackerman (2008), provide incentives to local officials to make corrupt deals for their 
personal gain. This can be explained because the conflict might have nurtured a 
culture of impunity and secrecy on which illegal acts are fairly easy to cover. 
Furthermore, the end of such conflict might not encourage the enactment of a 
transparent government with accountability for its actions, especially if those who 
benefitted financially from the conflict remain in power. Hence, even though 
incentives to participate in corrupt deals exist everywhere, the frequency and 
magnitude of corruption may be especially elevated in post-conflict countries (Rose-
Ackerman, 2008), which is the case of Guatemala. 
Even though Guatemala’s constitution clearly states that corruption is illegal, 
corruption is rampant in the country (Transparency International, 2011). Moreover, 
even though Guatemala has held democratic elections since 1986, most political 






















(Peacock & Beltrán, 2003). Hence, the legislative, executive, and bureaucratic 
sectors of the country are believed to be influenced by the same sectors despite of 
which political party is in power. 
Unsurprisingly, a considerable number of Guatemalans claim to not trust their 
politicians and central authorities in all three main areas of the government: The 
political elite, bureaucrats, and members of the judicial system. This has become 
evident in the results of a study conducted by Americas Barometer on which 
Guatemala was ranked as the country with third-lowest level of belief in its public 
institutions out of 26 countries in the Americas (Migliorisi & Prabhu, 2011). 
Furthermore, according to Migliorisi and Prabhu (2011), both local and foreign 
investors take advantage of the rampant corruption in Guatemala to advance their 
own interests. However, during the extensive literature review performed for this 
study, no literature on how corruption affected the attraction of FDI in Guatemala 
was found.   
Although, as mentioned before, no study linking how corruption affects the attraction 
of FDI was found in relevant literature, the World Bank published a significant study 
of how widespread corruption is in Guatemala. According to the World Bank (2005), 
foreign and local investors in Guatemala perceive the government elite to be highly 
corrupt. In fact, all the respondents in this study expressed that the business climate 
in Guatemala is dominated by illegal payments to members of the government elite 
and bribes are a common practice amongst them. Nevertheless, the study did not 
present results of to what extent different investors perceived the Guatemalan 
government elite as corrupt or which investors were more affected by corruption in 
this segment of the Guatemalan government. 
When discussing about corruption in the judiciary system in Guatemala, respondents 
to the World Bank’s Transparency, Corruption, and Governability study also 
expressed high levels of corruption in this branch of the government (World Bank, 







in the judiciary system is rampant in Guatemala. The rationale for these expressions 
is based on the lack of independence that members of the judiciary system have in 
the country (even though this branch of the government should be totally 
independent) and how members of other branches of the government and of the 
private sector can influence judicial decisions.  
The World Bank’s report also mentions that investors in Guatemala perceived high 
levels of corruption in the Guatemalan bureaucratic sector (World Bank, 2005). The 
report says that two thirds of investors in Guatemala perceive high levels of 
corruption in the bureaucratic sector and that more than one third of bureaucrats 
reported to have witnessed corrupt acts in their organisations. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned before, The World Bank report does not make a difference regarding 
whether or not foreign investors are more or less affected by corruption in Guatemala 
based on the corruption levels of their home countries. 
3.6.3 Dimensions of Corruption in Guatemala 
Reports on how corruption affects FDI in Guatemala are virtually inexistent, and the 
same situation is found when analysing the extent on which pervasiveness and 
arbitrariness of corruption affect FDI in the country. Furthermore, even though 
scholarly research has been performed on these two dimensions of corruption, an 
analysis at the firm level is needed to understand how these dimensions affect the 
process of allocating FDI to a foreign location.  
As mentioned before, arbitrary corruption is described as the level of uncertainty 
created by corruption (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). In this sense, foreign investors 
might be deterred by the lack of knowledge of how to cope with corruption rather 
than the level of corruption itself. On the other hand, pervasive corruption is 
classified as the likeliness of a foreign investor to encounter corruption in a foreign 
location. Pervasive corruption, in this sense, pervasive corruption may affect how a 







location (Doh, et al., 2003). Nevertheless, according to the World Bank’s 
Transparency, Corruption, and Governability study  investors in Guatemala have a 
general idea of how the dimensions of corruption (World Bank, 2005). However, this 
study did not actually capture how the dimensions of corruption affected the 
investment decision-making process or if different investors were affected in a 
different manner. 
3.7 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter provided a description of FDI flows to Latin America and to Guatemala. 
The chapter also presented scholarly literature dealing with the determinants of FDI 
to the Latin American region and Guatemala as well as an account of how corruption 
affects the area. Latin America is an extremely important receptor of FDI; however, 
it also presents astonishing amounts of corruption. Therefore, understanding how 
corruption affects FDI flows to the region would help to combat this problem. The 
chapter also presents a more detailed analysis of how corruption affects a country 
and for this purpose, Guatemala was chosen due to its high levels of corruption and 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
Methodology is concerned to the manner on which a researcher approaches a 
problem. Research methods are the procedures and rules that can be seen as tools or 
means to solve problems. Research methods play a number of roles such as: the 
reasoning to reach a solution, explain how the solutions are going to be achieved, and 
the examination and evaluation of the findings of a given study (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 
2005).  
In order to answer the research questions: a) How does corruption distance between 
home and host country affect the attraction of FDI to emerging markets? And b) 
Why are some foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high levels of 
host country corruption when investing abroad? This study draws on two different 
approaches namely a macroeconomic and a firm level analysis. The macroeconomic 
analysis’s purpose is to establish whether or not the distance and its sign between the 
corruption levels of two sets of foreign investors (investors with either higher or 
lower corruption levels than the host location) have an effect when investing in a 
highly corrupt area. The second analysis focuses on how corruption affects the 
attraction of FDI and operations at a highly corrupt host country location. To do so, a 
firm level analysis is utilised. 
4.2 Mixed Methods to Analyse how Corruption Distance and its Effect on FDI 
4.2.1 Mixed Methods Approach 
Early efforts to enrich methodological pluralism were proposed by scholars in the 
social sciences with quantitative backgrounds (Webb, et al., 1966). These efforts 
were proposed based on the validity problems deriving from a single method or 







research methodologies. However, methods triangulation is considered as the most 
popular methodology in business studies (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela, 2006). 
Triangulation is not the only term that has been used to describe the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Terms such as multi-method, methodological 
mix, integrated mix, multiple methods, and combined methods have been used in 
different studies (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the usage of these methods has been inconsistent, which has generated 
criticism (Erzberger & Kelle, 2003). For this reason, and to maintain consistency 
with mainstream IB literature, this study will use the term mixed methods as its 
research methodology. In line with Creswell et al., (2003, p. 212) this research 
defines mixed methods as “one that combines qualitative data collection and/or 
analysis with quantitative data collection and/or analysis” in a single study.  
To make the definition used in this study more explicit, few points should be 
clarified. Hurmerinta-Peltomäki and Nummela (2006) say that there are 13 different 
options of mixed methods. However, for this study a mixed methodology strategy a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative elements in the data collection and 
analysis. In addition, Creswell et al., (2003) say that from a methodological point of 
view, four possible phases can be identified: initiation, before the data collection; 
implementation, when the data is collected; integration, when the data is analysed; 
and interpretation, when conclusions are drawn. For this section of the study, a 
qualitative approach in the form of interviews will be used. After the interviews were 
conducted, the information gathered was used to construct a questionnaire to be 
analysed quantitatively. 
The first section of this study attempts to answer the research question: How does 
corruption distance between home and host country affect the attraction of FDI to 
emerging markets? To do so, corruption itself is not used as a deterrent or encourager 
of FDI. Instead, this section of the study argues that it is the distance between 







Furthermore, this section of the study argues that when investing in a highly corrupt 
host region, those firms located in home countries with a higher corruption level than 
the host countries are not affected by corruption distance, since they are familiar with 
operating in a highly corrupt location. On the other hand, firms located in countries 
with lower levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host country will be affected by 
the distance in corruption levels between the host and home country. In order to carry 
this section of the research, a macroeconomic approach is needed to determine 
whether or not corruption distance has an impact on FDI. 
The second section of the study deals with answering the research question: Why are 
some foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high levels of host country 
corruption when investing abroad? To answer the question, a firm-level analysis is 
performed. In this section, semi-structured interviews were used to design a 
questionnaire that required decision-makers to answer how their FDI allocation was 
affected by high levels of corruption in a foreign location. This section also analysed 
how corruption affected foreign operations once the decision to invest had been 
made. 
In order to answer both questions a mixed methodology was used. The first section 
of the study utilised quantitative methods to answer the how question, while the why 
question needed a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods. 
4.3 Quantitative Research Paradigm 
As mentioned, the macroeconomic section and part of the second section of this 
research utilises quantitative methods, which rely on numbers. This kind of research 
is a well-established method in social research, especially when utilised to provide a 
logical structure to problems to which researchers address with the help of existing 
theory (Fielding, 2007). A numbers-based research area, quantitative research 
statistically measures several business indices and has the advantage of being 







ability to analyse large amounts of data and to translate such data into easily 
quantifiable graphs and charts (Byrman, 1992).  
4.3.1 Nature of the Quantitative Paradigm 
According to Sale et al., (2002), the quantitative paradigm is based in positivism. 
This assertion is based on the fact that science is defined by empirical research and 
all phenomena can be condensed to empirical indicators that represent the truth. The 
positivism paradigm is based on the ideas proposed by French philosopher August 
Comte who argued that observation and reason are the means of understanding 
human behaviour (Dash, 2005). According to Comte, true knowledge is developed 
by the experience of the senses and can be obtained by experimenting and 
observations (Dash, 2005). However, positivism cannot be fully applied in this 
research since the decision to allocate FDI rely 
4.4 Qualitative Research Paradigm 
The second section of this research also relies on interviews, which is part of the 
qualitative paradigm. Qualitative paradigm argues that all quantification is limited in 
nature and therefore only a small portion of any reality can be seen in a quantitative 
manner and thus, losing important aspects of the whole phenomenon. The aim of this 
section of the study is to understand how corruption affects the attraction of FDI to a 
highly corrupt location.  Therefore, answering whether or not foreign investors based 
in countries with higher or lower levels of corruption than the host country are 
affected by high corruption in the host country is only one part of the answer and to 
understand why they are affected is imperative. Therefore, to provide a more holistic 
picture of the issue a qualitative analysis that provides a contextual answer based on 









4.4.1 Nature of the Qualitative Paradigm 
The aim of the second section of this study is to understand how corruption affects 
the attraction of FDI to a highly corrupt host location at the firm level in a qualitative 
manner. At the core or the qualitative paradigm lays the assumption that the best 
approach to understand a phenomenon is to study its context (Krauss, 2005). To do 
so, knowledge will be created from the responses by foreign investors about how 
high corruption in the host country affects their decision-making process of 
allocating FDI. Therefore, this part of the study aims to understand the reality that 
the participants construct. Furthermore, the research question cannot be fully 
answered by only observing the interaction of decision-makers with their 
environment, but by making reference to the meaning that such interactions represent 
to the individual participants and the effects on their decisions. Since the goal of this 
part of the study is to understand the subjective motives on individual decision-
maker behaviour, the realist strand is more appropriate to answer the research 
question at a firm level. 
4.5 Integrating the Quantitative and Qualitative Paradigms 
The quantitative and qualitative paradigms are two different stances that help 
researchers study different phenomena. However, the two approaches can be 
combined because they have the same goal of understanding the world in which we 
live (Haase & Myers, 1988). Furthermore, King, et al., (1994) state that both the 
qualitative and quantitative research share the same logic, and that the same rules of 
inference apply to both. However, detractors argue that the two paradigms study 
different aspects of certain phenomena and therefore cannot be used to validate one 
another (Sale, et al., 2002). For that reason, this study utilises both paradigms to 
complement the answers of how corruption affects FDI, instead of using each 









The aim of the study is to understand the reality on which firms investing abroad are 
affected by high levels of corruption in the host country. Even though perceptions 
and interpretations are different they might be shared if they are grounded on a 
common experience (Maxwell, 2012). Furthermore, this research assumes the 
existence of elements of the social world that exists regardless of the current state of 
knowledge regarding corruption and its effect on FDI.  This can be interpreted as 
realism. Realism claims that reality exists in its own and that contributes to the 
respondents’ denotation of their environment. Furthermore, the realist strand 
searches the effects or limitations on individual choices by wider social forces or 
structures, which will be used in this study based on the limitations on the 
respondents’ answers on how corruption affected their rationale to invest in a highly 
corrupt foreign location. 
4.5.2 Epistemology 
Philosophically speaking, there are several different views and approaches to realism 
(Hunt, 2003). However, for this section of the study a critical realism approach will 
be used. One of the most potent arguments in favour of the critical realism approach 
is that it is performative and thus uses casual language and actions to describe a 
reality  (Easton, 2010). The critical realist approach argues that we know the world 
by means of language; however, language does not define the totality of the world 
(Mutch, 1999). This echoes the need of this research to analyse how corruption in the 
host country affects managers’ decision-making process, but also their current 
practices regarding this issue in a foreign location.  
4.6 Macroeconomic Analysis of how Corruption affects FDI to Latin America 
Corruption is rooted in Latin America and it has a deep effect on the region (Ferro, 
2004). According to Raul Ferro, director of America Economia, the deficit, 







are sectors taking advantage of those conditions. Furthermore, it has been asserted 
that corruption is the root of all problems in the region (Salvia, 2003). 
In this study, corruption distance and how it affects the attraction of FDI in Latin 
American countries will be analysed. To do so, home countries will be divided into 
countries with higher or lower corruption levels than the host countries. Also, in 
order to obtain a better picture of corruption and its effects on FDI the distance in the 
levels of corruption of host and home countries will be considered.  
To test the two hypotheses, FDI inflows to 12 Latin American countries will be 
analysed from 2006 to 2009
1
: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. Although the 
number of host countries is limited, the result can provide a clear picture of how 
corruption distance affects inward FDI to Latin America.  
Home countries are defined as either more or less corrupt than host countries. By 
doing so, we can also observe how FDI is affected by a region that comprises only 
developing countries characterised by high levels of corruption, according to 
Transparency International (Transparency International, 2010). The effects of 
corruption can be studied according to whether or not foreign investors are familiar 
to dealing with corruption in their home countries. Also, we can test if the distance 
between corruption levels affects countries with high corruption levels as well as 
those with lower corruption levels at home. 
4.7 Variables and Measurements 
In order to test the hypotheses, FDI inflows to Latin America from 2006 to 2009 
were used as the dependent variable. These flows were obtained from the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) publication in 2010 
(ECLAC, 2010). A dichotomous variable was used as the main independent variable. 
This variable indicates whether the home country is more or less corrupt than the 
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host country in the period of 2006 to 2009. To measure corruption the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International was used. This index has 
been widely used by scholars studying corruption and its effects (Judge, et al., 2011). 
The CPI rates countries from around the world from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (clean); 
however, in the model highly corrupt countries were denoted with a 10 index and 
clean countries with a 0 in order to obtain positive results.  
4.7.1 Main Variables 
4.7.2 Corruption Distance 
Firstly this study begins with corruption distance when home countries are either 
more or less corrupt than the host countries. The distance between the host country 
and the home country according to the Corruption Perception Index from 
Transparency International was used. One important point that needs emphasis is that 
by analysing corruption distance, this study controls to a large extent for cultural 
distance, since such distance can be treated as cultural distance (Demirbag, et al., 
2007). Furthermore, this measurement is more appropriate for this research since 
Latin America is a fairly homogeneous host region in terms of national culture as our 
unit of analysis (Hongxin, et al., 2004). 
Based on the literature on corruption and FDI and how there is no agreement as of 
whether or not FDI is deterred by corruption this study argues that it is the distance 
of corruption levels between home and host countries what affects FDI. Moreover, 
this study argues that MNEs from home countries with lower levels of corruption 
than a highly corrupt host country may be negatively affected by the distance in 
corruption levels between them. On the other hand, MNEs from home countries with 
higher levels of corruption than an already highly corrupt host country may not be 
affected by the distance of corruption levels. This claim is grounded on the idea that 
MNEs from different institutional environments might acquire a different array of 







2008). Nevertheless, this study extends this idea by also arguing that these skills and 
know-how can be transferred and exploited in foreign locations with similar 
institutional environments even if such environments are not seen as ‘ideal’ by some 
foreign investors. 
One problem with the argument that assumes that MNEs from countries with low 
levels of corruption do not have the capabilities of learning how to deal with 
corruption abroad is that it assumes that such MNEs have a passive role in the issue. 
In other words, the problem with this argument is that it says that MNEs would have 
to adjust to a host institutional environment to attain corporate success. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that MNEs are capable of influencing the host country institutional 
environment  (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Therefore, the claim that corruption distance 
will have a stronger effect when the home country has lower levels of corruption 
than a highly corrupt host country could also be explained by the decision of MNEs 
of not partaking in corrupt deals abroad. In either case, however, it is expected that 
the corruption distance between host and home countries have a deterrent effect 
when MNEs from less corrupt countries invest in a highly corrupt country due to the 
costs that they would incur to adapt to these unknown foreign institutional 
environments. 
4.7.3 Control Variables 
Although there is an ongoing debate regarding which institutions matter in relation to 
the attraction of FDI (Buckley, et al., 2007; Judge, et al., 2011),  there are various 
institutional and macro-economic variables that have been used in several studies 
covering all three pillars of the institutional environment. These variables are 
constructs of several measures and sources, and hence, provide a more 
comprehensive measurement than individual indicators. However, they present the 
disadvantage of being estimates and thus could introduce measurement errors 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). Such variables have been widely used in research 







transaction cost variables. These variables are integrated in this model to observe 
their interaction with the corruption level of the host country. A concise description 
of these variables is presented next.  
As control variables the human development index published by the United Nations 
(2012) was used. This index is a construct made up of GDP per capita, education, 
and life expectancy at birth, as proposed by Globerman and Shapiro (2003). The rule 
of law index retrieved from the World Bank Dataset (2011) measures law 
enforcement, property rights, crime, etc. (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003).  Bureaucracy 
level ranks countries as how easy it is to start a business there (World Bank, 2011). 
The infrastructure index was taken from the percentage of internet users of the host 
country (World Bank, 2011). The educational attainment index was measured by the 
total number of college students enrolled in tertiary education (ECLAC, 2010). The 
economic freedom index was used to measures trade, fiscal, and monetary policy 
(Heritage Foundation, 2012). The inflation rate was measured as the annual 
percentage rate in the consumer price index from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, 2011). 
The natural logarithm of the total GDP (World Bank, 2011) of the host country was 
used to measure purchasing power of the host country, as used by Globerman and 
Shapiro (2003) and Buckley et al. (2007). Finally, the unemployment rate of the host 
country was used to indicate the attractiveness of the country since investors are 
aware that employees will be loyal since their chances of finding another 
employment are slim (Coughlin, et al., 1991). The unemployment rate was taken 










Table 5: List of the variables, their measurements, and date sources 
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4.8 The Model 
 
4.8.1 Pearson’s Correlation 
 
The first step needed to analyse panel data is whether or not a correlation between 
variables is present (Crompton & Duray, 1985). To correlate a Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficient three different sums of squares (SS) are usually needed. This coefficient 
also requires the sums of squares for variable X, the sum of squares for variable Y, 
and the sum of the cross-products of XY (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2009). Then the sum 





This formula keeps track of the spread of variable X. Since this formula is the 
numerator of the variance of X (S
2
 x), it can also be expressed as SSxx = (S
2
 x) (n – 1) 









As with formula (1), formula (2) keeps track of the spread of variable Y. Also, since 
the numerator of the variance Y (S
2
 y), it can also be expressed as SSyy = (S
2
 y) (n – 1) 
(Gravetter & Wallnau, 2009). 




Formula (3) is analogous to the other sums of squares except that it is used to 
quantify the extent to which the two variables are correlated (Gravetter & Wallnau, 







4.8.2 Panel Data Analysis 
Early empirical studies on corruption and its effects on FDI used ordinary least 







Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). However, OLS treated data as if there was one single 





However, the model presented by equation (1) does not depict any possible 
differences in individual characteristics or any particular common time series effects. 
However, corruption has its roots on cultural and institutional grounds and therefore 
it is expected that different societies have different cultural and institutional 
characteristics. For this reason, treating cross-country data as homogenous will 
results in bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity (Chen, 2008). Most recently, 
however, empirical studies have employed panel data methods to evade this kind of 
unobserved heterogeneity bias (Egger & Winner, 2005).  
An alternative to avoid the unobserved heterogeneity bias in equation (1) is to 
assume that the model has an intercept term α that is different for different countries. 












The panel data model presented in equation (2) encapsulates the differences in 
individual countries, and the estimation methods concentrate on using the available 
information about differences in their behaviour. After that, the task in this empirical 
work is to identify the nature of heterogeneity and to specify the model based on 
existing statistical tests (Baltagi, 2005). The model can then be estimated and 
inferences can be made thereafter. 
In this study the panel data set contains information regarding a time dimension t (t = 
1, 2, …, T) and a unit dimension i which denotes a host country (i = 1, 2, …, n). The 
model also has K variables or regressors. The model also assumes that the intercept 
changes for individuals but it is constant over time and the slope is constant for host 









This means that the intercept for all the countries has a constant portion (τ) and a 
portion that changes for every country (νi). Based on equation (4) two models can be 
discussed: Fixed Effects and Random Effects. In a fixed effects model, vi is a fixed 







random effects model, vi is a random variable and it assumes that Xkit and vi are 
uncorrelated. In this sense, the fixed effects model can be estimated by least squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) regression, the within effect model, and the between effect 
model. The random effects model, on the other hand, is estimated by the generalised 
least squares (GLS) and the feasible generalisation least squares (FGLS). When the 
variance structure is known, GLS is used. If unknown, however, FGLS should be 
used (Greene, 2002).   
 
4.8.3 Empirical Model 
Given the panel structure of the data in this study, the model to investigate the effects 
of corruption distance on FDI inflows to Latin America was constructed for a 
balanced panel data of 12 Latin American countries. This approach was selected in 
order to account for unobserved heterogeneity in the sample data. For the empirical 
research the following regression model was used: 
 
(9) 
Yit = αi + βXit + µit + εit 
Based on the simple form of formula (5) the following model was produced: 
(10) 
LnFDI = αi + β1CPIit  +  β2CorrDummyit + β3CorrDis1it + β4CorrDis2it + β5Humanit 
                   + β6Lawit + β7Bureaucracyit + β8EcFreedomit + β9Educationit  
                   + β10Inflationit  + β11Infrastructureit + β12GDPit  
                   + β13Unemploymentit +µit + εit  
 
In equation (6) i is the country subscript, t is the time subscript, βs are unknown 







region, µ is the between-entity error, and ε is the within-entity error. Random effects 
logistic regressions were used to control for the possible correlations between 
variables. The model was also chosen by performing a Hausman test for random 
effects with a chibar2 (01) = 1.000
2
. In addition, the model allows for a 
comprehensive inclusion of all the variables to reduce omitted variable bias. It also 
has the advantage of being replicable with little or no changes to test different 
geographic areas to see if corruption affects the attraction of FDI differently in 
different locations.  
4.9 Firm-Level Analysis of how Corruption affects the Attraction of FDI 
Even though the macroeconomic analysis clearly shows that corruption distance and 
its sign have an effect on FDI, this is only one part of the answer about how 
corruption affects FDI. Therefore, in order to understand why some firms are more or 
less affected by corruption of the host country micro-level analysis is needed. The 
reasoning for undertaking this approach is because FDI is carried out by firms, and 
hence, understanding their rationale regarding FDI allocation to a highly corrupt 
location is needed to have a better understanding about how corruption affects FDI. 
4.9.1 Research Design and Data Collection 
4.9.2 Interviews 
As previously mentioned, this section of the study seeks to analyse how corruption 
distance affects the attraction of FDI to Latin America. In order to carry out this 
research an econometric approach was used to verify if home countries more corrupt 
than an already corrupt country react differently to high corruption in the host 
country than home countries with lower rates of corruption than the host country. 
However, according to Parkhe (2004), in various areas of rigorous empirical 
investigation in International Business there is no satisfactory approach to substitute 
interviews. However, the researcher must be cautious when conducting interviews 
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since problems can arise. According to Parkhe (2004), there are several possible 
problems with conducting research interviews. Such problems range from self-
reporting bias, language reporting context and interpretation and so on. Nevertheless, 
if the appropriate safeguards are implemented research interviews to decision makers 
will enrich insights of most studies (Parkhe, 2004). 
Daniels and Cannice (2004) argue that before deciding to conduct interviews to study 
an issue in International Business three requirements must be met: (1) the study must 
be exploratory, (2) there is a small population of possible respondents, and (3) the 
interviews should allow a more in-depth interaction with respondents than the 
interaction provided by questionnaires. In order to analyse how corruption affected 
the attraction of FDI in Guatemala, all three requirements were met. 
Firstly, the study was exploratory in nature. Despite the fact that there is a vast 
literature on how corruption affects FDI, most of these studies utilised aggregated 
macro-economic data that was evaluated with the aid of econometric techniques. 
However, this issue deserves a more in-depth analysis in order to discover possible 
relationships or situations not previously considered. Secondly, due to the nature of 
the study, the number of possible respondents is reduced. This situation was 
magnified by the fact that issues of corruption are considered sensible and therefore 
possible respondents might not agree to take part of the study. Thirdly, when 
studying how corruption affected a firm’s strategy, it is important to be able to 
interact with the respondent in order to understand why certain situations deserved 
more attention than others. 
Harrell and Bradley (2009) define interviews as the discussions that occur usually 
one-on-one between a subject and an interviewer, intended to gather information on a 
specific set of topics. The rationale for choosing interviews as part of the research 
methods is due to the insights that these instruments offer to interpret the results from 
the quantitative analysis. The objective for using interviews in this study was to 







companies investing in a highly corrupt foreign location and how to cope with such 
corruption once operations have been established. Furthermore, in order to offer the 
respondents enough freedom to express their views semi-structured interviews were 
utilised. 
The usage of unstructured interviews allowed the interviewer to have a clear plan but 
with minimum control of how the respondent answered. In fact, this kind of 
interview was ideal for the interviewee to have freedom to express how corruption 
affected his or her decision to invest in Guatemala and how the corruption levels of 
the host country affected their strategy and operations in the country. One drawback 
from using this kind of interview, however, is that even though this method provides 
a great deal of rich data, it can take a long time to collect. Therefore, according to 
Harrell and Bradley (2009) this kind of data collection method is most suitable when 
the researched has a great deal of time to spend with the interviewees.  
Another aspect to take into account in this particular study is the sensitivity of asking 
decision-makers their personal views on corruption and whether or not they 
participate in in it. However, the task becomes even more challenging when such 
decision-makers are considered members of corporate elite. According to Marschan-
Piekkari and Welch (2004), corporate elites are formed by top management, 
specialists, and middle managers that have elite positions within a firm. This 
definition also includes employees with long tenure within the firm that have a broad 
internal knowledge of the organisation and that possess extensive internal and 
external networks or functional responsibility (Welch, et al., 2002). 
Researchers have long acknowledged that interviewing ‘elites’ is a complicated task 
(Harvey, 2011) and as mentioned before, the complications are magnified by the 
sensibility of the issue of corruption. The main reasons for the difficulty in 
conducting elite interviews are, according to Welch, et al., (2002), (1) gaining access 
to elites, (2) successfully managing the power asymmetry between interviewee and 







In this study gaining access to managers of MNEs investing in Guatemala proved to 
be extremely challenging. These difficulties are acknowledged in current 
International Business literature since according to Welch, et al., (2002) obtaining 
access to elite interviewees presents different challenges to those faced when 
studying non-elites. Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent to access top managers 
of MNEs investing in Guatemala, the task proven even more difficult when the only 
respondents suited to be interviewed were those managers who (a) had the power to 
make decisions regarding the allocation of FDI; and (b) were willing to share their 
views on how corruption in the host country affected their decision to invest in 
Guatemala and their subsequent operations. Therefore, the number of interviews 
used in this study is only 12. However, the data gathered was rich enough to 
understand how corruption affected the decision making process of investing in a 
country with high levels of corruption and to develop a questionnaire to be 
administered to possible respondents. 
Qualitative research relies on a successful working relation between interviewers and 
interviewees. However, an effective working relation can be difficult to achieve if 
there is a power imbalance between the interviewer and an interviewee (Kvale, 
1996). Mainstream literature assumes that whenever such power imbalance occurs it 
is the interviewer who possesses a higher status or at least more experience in 
participating in complex debates. (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998) Therefore, in this sense 
the interviewer has a more powerful position during an interview. Nonetheless, this 
was not the case when interviewing managers of MNEs investing in Guatemala. In 
order to balance the power relationship between the interviewer and interviewees, 
semi structured interviews were used and thus allowing interviewees to talk about 
corruption without a rigid structure on the questions.  
The issue of openness is an area of dispute in literature, especially the degree of 
openness that researchers can expect from elites during interviews (Kezar, 2003). 







interview, the issue becomes more crucial when interviewing elites since they have 
more experience in handling questions and they stick more closely to organisational 
policies (Thomas, 1993). Nevertheless, surprisingly in this study all the participants 
were extremely open with their answers of how corruption affected their decision of 
investing in a highly corrupt foreign location, and how corruption in the host country 
affected their already established operations. 
4.9.3 Interview Design  
Before conducting interviews a goal must be set and develop questions that aid to 
achieve such goal. Then, the researcher must identify possible respondents, persuade 
those respondents to participate in the study, arrange logistics for the interviews, and 
finally conduct the interviews (Mason, 1996). In this study the goal was to 
understand how corruption affected the allocation of FDI in Guatemala and how 
corruption affected subsequent operations in the country. The questions were 
designed mirroring key issues highlighted in the existing literature. The possible 
respondents for this study were managers with FDI allocation responsibilities of 
MNEs operating in Guatemala and were persuaded due to their willingness to 
cooperate in the fight of corruption in the country. The logistics for conducting the 
interviews were planned in order to cause minimum disruption to the respondents, 
and finally the interviews were conducted. 
This study utilised semi-structured interviews since it allows the respondent the time 
and scope to talk about how high corruption in the host country affected his or her 
decision of investment and subsequent operations. Also, the reason for the interview 
was to understand the respondent’s point of view regarding corruption rather than 
making generalisations about the topic. In this sense, the interviews were more a 
conversation about corruption and how it affected their rationale to invest in 
Guatemala and their operations after the decision to invest was made. Therefore, 







to minimise its effects, and whether or not corruption was a deterrent to investment 
in Guatemala were asked when the interviewer thought appropriate
3
.  
4.9.4 Interview Administration 
In total, twelve interviews were conducted from August to November 2012. 
Interviewees were selected based on the following criterion: (a) Respondents should 
be managers of MNEs operating in Guatemala, and (b) The respondents should have 
direct involvement on foreign investment decisions in their companies. Respondents 
interviewed were divided in those whose firms were located in countries with lower 
corruption levels than Guatemala and those located in countries with higher 
corruption levels based on the CPI (Transparency International, 2010). Also, in order 
to have a balanced mix of respondents, half of them were managers of MNEs located 
in countries with lower corruption levels than Guatemala whereas the other half were 
managers from MNEs located in countries with higher corruption levels than the host 
country. 
In this research all the interviews were administered with the help of Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP)
4
. The choice of VoIP to administer the interviews responded 
to the difficulty in reaching the sites where the interviewees were located (Mexico, 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, United States, Canada, and Honduras). Furthermore, since 
all the participants hold key strategic positions in their companies, making 
arrangements to visit them all during the same timeframe proved extremely difficult.  
According to Rowley (2012), VoIP interviews save the researcher travel time and 
may even decrease interviewer bias, but some of the connection between the two 
parties might be lost.  
Although the limitations inherent to face-to-face personal interviews might be 
magnified by conducting them via VoIP, this research minimises such limitations by 
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not relying solely on interviews. In this section, the personal interviews are a tool to 
understand how managers react to high levels of corruption in foreign markets, and 
to construct a questionnaire to revise the issue in more depth. 
4.9.5 Language 
The language in which interviews are conducted is an important methodological 
issue that goes beyond a personal preference to an instinctive consideration of power 
that has an effect on the dynamics of the interview situation (Marschan-Piekkari & 
Reis, 2004). In fact, Marschan-Piekkari and Reis (2004) argue that when the 
interviewer and interviewee do not share a common native language the language on 
which the interview is conducted should benefit the research participant. Based on 
this premise the interviews were conducted in either Spanish or English. Out of the 
twelve participants in this study three were English native speakers and they chose 
English as the language for the interviews. On the other hand, the remaining nine 
participants, although fluent in English, decided to be interviewed in their native 
Spanish. 
Even though the researcher was comfortable conducting interviews in both 
languages, it is important to acknowledge that interviewing in one language and 
reporting in another is a challenge that has been recognised in literature (Welch, et 
al., 2002). In this study, due to the nature of the topic the researcher decided to not 
provide transcripts to a third party to ensure that its translations into English were 
accurate. However, to guarantee that the translation from Spanish into English was as 
accurate as possible, the English transcripts were translated into Spanish and then 










4.9.6 Quantitative Approach 
4.9.7 Questionnaires 
Questionnaires are the most commonly used type of quantitative methods in the IB 
discipline accounting for 60.34% of the empirical articles published in major IB 
journals from 1992 to 2003 (Zhilin, et al., 2006). Furthermore, self-administered 
questionnaires are the most commonly utilised data gathering method in the social 
sciences (Blaikie, 2010).This method is preferred over surveys because 
questionnaires allow self-administration, a defined structure, and no intervention 
from the researcher except in the designing of the instrument is needed. Whereas 
surveys need direct participation of the researcher in filling the survey and making 
notes of the interaction with the subject being researched. (Blaikie, 2010). 
Questionnaires also allow the researcher to gather large amounts of data from a 
relative large sample (Malhotra, et al., 1996). 
Even though the interviews conducted were of high value to answer how corruption 
affected the attraction of FDI in Guatemala, the reality is that they were not enough 
to make a generalisation of the issue. For that reason, the insights provided by the 
interviews were utilised to craft a questionnaire that could reach a larger sample. 
According to Neelankavil (2007), questionnaires are defined as a technique for 
collecting large amounts of data from a fairly large set of possible respondents 
utilising a question and answer format. However, designing a questionnaire is not an 
easy task. In fact, Neelankavil (2007) says that even though much progress has been 
made in questionnaire design it is still considered an art since very few theories in the 
designing of questionnaires have been developed. Despite the challenges associated 
to designing research questionnaires, Neelankavil (2007) provides a guideline to 
develop questionnaires to ensure their reliability. Firstly, questionnaires should 
reflect the researcher’s objectives. Also, the questions and types of questions in 







The main aim of the questionnaire was to capture the perception of how corruption in 
the home and host countries affected the attraction of FDI and operations in 
Guatemala. The questionnaire also addressed how the uncertainty created by 
corruption in Guatemala affected the strategy of foreign MNEs operating in the 
country and if some MNEs were better equipped to deal with this uncertainty. In 
order to make sure that the questionnaire covered all the important issues regarding 
how corruption affected FDI and how significant each item was, ranked responses 
were used. Finally, to ensure a higher rate of response the questionnaire did not 




4.9.8 Questionnaire Administration 
According to the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce, 299 foreign MNEs are 
currently registered in this organisation and operating in the country. The 
questionnaires were administered to the whole sample of foreign MNEs registered at 
the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce. The questionnaire was administered in two 
rounds. The first round was sent to the managers responsible for the Guatemalan 
operations from November 2012 to January 2013. The second round of 
questionnaires was distributed during a meeting held at the Guatemalan Embassy in 
Washington DC for foreign investors with operations in Guatemala.  
4.9.9 Language 
As with the interviews, the questionnaires were designed in English; however, the 
respondents were given the choice of answering them either in English or Spanish. In 
the same manner than with the interviews, the questionnaires were translated into 
Spanish by the researcher. After being translated into Spanish the questionnaires 
were translated back into English and compared to the original version to compare if 
they were consistent. When distributed, the respondents received both versions of the 
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questionnaires and were asked to choose the questionnaire with the language of their 
preference return it filled to the researcher. 
4.9.10 The Analysis  
The data from the questionnaires were evaluated using Multinomial Logistic 
Regressions. The Multinomial logistic regression was used to predict categorical 
placement in the probability of membership on a dependent variable (FDI range) 
based on multiple corruption independent variables. According to Starkweather and 
Moske (2011), the independent variables can be dichotomous (binary) or, as in this 
case, continuous (ratio in scale). Furthermore, the multinomial logistic regression is 
an extension of the binary logistic regression but the main difference with the latter is 
that the multinomial logistic regression allows for more than two categories of the 
dependent variable (FDI ranges) but does not assume a specific order of these 
(Starkweather & Moske, 2011).  
Also, one of the most important reasons for using multinomial logistic regressions in 
this study is because it does not need careful considerations regarding sampling size 
and scrutiny for outlying cases, and furthermore, this regression does not assume, 
linearity normality, or homoscedasticity (Starkweather & Moske, 2011). However, 
the model does have a clear assumption, which is the independence between 
dependent variables. This assumption requires that dependent variables cannot be 
members of another category, in this case, FDI and a corruption variable, this 
condition is met.  
The assumptions used for this research is that the dependent variable (FDI ranges) 
are independent from each other, and that their order does not affect the outcome of 
the results. According to Greene (2003) unordered-choice models can be caused by a 
random utility model by the ith respondent faced with J choices, and supposing that 











ijβ + εij 
 
If the respondent makes a choice j in particular then it is assumed that Uij is the 
maximum amongst the J utilities. Therefore, the statistical model is guided by the 
probability that choice j is made, which is  
(12) 
Prob (Uij > Uik)  for all other k ≠ j. 
 
Greene (2003) says that this model is made operational by certain choice of 
distribution for the disturbances and can be used for the logistic and probit models. 
However, the probit model has had several limitations, which will not be discussed in 
this document since that particular model is not going to be used. The Logistic 
model, however, has been widely utilised in several fields including economics, 
market research, and business  (Bull & Donner, 1987). 
The logistic model assumes that Yi is a random variable that indicates the FDI range 
chosen. Then Hausman and McFadden (1984) demonstrates that if (and only if) the J 
disturbances are independent and identically distributed with type I extreme value 
(Gumbel) distribution   
(13) 















Which leads to what is called conditional logit model that is the base for the 




However, as it can be noted in formula (X) the terms do not change across 
alternatives specific to the individual. Therefore, if the model needs to allow 
individual specific effects, such as it is the case with foreign investors in Guatemala, 
then the model needs to be modified (Greene, 2003).  
In order to allow for individual specific effects, a variation of formula (X) is used 










Where j is FDI ranges choices for a decision maker, relating to each relationship i 
(i=1, … N), According to Greene (2003), the logit transformation of the estimated 
equations offer a set of probabilities for the J +1 choices for a decision maker with 
characteristics Xi of the individual/unique probabilities or choices to the estimated 
with the assumption of a normalisation of β0 = 0. This rises since the probabilities 
sum to one; therefore only J parameter vectors are needed to determine the J + 1 
probabilities (Greene, 2003). 
(17) 
 
4.10 Ethical Issues of the Data Collection 
This study received approval by the University of Edinburgh Business School. Also, 
all the participants of the research agreed to take part of it voluntarily. It is important 
to note that the participation of respondents for this research was agreed verbally 
since signing an agreement might be considered rude by some participants 
(Boyacigiller, et al., 2004). This was established based on the author’s knowledge of 
the business etiquette in Guatemala where personal relations are highly regarded and 
verbal agreements are considered contracts. Also, due to the sensibility of the issue 
of how corruption affects managers’ decisions, no contracts or written statements 
were formulated to secure an interview or to ensure that a questionnaire was filled. 
Discussions about ethical issues in business research, and more specifically possible 
transgressions of them, usually revolve around a number of issues that reappear in 
different forms. Nevertheless, these issues have been usefully broken down by 
Diener and Crandall (1978) into four main areas: whether there is harm to 
participants; whether there is a lack of informed consent; whether there is an invasion 







During the data collection in this study (interviews and questionnaires) no harm of 
any type was inflicted in the respondents. This was achieved by fully explaining the 
nature of the research and how its results would only help explain how corruption 
affected the attraction of FDI to Guatemala without mentioning the identities of the 
sources. Also, all participants were fully informed of the aims and procedures of the 
research and only after the respondents consented to participate in the study did the 
data collection begin. The study also made sure to not invade any of the participants’ 
privacy by maintaining the anonymity of all respondents. Finally, during the data 
collection the aims of the research and how the data gathered was going to be used 
was informed to every participant in their native language (either English or Spanish) 
in order to avoid the perception of deception. 
4.11 Summary of the Chapter 
In order to understand how high levels of corruption affect FDI inflows two 
approaches were taken. Firstly, a macroeconomic approach analysing FDI flows to 
Latin America was used. In this section, macroeconomic variables were used to 
represent determinants of FDI to the region and the Corruption Perception Index 
from Transparency International as a measure of corruption. This study argues that 
the level of corruption in the host country by itself is not the only reason why 
corruption deters FDI. Instead, this study claims that it is the difference between the 
corruption levels between the home and host country what deters FDI.  
Nevertheless, analysing how corruption and corruption distance affect FDI a 
macroeconomic analysis does not provide a full picture of the issue. For this reason, 
a firm-level analysis was needed to answer the research question: Why are some 
foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high levels of host country 
corruption when investing abroad? This section of the study utilised a mixed 
methodology to understand how corruption affected the attraction of FDI to a highly 
corrupt country. Firstly, a series of interviews were conducted to analyse how 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of how corruption affects the attraction of FDI to a 
highly corrupt foreign location. The first section of this chapter addresses the 
research question: a) How does corruption distance between home and host country 
affect the attraction of FDI to emerging markets? To answer this research question, 
this section analyses how corruption and corruption distance affect the attraction of 
FDI to 12 Latin American countries from the years of 2006 to 2009. The results were 
obtained by analysing panel data with the aid of a random effects model. On the 
other hand, the firm-level results were obtained from a mixed methodology that used 
semi-structured interviews and questionnaires administered to managers responsible 
for allocating FDI to Guatemala.  
The second section of the chapter analyses the research question: b) Why are some 
foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high levels of host country 
corruption when investing abroad? To answer this research question, twelve in-depth 
semi-structure interviews were conducted to analyse how decision makers were 
affected by high levels of corruption in a foreign location when investing. 
Furthermore, from the answers provided to the interviews, questionnaires were 
designed to reach a larger sample of decision makers to analyse how corruption 
affected their decision to invest in a highly corrupt foreign location, and how 
corruption affected subsequent operations in such location. 
5.2 Macroeconomic Level Results 
The Pearson’s Correlations matrix results for the full sample of FDI to Latin America 
from 2006 to 2009 are presented in Table 6. The correlation matrix includes FDI 
flows to 12 Latin American host countries in the period described above. The matrix 






the host countries, a dichotomous variable describing whether or not a host country 
have a corruption level higher (denoted as 1 in the model) or lower (denoted as 0 in 
the model) than the host countries. Corruption distance was represented as the level 
of corruption of the home country minus the level of corruption of the host country 
as measured by Transparency International for the period of 2006 to 2009. Finally, 
the control variables were also represented by several indices published by 
recognised international organisations. 
The Karl Pearson Correlation matrix coefficient is used to quantitatively measure the 
extent to which two variables are correlated (Sharma, 2011). According to Sharma 
(2011), the coefficient determination, denoted by r
2
, always has a value between 1 
and -1. This coefficient is used to discover a linear covariation of two variables. This 
coefficient is preferred to determine the strength of relationship between two 
variables because since it is a percentage, it is easier to be interpreted.  Moreover, 
there is no definite rule stating which coefficient denotes correlational strength; 
however, Jackson (2011) offers the following guidelines: 
 0 <  |r| <  0.3   weak correlation 
 0.3 < |r| <  0.7  moderate correlation 
 |r|  > 0.7  strong correlation 
 
Based on the guidelines provided by Jackson (2011), corruption has a weak negative 
correlation with FDI flowing to Latin America; however, this correlation is 
statistically significant at the p<0.10. When analysing the correlation between 
corruption distance and FDI, the relationship is stronger, however. As presented in 
Table 6, corruption distance shows a strong negative correlation with FDI to Latin 
America when de home countries have lower levels of corruption than the host 
region, and this relationship is significant at the p<0.001 significance level. 






than the host countries, is positive and weakly correlated with FDI to Latin America, 
however this correlation is statistically significant at the p<0.10. 
As presented in Table 6, there are several strong correlations statistically significant 
in the Pearson’s Correlation matrix studying corruption, and its effect on FDI to 
Latin America. One of these variables includes Corruption Distance when the host 
region is more corrupt than the home region. This factor could mean that collinearity 
is present in the data; nevertheless, the tests performed on the data, and presented in 
the appendix of this document, did not reveal any important issues of 
multicollinearity in the dataset. 
Table 6 shows how FDI and corruption correlate in the Latin American region. The 
results of the correlation matrix show statistical significant negative relationship 
between FDI and the corruption level in the host countries at a p<0.10. Corruption 
distance presents a strong negative correlation at the p<0.001 level between 
corruption distance and FDI when the host countries have a lower corruption level 
than home countries. On the other hand, corruption distance shows a significant 
positive correlation at the p<0.10 level with FDI when the host countries experience 
higher levels of corruption than the host countries. 
The random effects regression results for the full sample are presented in Table 7. In 
this table three models are run. Model 1 analyses how corruption affects the total FDI 
flows to Latin America and excludes the corruption distance variables. This is made 
to understand how corruption affects FDI flows to Latin America. The result from 
Model 1 is that the total amount of FDI received in Latin America is negatively 
affected by high levels of corruption of the host countries. This result is statistically 
significant at a level of p<0.10. 
 
Model 2 analyses how corruption distance affects home countries with lower 






negatively associated (p<0.10) with FDI flows when home countries have a lower 
level of corruption than host countries experiencing high levels of corruption. Model 
2 also shows that investors from countries with lower levels of corruption than the 
host country are negatively affected by high levels of corruption of the host country. 
 
Finally, Model 3 tests what effect corruption distance has on the attraction of FDI to 
a highly corrupt region when the home countries are more corrupt than the host 
countries. In this model the corruption distance from home countries with lower 
levels of corruption than the host countries are excluded. The results show that 
corruption distance has a positive effect on FDI flows from countries with higher 
corrupt levels than an already highly corrupt host region; however, this relationship 
is not statistically significant. 
The correlations matrix shows significant correlations between variables. 
Nonetheless, these correlations were expected due to the nature of the variables 
chosen, as described before. However, to make sure that multicollinearity was not 
present in the model this research conducted a ‘Tolerance or Variation Inflation 
Factor (VIF)’ test as used in (Buckley, et al., 2007). In order to have a ‘standard of 








Table 6: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for Macroeconomic Analysis 
 
FDI 1            
CPI -0.17* 1           
CorrDis1 -0.20 -0.77*** 1          
CorrDis2 -0.21 -0.45** 0.29* 1         
Human 0.50*** -0.47*** -0.35* 0.1457 1        
Law 0.37** -0.88*** -0.75*** 0.31* 0.64*** 1       
Bureaucracy -0.002 0.58*** 0.46*** -0.07 -0.39** -0.47** 1      
EcFreedom -0.25* -0.24* -0.17 0.15 -0.03 0.24 -0.62*** 1     
Education -0.21 0.33* 0.58*** 0.11 -0.15 -0.38** 0.13 0.08 1    
Inflation 0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.13 -0.23 -0.8 0.39** -0.36* -0.15 1   
Infrastructure 0.38** -5.59*** -0.41** 0.13 0.81*** 0.73*** -0.38** -0.06 -0.25* -0.22 1  
GDP 0.46*** 0.22 0.06 -0.26 0.57*** 0.25* -0.26* -0.22 0.01 -0.30* 0.57*** 1 
Unemployment 0.22 -0.24* -0.02 -0.3 0.48** 0.35* -0.29* -0.05 0.25* -0.21 0.46** 0.40** 






Table 7: Results Random Effects Regression for Macroeconomic Analysis 
 





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CPI  -6.77038* 
  












122.8364* 183.0966* 185.2531* 
Law 
 
0.4614521** 1.61422*** 1.86183*** 
Bureaucracy 
 
0.11224919 0.2697496 0.940995 
EcFreedom 
 
-0.1567881 0.4805634 -0.8639065 
Education 
 
-1.028834 1.403908 0.3784996 
Inflation 
 
0.7107626 0.6078531 0.6981451 
Infrastructure 
 
-0.5448595* -1.10931* -1.332644* 
GDP 
 
6.829546* 4.799764 2.94363 
Unemployment 
 










48 48 48 
No. Host Countries 
 
12 12 12 
Wald Chi2 
 
57.9 62.76 54.1 
Prob>chi2 
 
*** *** *** 
Significance levels: *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively  
 
5.2.1 Model Fit 
To ensure the accuracy of the results, multicollinearity tests were performed as 
presented in the appendix. Also, to ensure minimum problems several assumptions 
were made. According to Baltagi, et al., (2003), one of the most important issues that 
panel data can present is endogeneity. Endogeneity occurs when there is 






issue can arise due to measurement error, an autoregression with autocorrelated 
errors, simultaneity and omitted variables.  
Nevertheless, in the social sciences there is always the possibility of finding 
endogeneity since the social sciences seek to understand the behaviour of people. For 
this reason, Reichstein (2011) argues that in the social sciences researchers cannot 
establish a laboratory-like environment to run experiments in order to keep the 
ceteris-paribus assumptions. Therefore, Reichstein (2011) suggests that to minimise 
the effects of endogeneity the researcher must (1) choose the appropriate model, (2) 
collect appropriate data, and (3) include appropriate proxies for possible omitted 
variables. In this study, all three conditions were met. The random effects model 
corrects for differences across entities have some influence the dependent variable 
(Moulton, 1986). Also, the data collected does not include missing values; finally, 
the proxy variables for time can be introduced in the random effects model (Moulton, 
1986). 
Finally, to test whether or not there was cross-sectional dependence between 
variables, a Pasaran CD (cross-sectional dependence) test was used. The Pasaran CD 
test supported the null hypothesis that residuals were not correlated with an index of 
0.1624. Finally, in order to test heteroskedasticity we used a Likelihood Ratio (RL) 
Test that showed no correlation at 1.00  (Drukker, 2003).  
5.3 Firm-Level Results 
The empirical data used to explain the results of the study consists of a unique firm-
level data set obtained from interviews and questionnaires administered to foreign 
investors registered with the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce. Currently the 
Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce has 299 foreign MNEs listed. The first stage of 
the data gathering involved twelve in-depth semi-structured interviews that were 
used to develop a questionnaire to be administered to the entire sample. The 






by two well-known institutions researching how corruption affects businesses in 
Guatemala, which are: Transparency International and The World Bank (The World 
Bank, 2005; Transparency International, 2011). The questionnaire also resembles 
questions used in academic publications
6
 (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006; Jensen, et al., 
2010). 
The selection of respondents for the interview followed the following rationale: Six 
managers of MNEs located in countries with a lower corruption level than 
Guatemala, and six from MNEs located in more corrupt countries
7
. Even though the 
MNEs were from different countries and operated in different industries several 
similarities were found. When talking to managers of MNEs from highly corrupt 
countries they described corruption as another obstacle for doing business, but not a 
serious one. Moreover, they agreed on the fact that corruption only slowed 
operations in a foreign country but was not consider a ‘deal breaker’. On the other 
hand, when talking to managers from MNEs located in countries with a lower level 
of corruption than Guatemala different issues arose. These managers saw corruption 
as a serious problem that developing countries faced. They also expressed concerns 
regarding the lack of knowledge of how to deal with corrupt local officials, and the 
need to adapt to local corrupt practices, which contradicted their behaviour in their 
home country.  
5.3.1Results from the Interviews 
The results of the twelve interviews conducted provide an insight of how corruption 
affects the allocation of FDI in a highly corrupt host country. The profiles of the 
firms selected for the interview are provided in Table 4. As previously mentioned, of 
the twelve interviews six firms were headquartered in countries with higher levels of 
corruption than Guatemala, while the rest are located in a home country with lower 
                                                          
6
 See appendix for complete questionnaire  
7







corruption levels than the host country. The results of how corruption affects FDI to 
Guatemala depending on the corruption levels of the home country are provided 
below. 
As shown in Table 8, firms located in countries with higher corruption levels than 
Guatemala decided to invest in the country to gain access to the host market. Also, 
the entry mode preferred by these firms was joint venture. When asked about 
whether or not they had other foreign subsidiaries in the Latin American region, four 
out of six interviewees declared to not have them. On the other hand, investors from 
countries with lower corruption levels than Guatemala preferred to penetrate the 
market via wholly owned subsidiaries and they declared to have subsidiaries in other 
Latin American countries. Moreover, the motives for FDI in Guatemala for firms 
with lower corrupt levels than Guatemala declared that their motivations were evenly 
distributed in the three main motivations of FDI (market, resource, and efficiency-
seeking). 
Table 9 presents the main answers of managers in charge of allocating FDI to 
Guatemala about how corruption affected their decision making process and 
subsequent operations in the country. Firms from more corrupt countries also agreed 
that making illegal payments to local officials was not morally acceptable but they 
justified doing it as a ‘means to an end’ approach. All the interviewees justified 
paying bribes to local Guatemalan officials by saying that if they did not do this they 
would go out of business and their employees would suffer. These managers also 
acknowledged that personal connections with local officials in all three major areas 
of the public sector in Guatemala (elite, judiciary, and bureaucracy) were crucial to 
expedite processes to operate in the country. 
According to Investor 1, corruption, although detrimental for a society, is sometimes 
necessary to expedite processes. This manager argued that although corruption 
should not exist, there is little a single company can do about it. Investor 1 also 






since ‘everybody knows the country is highly corrupt’ and knowledge of how to deal 
with corruption in Guatemala could be obtained at the home country. Furthermore, 
this manager argued that if his company did not engage in corrupt deals, the well-
being of the company and the employees could be in jeopardy. Furthermore, in the 
words of the interviewee: 
 
Corruption is morally wrong. However, sometimes managers have to engage in 
corrupt deals in order to be able to generate business. If I had a choice, of course I 
would not participate in corrupt deals, but the reality is that if you want to operate in 
Guatemala without engaging in corruption, you won’t get very far. 
 
The view expressed by Investor 1 was echoed by Investors 3, 5, and 6. According to 
these managers, corruption should not exist and it is detrimental for businesses as 
well as all sectors of a society. Nevertheless, these investors also argued that if they 
want to continue operating in Guatemala, they have to comply with the local 
‘business culture.’ Moreover, these investors also agreed that corruption in 
Guatemala did not increase uncertainty when doing business in the country since 
they had familiarity of the possible illegal requirements requested by local public 
officials. The one difference between these investors, however, is how they replied to 











Amount Invested in Past 5 
Years 
Motivation for FDI in 
Guatemala 
Ownership Structure 
Other Subsidiaries in 
Latin America 
Investor 1 More Corrupt Up to US$1 million Market-seeking Joint Venture No 
Investor 2 More Corrupt 
Between US$10 and US$20 
million 
Market-seeking Joint Venture Yes 
Investor 3 More Corrupt 
Between US$5 and US$10 
million 
Efficiency-seeking Joint Venture Yes 




Investor 5 More Corrupt 
Between US$5 and US$10 
million 
Market-seeking Joint Venture No 
Investor 6 More Corrupt 
Between US$5 and US$10 
million 
Market-seeking Joint Venture No 
Investor 7 Less Corrupt 






Investor 8 Less Corrupt 






Investor 9 Less Corrupt 






Investor 10 Less Corrupt More than US$30 million Resource-seeking Joint Venture Yes 
Investor 11 Less Corrupt 






Investor 12 Less Corrupt 












According to Investor 5 
There is no recipe of how to deal with corruption in any place even if it is your own 
country. The only thing you can do, though, is to experience it and then adapt to 
respond to the environment on which you operate and this includes corruption  
  
On the other hand, Investor 3 declared that 
Managers do not need to learn how to deal with corruption but how to deal with 
people with different customs 
 
Within the same line of thought than Investor 3, Investor 6 declared that when 
replying whether or not knowledge about how to cope with corruption in a foreign 
country can be acquired at home replied: 
 
Managers should acquire knowledge of how to deal with people and not with their 
beliefs. You cannot change how a person acts, but you can change how you react to 
their actions. I possess knowledge of how to deal with people, and that has helped me 
conduct business at home and abroad. 
 
An interesting issue arose when talking to Manager 4. According to this manager, 
corruption per se does not exist. Instead, this manager declared that people instead of 
talking about corruption should be talking about culture. Manager 4 declared that just 
because certain countries did not understand business practices abroad did not mean 
that they were wrong. Although this manager agreed that providing illegal payments 
to public officials could affect the bottom line of a business, managers should adapt 
to this because otherwise they would go out of business. Moreover, this manager 
described corruption in Guatemala as 







Finally, not all investors from a country with higher levels of corruption than 
Guatemala ‘condoned’ corruption. According to Investor 2, corruption does not have 
a logical reason to exist. According to this respondent, if the system was transparent 
and fair to all parties, public officials as well as companies would not have an 
incentive to participate in corrupt deals. Finally, this investor declared that even 
though the experience at home might provide some knowledge about how to deal 
with corruption since  
No one can totally learn how to deal with corruption at home or abroad. However, 
the experience at home taught us where we should expect illegal requests to take 
place 
 
On the other hand, when talking to managers of MNEs headquartered in countries 
with a lower corruption level than Guatemala there was consensus regarding how 
corruption affected the decision-making process of allocating of FDI in Guatemala: 
corruption was a serious factor to take into account but not the only factor. 
According to these managers, corruption delayed and increased prices of projects, 
but did not dictate whether or not investment was going to be made. The respondents 
also said that the corruption level of the host-country could affect the duration of the 
project, the quality of the work performed, and the entry-mode used (either wholly-
owned subsidiary or joint venture). 
Although investors from countries with lower level of corruption than Guatemala 
agreed that corruption was not acceptable, their views on several issues differ from 
one another. According to Investors 7, 10, and 12 corruption is not only morally 
wrong but also the cause of the poverty around the world, and a cancer to society. 
Furthermore, this investor firmly declared not to engage in any corrupt deal in any 
market where the company operates. This manager also argued that the uncertainty 
levels that corruption generates can actually dictate whether or not a foreign 







present in all aspects of the Guatemalan public sector its impact is different. 
According to Investor 7: 
Corruption in Guatemala is widespread and ingrained in all aspects of the public 
sector. However, the costs of corruption in the bureaucratic sector are minimal when 
compared with the costs of corruption in the government elite or the judiciary sector 
 
Investors 7, 10, and 12 also declared that they did not have the opportunity to learn at 
home how to deal with high levels of corruption abroad. These three investors also 
agreed that their home countries are not ‘corruption-free’ but that this problem is 
mainly present in the public sector, and since they do not do business with their 
government, they can avoid corrupt deals.  
On the other hand, there were two interviewees from countries with lower corruption 
levels than Guatemala that did not ‘demonize’ corruption as Investors 7, 10, and 12. 
According to Investors 8 and 9, corruption is a major factor that might impede 
business, but it is not the only one. Furthermore, according to these respondents, 
corruption should be avoided when possible, but this cannot be done in all situations.  
Another difference between Investors 8 and 9 and Investors 7, 10, and 12 is that the 
former agreed that corruption is predictable in Guatemala. According to Investor 8, 
Corruption is more frequent when doing business with the Guatemalan government. 
After learning that there was no way to not engage in corrupt deals when working 
with the government we just decided to avoid such contracts  
 
Finally, Investor 9 declared that corruption is very predictable in Guatemala and even 











Personal Views of 
Corruption 
Engaging in Corruption 
in Guatemala 
Uncertainty Due to 
Corruption 
Corruption Among Different 
Levels of Government 
Acquired Knowledge of 
how to Cope with 
Corruption 
Investor 1 More Corrupt 
Corruption is morally 
wrong. However, 
sometimes it is 
necessary to continue in 
business 
Corruption is very 
common in all the aspects 
of Guatemalan operations. 
Unfortunately, sometimes 





but the firm needs to 
adapt quickly 
Although corruption is 
rampant, the problem is more 
prevalent in the bureaucracy 
Knowledge of how to 
approach a corrupt official 
(bureaucrat) was acquired 
at home 
Investor 2 More Corrupt 
Corruption should not 
exist and firms should 
not engage in it. 
Corruption is engrained in 
all sectors of the 
Guatemalan society. It is 
very difficult to not 
engage in it 
When investing in 
Guatemala we had 
knowledge of the 
problem in the country. 
Uncertainty was 
minimal  
Corruption is more widespread 
among bureaucrats. However, 
the other two branches of 
public life are also corrupt but 
more cautious as to publicly 
engage in corrupt deals 
No one can totally learn 
how to deal with corruption 
at home or abroad. 
However, the experience at 
home taught us where we 
should expect illegal claims 
Investor 3 More Corrupt 
Corruption is wrong, but 
it is understandable 
since some public 
officials need to 
complement their 
wages. 
It is how business is 
conducted in the Country 
“when in Rome” 
There is no uncertainty 
due to corruption. No 
one is surprised by 
corruption in 
Guatemala 
People think that the 
bureaucratic sector is more 
corrupt. The other two sectors 
are equally or more corrupt but 
they are not as visible 
There is no need to know 
how to deal with 
corruption. You should 
learn to deal with people of 
different customs 
Investor 4 More Corrupt 
“I do not believe that 
there is such thing as 
corruption. People only 
have different business 
cultures” 
That is how everybody 
does business. It is part of 
the business culture of the 
country 
There is no uncertainty 
if you know what you 
will encounter 
All sectors operate differently. 
The government elite ask for a 
percentage of the project; the 
judiciary only responds to the 
elite; bureaucrats request little 
contributions 
Public officials operate 
very similarly everywhere 






Investor 5 More Corrupt 
Corruption is wrong but 
if I do not comply, I do 
not have a business and 
cannot offer 
employment 
There is no other option 
but to comply with the 
local conventions 
Sometimes you do not 
know what a public 
official will ask but 
that is the exception 
rather than the rule 
Corruption among the 
bureaucrats and judges is 
constant. With the elite it 
changes after every election 
Nothing can fully prepare 
you to deal with corruption 
abroad; but, after having 
operations in the country 
you learn what to expect 
Investor 6 More Corrupt 
It should not be 
acceptable but it is the 
only way to do business 
sometimes  
That is how business is 
conducted in the country 
There is no uncertainty 
when you know what 
to expect 
Everybody is corrupt but in 
different forms. Every sector 
asks for different illegal 
payments depending on who 
you are and what you do 
I possess knowledge of 
how to deal with corrupt 
people. You just wait to see 
what their requirements 
are. You do not offer 
anything until then 
Investor 7 Less Corrupt 
Corruption is not only 
morally wrong but it is 
the main cause of 
poverty around the 
world 
We try to not engage in 
any corrupt deal whenever 
possible 
Uncertainty is very 
high when doing 
business in Guatemala. 
Local officials believe 
they can request 
unlimited bribes 
Bureaucrats are highly corrupt 
but their impact in the bottom 
line is minimal. Corruption 
among senior officials makes a 
dent in our bottom line, though 
Absolutely not. Of course 
there is corruption at home 
but nothing even close than 
Guatemala 
Investor 8 Less Corrupt 
Corruption is a major 
impediment for business 
abroad but not the only 
factor to take into 
account 
As far as I know we do not 
engage in corrupt deals 
Corruption occurs 
more often when doing 
business with the 
government. We try to 
avoid that 
Corruption is widespread in all 
sectors of the government. 
No, at home it is know that 
there is corruption in 
government contracts but 
we do not participate in 
those 
Investor 9 Less Corrupt 
Corruption is morally 
wrong. Sometimes it is 
unavoidable though 
We try not to engage in 
corruption at large scale. I 
have to admit that to 
expedite some processes 
we have had to resort to 
alternative means 
Corruption in 
Guatemala is very 
predictable as well as 
its costs 
There is no sector in the 
Guatemalan government 
corruption free 
Corruption at home is not 
uncommon. However, due 
to cultural differences I do 
not believe that corruption 
at home helped cope with 
corruption in Guatemala 
Investor 10 Less Corrupt 
Corruption is wrong and 
should be combatted  
Absolutely not. We have 
to demonstrate that it is 
possible to turn a profit 
being honest 
Uncertainty can be 
high but once officials 
see how we do 
business they do not 
bother us 
Unfortunately corruption is 
rampant in the country at all 
spheres 
I am sure there is 
corruption at home but we 
have a zero tolerance 
policy at home and abroad 
Investor 11 Less Corrupt 
Corruption is wrong and 
delays processes 
Unfortunately you have to 
play by the local rules but 
we avoid it when we can 
In general there is no 
uncertainty but of 
course there are 
exceptions 
Bureaucrats request more 
bribes but the other two sectors 
request larger amounts of 
money 
No. Corruption is present at 
home but it takes different 
forms than in Guatemala 
Investor 12 Less Corrupt 
Corruption is a cancer 
of a society 
We have too much to lose 
if we engage in corrupt 
deals 
We do whatever we 
can to avoid engaging 
in corruption 
Corruption is widespread in 
Guatemala but with companies 
that work with the government 
We never participated in 
corrupt deals at home. No 









In summary, while interviewing managers of MNEs from less corrupt countries than 
Guatemala interesting and surprising issues arose. These managers all agreed that 
corruption was detrimental to doing business and a very important factor to take into 
account when deciding to invest in a foreign location. Corruption, according to these 
respondents, was the root of all problems in the country. Corruption, according to 
them, divests private funds to a few government employees, increases inefficiencies, 
and hence deepens the poverty levels in the host country.  Managers of MNEs from 
less corrupt countries than Guatemala also expressed that corruption is as an ‘evil 
force’ that needs to be stopped. For that reason, they expressed that if given the 
choice they would choose a wholly owned subsidiary over a joint venture in order to 
have total control to curve any wrong-doings. These managers also expressed 
concern in the levels of corruption in several areas of the government in the country. 
One interesting finding, however, was that even though all the managers from less 
corrupt countries viewed corruption as a serious problem that needed to be 
eliminated; however, their operations in the host country told a different story. These 
managers admitted that in order to do business in a corrupt environment like 
Guatemala’s they needed to adapt to local social conventions that might not be 
acceptable in their home-countries. They argued that making illegal extra payments 
and providing kickbacks to local officials was, sometimes, necessary to keep the 
business going. One important point to be raised, however, is that the decision to 
invest in a foreign country does not depend only on the corruption levels of such 
location to these managers. Instead, how to invest in a highly corrupt foreign location 
is dictated by the levels of corruption. Nevertheless, once such decision has been 
made, operating in a highly corrupt country with a different business culture than at 
home is a totally different game and will be described later in this study. 
Finally, an important finding of this study is the fact that it appears that acquiring 
knowledge of how to deal with corruption at home might help to cope with 







host country might be more important to analyse how corruption affects FDI than the 
level of corruption of the host country alone. This claim can be explained because 
MNEs based in highly corrupt home countries might not see corruption abroad as a 
deterrent for FDI since they are used to operating in such environments in their home 
country. Also, since corruption is the norm in the home country, these MNEs might 
not face pressures at home to abstain of investing in highly corrupt foreign locations. 
On the other hand, firms located in countries with low levels of corruption might be 
deterred by the uncertainty that corruption in the host country represents. 
Furthermore, these firms might also face pressures at home for not conducting 
business in foreign locations considered as highly corrupt. 
5.3.2 Limitations of the Interviews 
Despite the invaluable insights learned from the interviews, they could not provide 
the whole picture needed to understand how foreign investors react to corruption in 
Guatemala. Therefore, the interviews were used to craft a questionnaire that would 
(a) reach more respondents to have a more representative sample, and (b) provide the 
anonymity respondents needed to answer sensitive questions regarding corruption. 
The questionnaire was developed to reflect how MNEs react to the perception of 
corruption in their home country as well as in the host country. It also sought to 
quantify the uncertainty created by corruption in the host country, the strategy 
created to minimise the effects of corruption, the previous knowledge acquired to 
deal with corruption, and how corruption affects the already established operations in 
Guatemala. The questionnaires were sent to the whole population of MNEs operating 
in Guatemala in the period of November 2012 to January 2013. The questionnaires 
were distributed in two rounds. Firstly they were personally handed to the highest 
ranking manager in Guatemalan from November 2012 until February 2013, which 
provided 53 questionnaires filled. Secondly, at a meeting of foreign investors in 







January 2013, which provided the remaining 36 questionnaires obtained for a total of 
89 questionnaires received. 
5.4 Results from the Questionnaires 
At the end of the two rounds of data gathering 89 questionnaires were received. Of 
those, 32 questionnaires were not useful because they were not completed and/or 
they omitted answers that were necessary to analyse how corruption affects FDI in 
Guatemala. After scrutinising all the questionnaires filled, the total amount of usable 
questionnaires was 57 (19.06% of the total population) of which 34 were comprised 
by MNEs located in countries with a lower corruption level than Guatemala, and 23 
located in a more corrupt country. Although the response rate might seem low it is 
important to note that due to the nature of the study a 19% response is actually very 
significant. In addition, since the questionnaire had to be answered by decision 
makers in charge of selecting FDI destinations the response rate becomes even more 
substantial. 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Entry Mode of MNEs in Guatemala from 2007- 

















Greenfield (WOS)   17 (50%) 
 
4 (17.39%) 
Total   34 
 
23 
    Source: Author’s questionnaires 
 
Table 10 presents a description of the entry mode that foreign companies have 
adopted to penetrate the Guatemalan market. The vast majority (82.35%) of MNEs 
from less corrupt countries chose a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) as their entry 







preferred WOS due to the control that this entry mode provides. These managers also 
expressed that the choice between greenfield and brownfield depended solely on the 
existence of a local firm that was attractive and at a reasonable price. On the other 
hand, MNEs from more corrupt countries preferred joint ventures (JVs) for economic 
reasons, according to the respondents. Table 10 presents the sector on which 
investment was made in Guatemala during the period 2007-2012 presented in 
motivations for FDI. For both, more and less corrupt countries, the manufacture and 
services sectors were more attractive, while the natural resources and agriculture 
sectors were not. The amount invested in the country also has differences between 
MNEs from either more or less corrupt countries than the host country. As presented 
on Table 3, MNEs from less corrupt countries made larger investments in the host 
country than those located in more corrupt countries within the 2007-2012 period. 
 
















Resource Seeking   11 (32.36 %) 
 
4 (17.38%) 
Total  34  23 
                          Source: Author’s questionnaires 
  
For MNEs from countries with a lower corruption level than Guatemala the 
distribution of FDI in the country was evenly allocated in the three main motives for 
the country. For these MNEs the main motivation for investment in the country was 
market seeking with 35.28% of the total investment in the period of 2007 to 2012. 
During the same period, both efficiency seeking and resource seeking FDI accounted 







in countries with higher corruption levels than Guatemala market seeking was the 
main motivation for investing in the country. According to the data gathered by the 
author of this study, 43.48% of respondents indicated that the main motivation to 
invest in Guatemala was market seeking. The second most popular motive for 
investment in the country for MNEs from more corrupt countries was efficiency 
seeking with 39.14% of respondents stating this as their main motivation. Finally, for 
the period of 2007 to 2009, MNEs from countries with higher corruption levels than 
Guatemala declared that only 17.38% of the FDI allocated in the country had a 
resource seeking motivation.  





Amount of FDI         

































Total   34 
 
23 
                Source: Author’s questionnaires 
 
In order to analyse which factors affected the attraction of FDI in Guatemala at the 
firm level, the answers to the questionnaire were utilised as variables for multinomial 
logistic regressions. Table 12 presents how variables of the motives for FDI, entry 
mode, and previous presence in the Latin American region affected FDI flows to 







Guatemala from MNEs located in countries with higher corruption levels than a host 
country with high levels of corruption. On the other hand, for MNEs located in less 
corrupt countries than the host country, having already an established presence in the 
region showed a positive and statistically significant relationship at p<0.10 with FDI 
flows to the host country as presented in Model 4. 
 
Table 13: Multinomial Logistic Regression of FDI in Guatemala 
 





     
Intercept 
 
 52.150 (2.268)* 38.732 (4.139)* 
Entry Mode 
 
 50.230 (0.347) 42.281 (7.7687) 
Motive    56.344 (6.462) 37.821 (3.228) 
Subsidiaries   59.205 (9.323)* 35.349 (0.756 
Model Fit     
Deviance (-2 log likelihood)   49.882 (16.619)* 34.593 (11.498)* 
Cox and Snell   0.387 0.393 
Nagelkerke   0.414 0.427 
McFadden   0.180 0.197 
N   34 23 
Significance levels: *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively 
 
Table 13 presents the responses of managers (FDI decision-makers) of MNEs 
operating in Guatemala and their perception of their knowledge of whether or not 
they would face corruption in this host country. The results show that both, foreign 
MNEs headquartered in either more or less corrupt countries than Guatemala face 
corruption in the host country in the three main sectors of the public sector. The data 







Guatemala the probabilities of facing corruption with Guatemala’s political elite is 
55.9%; with the judiciary system, 55.9%; and with the bureaucratic sector, 94.1%. 
 




Likeliness of Facing Corruption in Guatemala 
      
  
Very Unlikely Unlikely 
Neither likely 
nor unlikely 
Likely Very Likely 
Political elite  
     More corrupt 0 (0%) 1 (4.3%) 10 (43.5%) 11 (47.9%) 1 (4.3%) 
Less corrupt 0 (0%) 2 (5.9%) 13 (38.2%) 15 (44.1%) 4 (11.8%) 
 
Judiciary system      
More corrupt 0 (0%) 3 (13%) 8 (34.8%) 9 (39.2%) 3 (13%) 
Less corrupt 0 (0%) 3 (8.8%) 12 (35.3%) 14 (41.2%) 5 (14.7%) 
 
Bureaucrats      
More corrupt 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (8.7%) 14 (60.9%) 7 (30.4%) 
Less corrupt 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (5.9%) 13 (38.2%) 19 (55.9%) 
      Source: Author’s questionnaires 
 
Table 14 also presents the responses of managers of MNEs located in countries with 
higher corruption level than Guatemala and their perception of how likely they are of 
facing corruption in the host country. MNEs from countries with higher corruption 
levels than Guatemala expressed that their probability of facing corruption with the 
political elite of the host country is 52.2%, which is the same rate for the judiciary 
system; and in the bureaucratic sector, 91.3%.  
As shown in Table 14, managers from foreign MNEs operating in Guatemala are 
aware of the high levels of corruption of the host country. Table 13 presents how 
much the perception of corruption affects the attraction of FDI to Guatemala. Table 







bureaucratic sectors does not affect the attraction of FDI to the host country. These 
results can be explained by the fact that decision-makers have knowledge of the 
corruption levels in Guatemala and the corruption level was taken into account when 
deciding to invest in the country. 
 
Table 15: Multinomial Logistic Regression Facing Corruption in Guatemala by        
                Government  
 





     
Intercept 
 
 41.693 (2.239)* 43.398 (1.820)* 
Government Elite 
 
 41.962 (2.508) 42.225 (0.647) 
Judiciary System    41.140 (1.686) 42.305 (0.727) 
Bureaucrats   41.154 (1.700) 43.021 (1.443) 
Model Fit     
Deviance (-2 log likelihood)   39.454 (5.493)* 41.579 (3.127)* 
Cox and Snell   0.149 0.127 
Nagelkerke   0.160 0.138 
McFadden   0.060 0.054 
N   34 23 




Researchers have argued that there are two dimensions of corruption, arbitrariness 
and pervasiveness (Doh, et al., 2003). In order to capture how these two dimensions 
of corruption affected foreign investors in Guatemala, questions regarding the 
uncertainty that corruption in the host country were asked. As presented in table 15, 
MNEs from more corrupt countries than the host country have a slight advantage 







stating that they possessed knowledge of how much an unofficial payment will be, 
compared with an 35.3% of respondents from less corrupt countries. Managers from 
more corrupt countries also showed an advantage when dealing with arbitrary 
corruption in Guatemala. Table 6 shows that 47.8% of managers from more corrupt 
countries had knowledge of whether or not an extra unofficial payment will be 
needed after already making an initial payment. Similarly, MNEs from less corrupt 
countries said that they had such knowledge at a 41.4% rate.  
Table 16: Arbitrariness and Pervasiveness of corruption in Guatemala 2007-2012 
 
Arbitrariness and Pervasiveness of Corruption in Guatemala  




No Neutral Somewhat yes Yes 
Knowledge of price of unofficial 
payments  
     
More corrupt 0 (0%) 2 (8.7%) 11 (47.8%) 8 (34.8%) 2 (8.7%) 
Less corrupt 1 (2.9%) 4 (11.8%) 17 (50%) 11 (32.4%) 1 (2.9%) 
 
Knowledge if more unofficial payments 
will be needed      
More corrupt 0 (0%) 2 (8.7%) 10 (43.5%) 8 (34.8%) 3 (13%) 
Less corrupt 3 (8.2%) 9 (26.8%) 8 (23.6%) 12 (35.5%) 2 (5.9%) 
 
Knowledge if service will be delivered 
after an unofficial payment      
More corrupt 0 (0%) 3 (13%) 8 (34.8%) 10 (43.5%) 2 (8.7%) 
Less corrupt 2 (5.9%) 5 (14.7%) 12 (35.3%) 12 (35.3%) 3 (8.8%) 
Source: Author’s questionnaires 
 
Another aspect of the arbitrariness of corruption is measured by the uncertainty that 
whether or not after making an unofficial payment the service will be delivered as 
agreed (Doh, et al., 2003). As presented on Table 12, managers of MNEs from highly 







deal with corruption and use such knowledge to cope with corruption abroad. 
Managers of MNEs from more corrupt countries expressed that they had knowledge 
of whether or not a service was going to be delivered after making an illegal payment 
to a Guatemalan official at a rate of 52.2%. On the other hand, managers from MNEs 
with lower levels of corruption said that they had knowledge in this regard at a 
44.1%. 
Table 16 shows the result of the analysis of the influence of arbitrary and pervasive 
corruption on FDI to Guatemala at the firm level. Model 7 presents the results of the 
analysis of MNEs with headquarters in countries with lower levels of corruption than 
Guatemala and how they are affected by arbitrariness and pervasiveness in the host 
country. As presented in Table 8, MNEs from countries with lower corrupt levels 
than a host country with high corruption have knowledge of the pervasiveness of 
corruption in Guatemala. However, model 7 also shows that MNEs from less corrupt 
countries than Guatemala do not have knowledge about how to cope with the 
arbitrariness of corruption in the host country.  
 
Table 17: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Arbitrariness and Pervasiveness in  
                Guatemala 2007-2012 
 





     
Intercept 
 
 57.283 (5.806)* 39.393 (2.189)* 




62.378 (10.900)* 37.638 (0.434)* 
 
Knowledge if more unofficial 
payments will be needed    
54.933 (3.455) 40.508 (3.304)* 
 
Knowledge if service will be 
delivered after an unofficial 
payment   
57.730 (6.252) 40.465 (3.261)** 
Model Fit     







Cox and Snell   0.401 0.377 
Nagelkerke   0.430 0.409 
McFadden   0.189 0.187 
N   34 23 
Significance levels: *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively 
 
Table 16 also presents how the arbitrariness and pervasiveness of corruption in 
Guatemala affects the attraction of FDI from firms from countries with higher 
corruption levels than the host country. Model 8 shows that MNEs from countries 
with higher corruption levels than Guatemala as well as MNEs from countries with 
lower levels of corruption, have advance knowledge of how much an unofficial 
payment will be (pervasiveness) in the host country, and therefore, this knowledge 
has a positive effect on FDI at p<0.10. MNEs from more corrupt countries than 
Guatemala, however, have an advantage over their counterparts from countries with 
lower levels of corruption when dealing with the arbitrariness of corruption in the 
host country. Model 8 presents that FDI to Guatemala from MNEs headquartered in 
countries more corrupt than the host country is positively affected with statistical 
significance (p<0.10: knowledge if additional payments need to be made; p<0.01: if 
the service will be delivered) by the arbitrariness of corruption in the host country. 
High corruption levels in the host country are also believed to have an effect on the 
entry mode and strategy used by foreign MNEs penetrating a new market. Table 17 
shows that MNEs from firms located in countries with lower corruption levels than 
Guatemala expressed that their entry mode was affected by the level of corruption of 
the host country at a 26.2% rate; whereas the high level of corruption of the host 
country affected their strategy in the host country at an 8.8% rate. On the other hand, 
MNEs from countries with a higher level of corruption than Guatemala expressed 
that the corruption of the host country affected their entry mode and strategy used to 








Table 18: Corruption, Entry Mode and Strategy in Guatemala from 2007-2012 
Corruption, Entry Mode and Strategy when Investing  in Guatemala 
      
  




Level of corruption 
affected the entry 
mode to Guatemala  
     More corrupt 12 (52.2%) 10 (43.5%) 0 (0%) 1 (4.3%) 0 (0%) 
Less corrupt 5 (14.7%) 14 (41.5%) 6 (17.6%) 7 (20.6%) 2 (5.6%) 
 
Level of corruption 
affected strategy      
More corrupt 12 (52.2%) 10 (43.5%) 0 (0%) 1 (4.3%) 0 (0%) 
Less corrupt 8 (23.6%) 18 (52.9%) 5 (14.7%) 3 (8.8%) 0 (0%) 
       Source: Author’s questionnaires 
  
The multinomial logistic analysis performed to how corruption affects the entry 
mode and strategy of FDI to Guatemala is presented in Table 18. Model 10 shows 
that corruption does not appear to have an effect on the entry mode and strategy used 
by MNEs from countries with higher corruption levels than Guatemala. On the other 
hand, Model 9 shows that MNEs from countries with lower corruption levels than 
Guatemala adapt their entry mode and the strategy to penetrate the Guatemalan 
market. These effects over MNEs from countries with lower levels of corruption than 













Table 19: Multinomial Logistic Analysis Corruption, Entry Mode and Strategy in  
                Guatemala from 2007-2012 
 





     
Intercept 
 
 14.857 (1.009) 48.013 (0.901) 
Entry Mode 
 
 29.032 (15.185)** 50.313 (3.201) 
Strategy    25.817 (11.970)** 50.330 (3.218) 
Model Fit     
Deviance (-2 log likelihood)   13.847 (17.180)** 47.112 (5.157)* 
Cox and Snell   0.526 0.141 
Nagelkerke   0.572 0.151 
McFadden   0.295 0.056 
N   34 23 
Significance levels: *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively 
 
The questionnaire also included questions regarding current operations in Guatemala. 
The rationale for including these questions obeys to the fact that the firms selected 
for this study have already established operations in the country and they have to 
cope with the high levels of corruption in the host country in their daily operations. 
Table 19 presents the responses of managers regarding how corruption affects their 
operations in Guatemala. Managers of MNEs from countries with higher levels of 
corruption than the host country said that corruption is part of the business culture in 











Table 20: Corruption and Operations in Guatemala from 2007-2012 
Operating in Guatemala 
  
Not at all No Neutral Somewhat yes Yes 
Is corruption part of the business 
culture in Guatemala?      
More corrupt 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 8 (34.8%) 11 (47.8%) 4 (17.4%) 
Less corrupt 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (2.9%) 19 (55.9%) 14 (41.2%) 
 
Have you ever seen anyone in your 
line of business give a bribe to a 
member of the government elite?      
More corrupt 1 (4.3%) 8 (34.8%) 5 (21.7%) 7 (30.4%) 2 (8.8%) 
Less corrupt 1 (2.9%) 8 (23.5%) 8 (23.5%) 11 (32.5%) 6 (17.6%) 
 
Have you ever seen anyone in your 
line of business give a bribe to a 
legislator?      
More corrupt 1 (4.3%) 6 (26.2%) 7 (30.4%) 7 (30.4%) 2 (8.8%) 
Less corrupt 3 (8.8%) 10 (29.4%) 7 (20.6%) 11 (32.4%) 3 (8.8%) 
 
Have you ever seen anyone in your 
line of business give a bribe to a 
bureaucrat?      
More corrupt 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (4.4%) 11 (47.8%) 11 (47.8%) 
Less corrupt 0 (0%) 2 (5.9%) 5 (14.6%) 11 (32.4%) 16 (47.1%) 
 
Has a member of the government 
elite asked you for a bribe?      
More corrupt 2 (8.7%) 7 (30.4%) 10 (43.5%) 4 (17.4%) 0 (0%) 
Less corrupt 1 (2.9%) 12 (35.3%) 9 (26.5%) 7 (20.6%) 5 (14.7%) 
      
Has a legislator asked you for a 
bribe?      
More corrupt 1 (4.3%) 5 (21.7%) 10 (43.5%) 6 (26.2%) 1 (4.3%) 
Less corrupt 2 (5.9%) 11 (32.4%) 8 (23.5%) 11 (32.4%) 2 (5.9%) 
      
Has a bureaucrat asked you for a 
bribe?      
More corrupt 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (8.7%) 11 (47.8%) 10 (43.5%) 
Less corrupt 0 (0%) 1 (2.9%) 1 (2.9%) 11 (32.4%) 21 (61.8%) 
      
How likely is your firm to do 
business with the government?      
More corrupt 2 (8.7%) 6 (26.2%) 7 (30.4%) 7 (30.4%) 1 (4.3%) 
Less corrupt 2 (5.9%) 5 (14.7%) 16 (47.1%) 9 (26.4%) 2 (5.9%) 
      







witnessed the bribery of members of the local government elite and judiciary system 
at a 39.2% rate each, and members of the bureaucracy at a 95.6%. Managers of 
MNEs headquartered in countries with lower corruption levels than Guatemala 
expressed that corruption is part of the business culture in Guatemala at a 97.1%. 
These managers also said that they have seen members of the government elite at a 
rate of 44.1%; members of the judiciary system, 41.2%; and members of the 
bureaucracy, 79.5%. 
Table 20 also presents the answers of decision-makers of MNEs operating in 
Guatemala of whether a member of the Guatemalan government had requested 
illegal payments in order to carry out their operations in the country. Managers of 
MNEs from more corrupt countries than Guatemala have been requested illegal 
payments from the members of the government elite at a 17.4%; from members of 
the judiciary system, 30.5%; and from the bureaucracy, 91.3%. On the other hand, 
managers of MNEs from countries with lower corrupt levels than Guatemala said 
that the members of the government elite requested illegal payments at a rate of 
35.3% in the period of 2007 to 2012. During the same period, these managers said 
that members of the judiciary system had requested bribes at a rate of 38.3%; and 
members of the bureaucracy, 94.2%. Finally, both, MNEs from countries with higher 
or lower corruption levels than Guatemala, expressed that their probability of doing 
business with the host government is 34.3% and 32.3% respectively. 
In order to test how corruption in the host country affected FDI from companies 
already in operations in a highly corrupt host country, a multinomial logistic 
regression was performed. Table 20 presents that FDI from MNEs located in 
countries with lower corruption levels than Guatemala is positively affected and 
statistically significant at the p<0.001 level by the perception of giving bribes to the 
members of the government elite and legislators of the host country as seen in Model 
11. Conversely, Model 12 shows that FDI from firms from countries with lower 







by paying bribes to the government elite and members of the judiciary system of the 
host country. Furthermore, unlike FDI from firms located in countries with lower 
levels of corruption than the host country, FDI from firms from countries with higher 
corruption levels than Guatemala was positively affected by doing business with the 
local government. 
 
Table 21: Multinomial logistic regression Corruption and Operations in Guatemala  
                 from 2007-2012 
 
Variable (Coefficient) 





     
Intercept 
 
 48.053 (5.203)* 16.470 (3.548)* 
Is corruption part of the 
business culture in Guatemala? 
 
 
43.826 (0.976) 13.973 (1.211) 
 
Have you ever seen anyone in 
your line of business give a 
bribe to a member of the 
government elite?    
55.180 (12.330)** 13.713 (0.791) 
 
Have you ever seen anyone in 
your line of business give a 
bribe to a legislator?   
53.767 (10.917)** 15.096 (2.174) 
     
Have you ever seen anyone in 
your line of business give a 
bribe to a bureaucrat?   
45.895 (3.045) 12.998 (0.76) 
     
Has a member of the 
government elite asked you for 
a bribe?   
45.548 (2.698) 28.705 (15.784)** 
     
Has a legislator asked you for a 
bribe?   
59.624 (16.773) 26.465 (13.543)** 
     
Has a bureaucrat asked you for 
a bribe?   
46.658 (3.808) 12.988 (0.67) 
     
How likely is your firm to do 
business with the government?   
44.818 (1.968) 19.103 (6.340)* 








Model Fit   
  
Deviance (-2 log likelihood)   42.850 (48.007)** 12.922 (43.920)** 
Cox and Snell   0.756 0.786 
Nagelkerke   0.810 0.854 
McFadden   0.520 0.609 
Significance levels: *, **, and *** denote significance of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively 
 
5.4.1 Model Fit 
As previously mentioned, endogeneity should always be expected in a social science 
research; however, there are methods that can be used to reduce its effects. As 
presented in the results of the firm-level results, the model fit of each model does not 
suggest any problems with endogeneity. Finally, tests to ensure no multicollinearity 
was present were performed to all the models for the firm-level analysis. The VIF 
analysis did not suggest any problem with the data or the results. According to 
O’Brien (2007), a commonly accepted VIF has a value of 15; however, the author 
also explains that in order to be more cautious, a maximum threshold of 10 should be 
used. As presented in the appendix of this study, none of the models used for the 
firm-level analysis showed problems of multicollinearity. 
5.5 Summary of the Chapter 
The results of the macroeconomic analysis are used to answer the research question: 
a) How does corruption distance between home and host country affect the attraction 
of FDI to emerging markets? The results of this section show that the total amount of 
FDI flow to Latin America is deterred by corruption. However, when analysing 
corruption distance, countries with lower level of corruption than the host countries 
are negatively affected by corruption distance. On the other hand, corruption distance 
does not appear to have an effect on corruption when both the host and home 







Firm-level data was used to answer the research question: b) Why are some foreign 
firms less negatively affected than others by high levels of host country corruption 
when investing abroad? The firm-level analysis show that managers from more 
corrupt countries than the host countries have an advantage when dealing with 
arbitrary and pervasive corruption in the host country when compared to investors 
from countries with lower levels of corruption. On the contrary, firms from less 
corrupt countries show that having subsidiaries in other Latin American countries 
have provided them with the knowledge of how to cope with corruption in 
Guatemala. Finally, while firms from more corrupt countries do not change their 
entry mode or strategy due to the high levels of corruption in Guatemala, the results 
of this study suggest that high corruption in the host country affect these aspects 




















CHAPTER SIX: KEY FACTORS RELATED TO CORRUPTION AND HOW 
IT AFFECTS THE ATTRACTION OF FDI 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an answer to the two research questions. Firstly, this section 
answers the question: a) How does corruption distance between home and host 
country affect the attraction of FDI to emerging markets? Based on a macroeconomic 
analysis of FDI to Latin America this study argues that corruption distance has a 
negative effect on FDI when the home countries have a lower level of corruption 
than highly corrupt host countries. Furthermore, it has been acknowledged in recent 
literature that corruption creates challenges to foreign investors since it may increase 
the costs of doing businesses abroad, as well as the risk associated with those 
activities (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). However, this perception might not be the same 
depending on the levels of corruption of an investor’s home country.  
The second section of this chapter presents a firm-level evaluation of b) Why are 
some foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high levels of host country 
corruption when investing abroad? This section evaluates if corruption and its 
dimensions has a similar effect on the entry mode, quality of investment, and 
granting of public contracts for foreign investors depending on the level of 
corruption of their home countries.  
6.2 Corruption Distance and how it affects FDI to Latin America 
Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the study of how corruption affects 
the attraction of FDI reaching mixed results. The vast majority of studies conclude 
that corruption acts as a deterrent to FDI (Bevan, et al., 2004; Bénassy-Quéré, et al., 
2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). On the other hand, others 
have not found a relationship between these two variables or even a positive one 






an alternative explanation of how corruption affects FDI taking into account not only 
corruption levels but the corruption distance between the host and home countries. 
This study argues that the reason why the relation of corruption and FDI might be 
more complex than just analysing whether high corruption in the host country deters 
FDI. Instead, grounded on transaction cost and institutional theories and analysed 
with the aid of the OLI paradigm, this study argues that it is not the levels of 
corruption of a foreign location but also the distance in corruption levels between the 
home and host countries. Nevertheless, this argument is valid only when the host 
country is considered highly corrupt and the home country has lower levels of 
corruption. On the other hand, when the host country is perceived as highly corrupt 
but the home country is more corrupt, corruption distance does not seem to affect 
FDI. 
In order to explain how corruption affects FDI this study introduces the term of 
‘corruption distance’. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) found that the difference between 
the corruption levels between home and host countries have a negative effect on FDI. 
However, in their study the authors grouped all foreign investors without taking into 
account whether or not host countries were considered more or less corrupt than the 
home countries. Instead, this study argues that corruption distance does have a 
negative effect on FDI only when FDI flows go from home countries with lower 
levels of corruption than highly corrupt host countries. On the other hand, when FDI 
flows go from countries with higher corruption levels than highly corrupt host 
countries, corruption distance does not seem to have an effect on FDI. 
6.2.1 Corruption Distance and its Effects on FDI when Home countries are 
Equally or More Corrupt than Highly Corrupt Host Countries 
The main finding of the macroeconomic section of this study is that that not only 
corruption distance but also the direction of corruption distance matters. Firms 
established in countries with high levels of corruption may not be affected by high 






costs that firms operating in highly corrupt might incur when investing in similar 
environments abroad due to the knowledge developed of how to cope with high 
corruption. Also, despite the hostility that a highly corrupt foreign location might 
represent, firms with experience operating in such environments might have an 
advantage over those firms without such expertise (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
The explanation for this is that MNEs from highly corrupt countries face less liability 
of foreignness when they deal with a week institutional environment at home and 
thus can deal with similar conditions abroad and minimise their transaction costs.  
Even though measuring corruption across countries is a difficult endeavour, 
corruption reflects a fundamental institutional framework and hence, corruption and 
its forms can be correlated among different locations (Svensson, 2005). Therefore, it 
may not be surprising that MNEs located in countries with high levels of corruption 
are not negatively affected by high levels of corruption abroad. This claim can be 
sustained by the fact that firms operating in highly corrupt countries have 
internalised knowledge of how to deal with corruption abroad. Also, these firms 
might not face pressures at their home country to not engage in corrupt deals abroad. 
Based on the transaction cost perspective, this study argues that FDI from MNEs 
based in countries with higher levels of corruption than an already high corrupt 
foreign location. This argument is grounded on the premise that not all foreign 
investors face the same costs of engaging in corruption abroad (Montiel, et al., 2012). 
Firms from less corrupt countries than the host country might incur in higher costs of 
operating in highly corrupt countries not only to adapt to the local environment but 
also due to any damage that their image might experience if they engage in corrupt 
deals or do business in highly corrupt foreign locations (Terlaak, 2007). On the other 
hand, those firms that already operate in highly corrupt locations may not face such 
public image costs. 
The institutional environments of the host and home countries also have an effect on 






determined by the institutional environment of a given country, which has been 
argued to be an important factor for a location’s attractiveness (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
Therefore, the level of corruption of a foreign location can be a predictor of FDI 
flows to such location (Aizenman & Spiegel, 2006). However, in mainstream 
literature the levels of corruption have been portrayed as deterrent of FDI. Moreover, 
high levels of corruption are also associated with an unfavourable institutional 
environment (Egger & Winner, 2005). Nevertheless, this study argues that corruption 
itself might not be what deters foreign investors but the uncertainty it creates. 
Moreover, this uncertainty can be exacerbated due to the difference in levels of 
corruption between a home country with lower levels of corruption than a highly 
corrupt host country. Therefore, certain foreign investors with different institutional 
home environments might actually be deterred by high corruption in the host country, 
while those with similar institutional environments are not. 
6.2.2 Corruption Distance and its Effects on FDI when Home countries are Less 
Corrupt than Highly Corrupt Host Countries 
The results of this study indicate that corruption distance has a negative effect on 
FDI when the home country has lower levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host 
country. This finding is sustained by the fact that firms headquartered in countries 
with low levels of corruption might incur in high costs when conducting business in 
highly corrupt foreign locations (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). In fact, the costs that 
foreign MNEs face abroad due to corruption are very significant. According to Kwok 
and Tadesse (2006) corrupt payments total a significant amount of a nation’s GDP. 
Therefore, these costs cannot be understated by foreign firms evaluating whether or 
not to invest in a foreign location. 
Another aspect to take into account when explaining why corruption distance affects 
negatively FDI is the risk associated with investing in a highly corrupt foreign 
location. Casson and Lopes (2013) state that foreign firms entering unfamiliar 






more challenging than in others.  This argument is valid in the context of corruption 
distance and FDI when the home country has lower levels of corruption than a highly 
corrupt host country. However, investment occurs in foreign locations despite of 
their level of corruption, which could imply that there are some firms that are better 
able to adapt to unfamiliar conditions than others. Therefore, in this study it is argued 
that when the degree of unfamiliarity with the host country environment is greater, 
FDI is affected negatively. In other words, the greater the corruption distance 
between a home country with lower levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host 
country the more negative effect such distance has on FDI. 
6.2.3 Corruption and its Effects on FDI  
In line with the extant literature about corruption and FDI, this study argues that 
corruption deters overall FDI to Latin America. This argument is consistent with the 
extant relevant literature of corruption and FDI. The theoretical basis against 
corruption are derived from transaction costs and ethics (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002), 
since foreign investors might be deterred to invest in highly corrupt countries due to 
the high costs this represents, or because they believe corruption is morally wrong. 
As previously presented, the majority of FDI flows to Latin America originate in 
developed economies, which generally have low levels of corruption, according to 
Transparency International (Transparency International, 2011). Therefore, when 
investing in a location characterised as highly corrupt, such as Latin America, it is 
understandable that such high levels of corruption deter FDI lows to the region.  
The rationale behind the argument of why corruption deters FDI is due to the fact 
that high corruption in the host country can be difficult to manage, costly, and risky 
(Casson & Lopes, 2013). Therefore, the negative effect of corruption on FDI flows to 
Latin America found on this study implies that foreign investors, as a whole, are 
deterred by high corruption in the host country. However, this study not only 
corroborates that high levels of corruption have a negative impact in FDI as a whole, 






Most studies analysing corruption and FDI have taken an econometric approach but 
have utilised only cross-sectional data such as Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2006). Instead, this research utilised panel data for the analysis. 
Also, studies analysing how corruption affects the attraction of FDI have not taken 
into account the level of corruption of the host countries as compared to corruption 
levels of the home countries. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) analysed the interaction 
between home and host country corruption but they did not make a distinction 
between home countries with higher or lower corruption levels than the host 
countries. On the other hand, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) demonstrated that those firms 
that had signed the OECD Anti-Bribery convention are deterred by corruption abroad; 
however, with this distinction countries considered as highly corrupt (such as Mexico) 
were grouped with countries with low levels of corruption (such as Finland). 
Therefore, even if this study confirms that FDI, as a whole, is deterred by corruption 
abroad, it does so with an innovative method. 
6.2.4 Analysing Corruption Distance with the OLI Paradigm and Institutional 
Theory 
This study utilised a combination of the TCT and institutional theory with the OLI 
paradigm as a framework to analyse how corruption distance affects FDI. 
Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that the OLI paradigm is context-specific and 
that its elements cannot be analysed in an isolated manner (Stoian & Filippaios, 
2008). However, Brouthers, et al., (1999) argue that the OLI paradigm may be more 
appropriate to analyse FDI activities than transaction costs along. Among the 
ownership ‘O’ specific advantages of firms internationalising scholars have 
identified advantages inherent to the firm that allows it to begin operations in foreign 
markets. Based on this premise this study suggests that one ‘O’ advantage that firms 
located in highly corrupt countries is that they have acquired knowledge of how to 
deal with corruption at home and have exploited such knowledge abroad. On the 
other hand, firms that have not acquired and internalised knowledge of how to deal 






The results of this study suggest that once a firm located in a highly corrupt country 
has acquired knowledge of how to cope with corruption at home, this ‘O’ specific 
advantage can be exploited abroad. In other words, the intangible knowledge 
generated regarding how to cope with corruption at home has been internalised to be 
exploited in other highly corrupt locations. Nevertheless, MNEs headquartered in 
countries with low levels of corruption may have not generated such knowledge, and 
therefore, they may struggle to adapt to generate the knowledge to cope with high 
levels of corruption abroad. 
The third part of the paradigm has to do with the location of FDI abroad. As 
previously described the L advantages play an important part of the analysis of 
foreign markets since they can define whether or not such markets are attractive 
(Dunning, 1998). Furthermore, scholars have acknowledged that L specific 
advantages are different for different companies and even for different projects 
(Brouthers, et al., 1999). Therefore, this study argues that it is not only the presence 
of corruption in a foreign location what deters FDI. Instead, corruption in a foreign 
location may impact FDI depending on whether or not foreign investors experience 
high levels of corruption at home. Finally, this study argues that when analysing FDI 
activities to highly corrupt locations, scholars should not only include corruption 
levels of the host countries, but also the corruption distance between them and 
whether or not home-countries have higher or lower levels of corruption than the 
host countries. 
One of the most important factors to take into account when choosing a foreign 
location to establish operations is the institutional environment of such location (Wu, 
et al., 2008; Orr & Scott, 2008). According to Cantwell, et al., (2010), MNEs must 
adjust their strategies and structures to respond to uncertainty in a foreign 
environment. Furthermore, the institutional environment of a foreign location can 
determine the attraction of foreign investment since a good institutional environment 






a poor institutional environment abroad might increase the costs of operating in that 
location and thus deter FDI (Bénassy-Quéré, et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, building on the premise that not all foreign investors are equal 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006), and that some firms have internalised the knowledge of how 
to cope with corruption at home, this study argues that even though corruption 
increases uncertainty, this uncertainty is not the same to all foreign investors. 
Therefore, this study argues that the corruption level on its own is not enough to 
explain why corruption deters FDI. Instead, what might deter FDI is the uncertainty 
caused by corruption distance between a host country with high levels of corruption 
and a home country with lower corruption levels. On the other hand, those firms 
located in highly corrupt countries might not be affected by high corruption abroad 
since they are used to operating in similar situations. 
6.3 Firm-Level Analysis of Corruption and its Effects on FDI 
This section analyses the answer to the research question: Why are some foreign 
firms less negatively affected than others by high levels of host country corruption 
when investing abroad? To do so, a firm-level analysis of how high levels of 
corruption abroad affect foreign investors was conducted. Firstly, in-depth semi-
structured interviews were conducted. Secondly, based on the responses to the 
interviews a questionnaire was developed to reach at a larger respondent sample to 
better understand the issue. 
6.3.1 Motives of FDI and how they are Affected by Corruption 
The motives of FDI have been widely discussed in IB literature. As mentioned 
before, Dunning (1998) identified three main motives for FDI which are: Foreign-
market-seeking; efficiency-seeking; and resource-seeking. However, this study did 
not find that one motive for FDI to Guatemala was preferred over another due to the 
corruption levels of the country. At the same time, the choice of JVs or WOS as 






presence in other Latin American countries had a statistical significance as a 
motivation of FDI from countries with lower levels of corruption than Guatemala. 
These results may suggest that firms with lower levels of corruption than Guatemala 
needed to acquire knowledge of how to cope with a weak institutional environment 
in Latin America before deciding to enter the Guatemalan market. However, firms 
from more corrupt countries did not need to acquire knowledge to cope with 
corruption in a foreign location because they had acquired such knowledge at home. 
6.3.2 Types of Corruption in Guatemala and their Effect on FDI 
The three types of corruption that can be found in a democracy (in the bureaucratic, 
judiciary, and government elite sectors) did not present a significant effect on FDI 
from either more or less corrupt countries than Guatemala. Even though Guatemala 
is perceived as highly corrupt (Transparency International, 2010), none of these types 
of corruption seem to affect the attraction of FDI to the country. One possible 
explanation is provided by one of the foreign managers interviewed for this study. 
According to the respondent, ‘the high levels of corruption in Guatemala are not a 
secret to any foreign investor.’ Therefore, once the decision of investing in 
Guatemala has been made, it is unlikely that high corruption in any of the three main 
sectors of the public sphere of the country have a strong effect on foreign investment. 
6.3.3 Arbitrariness and Pervasiveness of Corruption and FDI to Guatemala 
Literature on corruption and FDI presents arguments for a negative impact on 
corruption on FDI and a positive one. Recently some scholars have argued that the 
reason why there is no consensus regarding corruption and its effect on FDI is due to 
the fact that corruption does not have the same characteristics in different countries 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). Based on two dimensions of 
corruption, arbitrariness and pervasiveness, Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) concludes that 
both types of corruption deter FDI. However, according to Cuervo-Cazurra (2008), 






of the uncertainty of operating abroad, while pervasive corruption increases the 
known costs of operating in a highly corrupt country.  
Building on Cuervo-Cazurra (2008), this study furthers the knowledge regarding the 
arbitrariness and pervasiveness of corruption. This study presents evidence that firms 
headquartered in highly corrupt countries may be better prepared to cope with the 
arbitrariness of corruption abroad because they have acquired knowledge of how to 
cope with that dimension of corruption at home. On the other hand, firms without 
such knowledge are deterred by the uncertainty caused by arbitrary corruption abroad. 
According to Cuervo-Cazurra (2006), pervasive corruption, corruption that is 
generally present, deters FDI because it increases the known costs of investing in a 
highly corrupt location. This study confirms that firms operating in Guatemala have a 
good knowledge of the known costs associated with corruption; therefore, firms from 
an either more or less corrupt home country than Guatemala are not deterred by high 
corruption in the host country.  
When analysing arbitrary corruption, however, firms headquartered in countries with 
higher corruption levels than Guatemala seem to have an advantage over their 
counterparts based in countries with lower levels of corruption. Based on the 
responses from foreign investors in Guatemala, this study argues that arbitrary 
corruption has a positive effect on FDI to Guatemala when the home country is more 
corrupt than the host country. Therefore, explaining why high levels of corruption in 
the host country may not deter foreign investors from highly corrupt home countries. 
This is an important finding because it helps explain why firms headquartered in 
highly corrupt countries might not be deterred by high levels of corruption in a 
foreign location. Based on this premise, this study proposes that firms based on 
highly corrupt countries have acquired knowledge not only about the known costs of 
corruption abroad, but also regarding whether or not extra payments will be needed 






current literature by empirically demonstrating why firms from highly corrupt 
countries might not be deterred by high corruption abroad. 
6.3.4 Entry Mode  
While there are a growing number of studies analysing corruption and its effect on 
FDI, the relationship between corruption and entry mode has not received the same 
level of attention (Duanmy, 2011). This study addresses this lack of empirical 
analysis in the area of corruption and its effects on entry mode at the firm-level. This 
study argues that companies did not choose to invest in the country based on the 
option of selecting JVs or WOS. However, when analysing how the high levels of 
corruption in Guatemala affected the entry mode chosen the results are different. 
While firms located in countries with higher corruption levels than Guatemala did 
not modify their entry strategy to the country due to the corruption levels of the host 
country, firms from less corrupt countries did.  
According to managers with investments in Guatemala, the high levels of corruption 
in the host country motivated them to opt for a WOS to enter the country. Scholars 
have argued that high levels of corruption in the host country will lead foreign 
investors to choose JVs over WOS in order to minimise risk (Smarzynska & Wei, 
2000). However, other studies have found the opposite. These studies actually argue 
that that MNEs would prefer to enter highly corrupt foreign locations via WOS in 
order to avoid collaborating with highly corrupt local companies, and to maintain 
greater control of their operations abroad (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006; Duanmy, 2011).  
This study, however, separated foreign investors according to the level of corruption 
of their home countries. The results of the study suggest that firms with lower corrupt 
levels than Guatemala would prefer WOS over JVs when investing in a highly 
corrupt foreign location in order to exert control over their operations. This result can 
be explained because in long-term contracts, such as FDI, greater asset specificity 
increases the costs of contracting (Willimason, 1996); therefore, in order to avoid 






location as too risky. On the other hand, corruption did not have an effect on the 
entry mode chosen by foreign investors from more corrupt countries. According to 
managers interviewed, corruption did not dictate their entry mode but instead the 
costs of establishing foreign subsidiaries did.  
6.3.5 Quality of FDI and Corruption 
This study also researched the quality of investment and how this was affected by 
high levels of corruption in the host country. According to Zurawicki and Habib 
(2010), it is necessary to investigate not only whether or not corruption in the host 
country decreases the level of investment but also if corruption decreases its quality. 
The results presented in this study suggest that the quality of FDI from more corrupt 
countries than Guatemala was not affected by the high levels of corruption of the 
host country. On the contrary, the quality of FDI from firms located in countries with 
lower levels of corruption was affected by the high levels of corruption of the host 
country. Based on the data gathered in this study, firms from less corrupt countries 
argued that their investment in Guatemala was mainly devoted to projects that could 
be easily relocated abroad if needed. Furthermore, these investors argued that due to 
the uncertainty created by high levels of corruption they would not make substantial 
investments in the country such as R&D centres or plants for highly skilled workers. 
6.3.6 Operating in Guatemala after the Decision of Investing has been made 
Institutional theory proposes that MNEs encounter a contradictory situation when 
attempting to gain legitimacy in the different markets on which they operate 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Furthermore, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) argue that 
headquarters often exert pressure to their foreign subsidiaries to resemble practices 
established at home when operating abroad. However, managers might resist such 
pressure if they believe that the practices imposed by headquarters go against local 
beliefs (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Based on this premise, this study seeks to 






similar pressures to not engage in corruption abroad than their counterparts 
headquartered in countries with lower levels of corruption than the host country. 
In their study, Kostova et al., (2008), suggest that due to their foreignness, MNEs 
may be protected from pressures to adapt to host country institutions. However, in 
the corruption area, Spencer and Gomez (2011) found evidence that MNEs face 
pressures to adapt to host country expectations and conventions. However, the results 
from Spencer and Gomez (2011) may be derived from the fact that they did not 
separate foreign investors based on their level of corruption as compared to the 
corruption level of the host country. For this reason, to shed light into the debate of 
how foreign firms cope with the pressure to engage in corruption in the host country, 
this study focuses on the different pressures foreign firms face. Thus, this study 
analyses firms from either more or less corrupt home countries than a highly corrupt 
country and how they cope with pressures to adapt to local corrupt conventions in the 
host country. 
Based on the results of the questionnaires handed to foreign investors with presence 
in Guatemala, this study found that firms from more corrupt countries might have an 
advantage when operating in a highly corrupt foreign country because they possess 
knowledge of how to conform to the local conventions of the host country. 
According to foreign managers of MNEs based in more corrupt countries than 
Guatemala, members of the government elite and of the judiciary system have 
requested them illegal payments to operate in the country. Furthermore, these 
managers also expressed that they do business with the local government in a regular 
basis. Therefore, it could be implied that these firms have knowledge of how to deal 
with corruption abroad, and they are not concerned regarding the damage that their 
reputation might suffer for doing so. 
On the contrary, firms based in less corrupt countries than a highly corrupt country 
might not totally conform to local pressures to adapt to high levels of corruption. 






may make illegal payments to local members of the government elite and of the 
judiciary system, they expressed that they try to avoid doing business with the local 
government. This result might suggest that even though firms from less corrupt 
countries do participate in corrupt deals, their involvement does not have the same 
magnitude than those of firms from more corrupt countries than a highly corrupt host 
country. Therefore, a possible explanation of why firms from highly corrupt home 
countries are not affected by high levels of corruption in the host country might be 
that they have less pressure from headquarters to not engage in corrupt deals. 
6.4 Summary of the Chapter 
Corruption and its effect on FDI have been widely studied in recent literature 
reaching very different results. While some authors have found a strong negative 
effect of corruption on FDI others have found no effect or even a positive one. For 
this reason, this study analyses the issue of corruption and FDI from a different 
perspective, which is whether the distance on corruption levels between host and 
home countries have a greater effect on FDI than just the corruption levels of the host 
location. Therefore, this research proposes the following research question: a) How 
does corruption distance between home and host country affect the attraction of FDI 
to emerging markets?  
In order to further the knowledge regarding corruption ant its relation with FDI, this 
study suggests that it is not only the levels of corruption of a foreign location what 
might affect the attraction of FDI but the distance of corruption levels between a 
home and host country. In addition to corruption distance, this study also suggests 
that the direction of such distance is important when analysing how corruption 
affects FDI. The rationale behind this claim is because when analysing FDI flows 
from countries with lower levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host region, the 
higher the distance the greater negative effect it has on FDI. On the other hand, 
corruption distance does not seem to have an effect on FDI when the home country 






This study also analysed how corruption affected foreign investors at the firm level 
in order to answer the following research question: b) Why are some foreign firms 
less negatively affected than others by high levels of host country corruption when 
investing abroad? To answer this research question, this study took into account how 
the high levels of corruption of Guatemalan public officials affected foreign investors. 
The results show that corruption amongst bureaucrats, judges, and members of the 
government elite do not seem to have an impact on the decision making process of 
allocating FDI in the country because foreign investors are aware of the problem.  
Moreover, one of the reason why FDI from firms located in highly corrupt countries 
might not be deterred by high levels of corruption abroad is because they may 
possess knowledge of how to cope with the arbitrariness of corruption. On the other 
hand, this study suggests that firms from countries with lower levels of corruption 
than Guatemala might struggle with the arbitrariness of corruption in the host 
country. 
High corruption levels in the host country seem to have an effect on the entry mode 
utilised by firms from countries with lower levels of corruption. Based on the results 
presented on this study, MNEs from less corrupt countries might opt to enter a highly 
corrupt host country via WOS. This might be explained by the fact that these 
investors prefer to have more control over their firms’ operations in a highly corrupt 
country. Also, these managers need to protect their image and not to be associated 
with local partners that are perceived as corrupt. 
Recent literature has also questioned if high levels of corruption in the host country 
affect the quality of FDI received by a host country. According to the responses of 
firms operating in Guatemala, the quality of FDI is affected by corruption when the 
home country is less corrupt than the host country. Managers of firms headquartered 
in countries with lower level of corruption than Guatemala expressed that their 
investment would not include state-of-the-art plants, or R&D facilities due to the 






FDI from more corrupt countries than Guatemala was not affected by the high levels 
of corruption of the host country. 
Finally, another reason why firms based on more corrupt countries than Guatemala 
might not be deterred by the levels of corruption of the host country is their 
relationship with the local government. Even though this study presents evidence that 
managers from MNEs based in both more or less corrupt countries than Guatemala 
might participate in corrupt deals, managers from more corrupt countries admitted to 




















CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this thesis, as mentioned in Chapter 1, was to analyse how corruption 
affects the attraction of FDI to a highly corrupt foreign location. In order to do so, the 
thesis proposed two questions to be answered: a) How does corruption distance 
between home and host country affect the attraction of FDI to emerging markets? 
And B) Why are some foreign firms less negatively affected than others by high 
levels of host country corruption when investing abroad? Emulating the vast majority 
of studies dealing with this issue, the first section attempted to understand how 
corruption affected the attraction of FDI to a highly corrupt foreign location at the 
macroeconomic level. The aim of this section was to understand whether or not FDI 
flows were affected by corruption in the same manner of the home country 
experienced higher or lower corruption levels than the host region. 
The second section of this study, on the other hand, was concerned with the analysis 
of how corruption affects the decision-making process of investing in a highly 
corrupt foreign country, and how corruption affected subsequent operations in that 
location at the firm level. The aim of this section was to understand which factors 
related with corruption abroad affected decision-makers when deciding to invest in a 
highly corrupt foreign location and to compare those answers based on the level of 
corruption of the home country. 
This chapter will study the theoretical contributions made by this thesis, which 
concentrate mainly in recognising that when analysing how corruption affects the 
attraction of FDI it is not only the corruption level of the host country what matters 
but the interaction of the corruption levels of the home and host country. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the knowledge of how corruption affects FDI 
by arguing that the level of corruption of the home country as compared to the host 
country will have an effect on FDI flows. This chapter will then provide 






Finally, this chapter ends with an evaluation of the thesis followed by suggestions for 
future research. 
7.1 Theoretical Contribution 
This study contributes to theory in a number of ways. The first section of the study 
makes contributions that can be classified under several key findings in relation to 
applicability of the study of corruption and its effects on FDI. The first contribution 
is the applicability of the TCT and institutional theories integrated to study how 
corruption affects FDI.  The second contribution is the applicability that this research 
offers by integrating TCT and institutional theory with the help of the OLI paradigm. 
The third area shows the importance of taking into account the role of the corruption 
level of the home country as well as of the host country when analysing corruption 
and how it affects the attraction of FDI. The forth area is the finding that when 
analysing FDI to a highly corrupt foreign location, it is important to take into account 
whether or not the home country has higher or lower corruption levels than the host 
country. Finally, this study contributes to the knowledge of corruption and its effect 
on FDI by stating that the corruption level of the home country alone may not deter 
FDI. Instead, this study argues that it is the uncertainty and the pressures faced at 
home that this corruption levels create what may deter FDI for those foreign 
investors not used to dealing with corruption in their home countries. 
The second section of the study also contributes to theory about how corruption 
affects the attraction of FDI but focused at the firm level. The key contributions of 
this section are, firstly, that when analysing corruption and its effect on FDI, it is 
important to distinguish the levels of corruption of the home country as compared to 
the host country. Secondly, this study argues that firms based in highly corrupt home 
countries might be better prepared to cope with the different dimensions of 
corruption of the home country based on the experience acquired at home. Thirdly, it 






home and host country expectations related to corruption in the host country based 
on the corruption levels of the home country.  
7.2 Applicability of TCT and the OLI Paradigm to Research Context 
When analysing how corruption affects the attraction of FDI at the macroeconomic 
level, the transaction cost theory and the OLI Paradigm are two well recognised 
standpoints that help to analyse the issue. However, the perspectives provided by 
these theories seem to offer opposing explanations of organisational occurrences. As 
previously mentioned, Granovetter (1985) says that the TCT provides an 
undersocialised account of MNEs’ activities. On the other hand, Roberts and 
Greenwood (1997) claim that the OLI Paradigm includes a socialised account of the 
process of FDI allocation, and thus, these frameworks can offer complementary 
elements in order to analyse issues affecting the MNE. 
While analysing how corruption affected the decision-making process of investing 
and operating in a highly corrupt host location, an including an institutional 
framework within the OLI Paradigm was selected as a more appropriate method. 
Building on Kostova and Zaheer (1999) this study argues that MNEs face pressures 
to adapt to the host location institutional environment while maintaining legitimacy 
at home. However, this study furthers this notion by stating that those foreign firms 
located in highly corrupt home countries face less pressures from headquarters to not 
engage in corrupt deals abroad, when compared to their counterparts headquartered 
in less corrupt countries. 
7.3 Increased Applicability Due to the use of TCT and the OLI Framework 
While both the TCT and the institutional theory have provided an answer of how 
corruption affects the attraction of FDI, each face shortcomings to fully explain this 
phenomenon. As previously mentioned, the TCT offers an explanation based only on 
the costs that a firm might incur when operating abroad, while the OLI that includes 






study integrated the TCT and OLI paradigm to provide a better picture of how 
corruption affects the attraction of FDI to a highly corrupt foreign location.  
The method chosen for using the TCT and the OLI paradigm. Based on the OLI 
paradigm this study argues that firms might develop knowledge (O advantages) of 
how to cope with a highly corrupt foreign environment. Also, this study proposes 
that such knowledge can be internalised and exploited in foreign countries 
experiencing high levels of corruption. This argument is based on Dunning’s work 
that states that O advantages can compensate for additional costs that an MNE may 
incur with starting operations abroad  that may not be faced at home (Dunning, 1988). 
Thus, to account for these variables this study utilises not only the corruption level of 
the host country, but also the corruption level of the home country. Moreover, the 
difference in corruption levels is used to account for the unfamiliarity that an MNE 
might have with a highly corrupt foreign location. Nevertheless, this study also 
differentiates between home countries with higher or lower corruption levels than the 
host countries, in order to evaluate if these firms have developed different knowledge 
regarding how to cope with corruption abroad. 
The I-specific advantages part of the OLI paradigm studies why an MNE would 
choose to own and operate a facility in a foreign country as opposed to servicing 
such market in other manner (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). The internalisation 
theory, therefore, proposes that MNEs will choose a low level of control to service a 
foreign market unless the transaction costs related with such operations are 
considered too high. However, this study argues that different foreign investors 
perceive different risks differently depending on the environment on which they 
operate at home. Therefore, if a firm has developed an O specific advantage of 
knowing how to deal with corruption that a firm may internalise and exploit such 
knowledge in other highly corrupt foreign locations. Conversely, MNEs without such 






This study also integrated institutional theory to the L section of the OLI paradigm to 
analyse how corruption affects FDI. As stated before, poor institutions may increase 
cost in the search, negotiation and enforcement of contracts abroad, and hence, these 
conditions may deter FDI to certain locations (Meyer, 2001). Nevertheless, 
institutions alone may not completely explain dissimilarities in the variation of FDI 
to foreign locations (Pournarakis & Varsakelis, 2004). Instead, FDI decisions involve 
an assessment of the foreign market and institutions seen from the investing 
company vantage point. Therefore, this study argues that the corruption levels of the 
foreign location matter as determinants of FDI but when compared to corruption 
levels of the home country. 
7.4 Applicability of the OLI Paradigm to Analyse how Corruption Affects the 
Attraction of FDI at the Firm Level 
While the first part analysed how corruption affected the attraction of FDI to Latin 
America in a macroeconomic manner, it is important to note that a firm level analysis 
was also needed to provide a better explanation of the issue. Grounded on the OLI 
paradigm and by including an institutional aspect to it, this study argues that the level 
of corruption of the home country as compared to the host country is an important 
factor to take into account when analysing how corruption affects the attraction of 
FDI. The results of this section suggest that MNEs from home countries with lower 
levels of corruption than a highly corrupt host country might struggle with the 
arbitrariness of corruption in the host country. This result can be explained due to the 
lack of experience that some firms located in countries with lower levels of 
corruption than a highly corrupt host country have in dealing with arbitrariness of 
corruption. 
This study also suggests that high levels of corruption in the host country may to 
have a direct effect on the entry mode utilised by firms from countries with lower 
levels of corruption. Based on institutional theory this study argues that MNEs from 






might be explained by the fact that these investors prefer to have more control over 
their firms’ operations in a highly corrupt country. Furthermore, these MNEs need to 
protect their public image and therefore, they might avoid being associated with local 
partners that are perceived as corrupt. 
Based on institutional approach this study also sheds light on the issue of whether or 
not high levels of corruption have an effect on the quality of FDI received by a 
highly corrupt host country. In line with the rest of this study, investing countries 
were separated as home countries with either more or less corruption levels than the 
host country. The results presented suggest that firms headquartered in countries with 
lower level of corruption than a highly corrupt host country would not include state-
of-the-art plants, or R&D facilities due to the high risks associated with corruption in 
the host country. Therefore, diminishing the quality of their investment allocated 
abroad due to the levels of corruption of the host country. On the contrary, the 
quality FDI from more corrupt countries than the host country does not seem to be 
affected by the high levels of corruption of the host country. 
Finally, the results of this study argue that all foreign investors with presence in a 
highly corrupt host country face pressures to conform to local business practices. 
However, those firms based in countries with higher levels of corruption than the 
host country might incur in more corrupt deals than their counterparts from less 
corrupt countries. This result suggest that the pressures of not participating in corrupt 
deals might be stronger for those firms located in home countries with lower corrupt 
countries than the host country. On the other hand, MNEs located in highly corrupt 
home countries might not face strong pressures to not engage in corrupt deals abroad. 
7.5 Extending TCT and OLI paradigm 
One more contribution resulting from utilising the TCT and the OLI paradigm was 
the extension of the literature in the IB discipline. The TCT theory was extended by 






home can internalise such knowledge and exploit it in other highly corrupt markets. 
Therefore, this argument means that firms with knowledge about dealing with 
corruption at home can minimise the costs associated with corruption abroad. On the 
other hand, the OLI paradigm was extended by stating that the corruption levels per 
se might not be fundamental in the decision-making process of allocating FDI. 
Instead, including an institutional environment to the L part of the paradigm in a 
foreign location should include an analysis of the distance between the institutional 
environment of the home and host countries and how this distance affects the 
decision to invest abroad. 
7.5.1 Role of Corruption Distance as Determinant of FDI 
This study analysed how corruption affected the attraction of FDI for host locations 
with high corruption levels. One of the most important contributions of the study is 
the introduction of the term ‘corruption distance’. Based on the results of the study, it 
is argued that the difference in levels of corruption of the home and host countries 
have an effect on the attraction of FDI to a highly corrupt host location. Furthermore, 
this study also argues that it is not the difference levels of corruption what affects 
FDI but also its direction. 
In order to analyse how corruption distance and its direction affected the attraction of 
FDI to developing economies, this study separated home countries as either more or 
less corrupt than the host country. This distinction was made in order to analyse 
whether or not firms from each set of countries react differently to corruption in the 
host country. The results suggest that corruption distance has a negative effect on 
FDI from when the home countries experience lower levels of corruption than the 
host countries. On the other hand, firms from highly corrupt countries were not 
affected by corruption distance when investing in the area.  
Therefore this study proposes that when analysing determinants of FDI the 






in order to obtain a better picture of the issue at hand, when analysing how 
corruption affects FDI flows to developing markets, a ‘corruption distance’ variable 
should be utilised. 
7.5.2 Role of Corruption in the Decision-making Process and Subsequent 
Operations in a Highly Corrupt Host Country 
While analysing how corruption affects the decision making process of investing and 
subsequent operations in a highly corrupt country this study found that the 
institutional environment of the home country could dictate how foreign firms 
operate in the host country. Firstly, the corruption level of the home country would 
have a direct effect on whether or not a foreign company penetrates a highly corrupt 
host country via WOS or a JV, if the home country has lower levels of corruption 
than the host country. This based on the need for the company to not be associated 
with local partners that might be considered corrupt. 
Secondly, pressures to not engage in corrupt deals differ based on the level of 
corruption of the home country. Firms based in countries with lower levels of 
corruption than a highly corrupt host country may get involved in corrupt deals; 
however, these firms tried to avoid direct contact with the local government. On the 
other hand, firms based in home countries with higher levels of corruption than an 
already highly corrupt host country actively engaged in business with the local 
government. This result may suggest that although all firms engage in some level of 
corrupt deals in the host country, those firms located in countries with lower levels of 
corruption than the host country face more pressures to not engage in corruption 
abroad. 
7.6 Empirical Contributions 
This study provides empirical evidence to complement studies suggesting that firms 
based on countries with high levels of corruption are not affected by this issue when 






levels of corruption than the host country are negatively affected not only by the 
corruption levels of the host country but also by the distance of such levels. By doing 
so, this study contributes to the study of how corruption affects FDI by introducing 
the concept of ‘corruption distance’ as an institutional determinant of FDI. 
At the firm-level analysis this study also provides important empirical contributions. 
Firstly, this study argues that foreign firms react differently by high levels of 
corruption abroad depending on the levels of corruption of their home countries. 
Also, this study empirically demonstrates that firms with higher levels of corruption 
than a highly corrupt host country have developed knowledge of how to deal with 
arbitrary corruption in the host country, while their counterparts based in less corrupt 
home countries struggle to acquire such knowledge. Finally, this study also argues 
that all firms operating in a highly corrupt host country must adapt to the local 
conventions; however, those firms located in home countries with lower levels of 
corruption than the host country face higher pressures to not fully engage in corrupt 
deals than their counterparts headquartered in countries with higher corruption levels 
than the host country. 
7.7 Recommendations for Policy 
This study has empirically demonstrated that in general high levels of corruption 
deter FDI. Furthermore, this study also demonstrated that corruption and corruption 
distance discourage FDI when the home country has lower levels of corruption than 
the host country. On the other hand, corruption and corruption distance do not affect 
FDI when the home country is considered more corrupt than the host country. 
However, the bulk of FDI activities are carried out by MNEs located in developed 
countries (UNCTAD, 2012), which generally have low levels of corruption 
(Transparency International, 2011). Furthermore, this study also demonstrated that 
the quality of FDI also suffers due to high levels of corruption abroad. Therefore, if 
local governments desire to attract more FDI and higher quality FDI into their 






order to decrease the corruption distance with the home countries of potential foreign 
investors. 
7.8 Recommendation for Management Practice 
Taking into account the difference in corruption levels of the home and host 
countries into the FDI model should help MNEs recognise the importance of this 
factor in the selection of a foreign location on which to conduct operations. 
Furthermore, in today’s business environment considering not only the corruption 
levels of the host country but the distance of these levels when compared to the home 
country will help managers in the process of assessing possible foreign locations 
where to invest. Therefore, when MNEs establish the importance of corruption 
distance for FDI allocation, their response to the estimated improvement or 
deterioration in the host country levels of corruption would have to be programmed 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). 
However, high levels of corruption are important not only to decide whether or not to 
invest in a foreign location. Instead, corruption levels will have a permanent effect on 
the daily operations of a company in a foreign country. Therefore, managers should 
also take into account the levels of pervasive and arbitrary corruption before and 
after the decision of investment has been made. Also, specific guidelines of how to 
react to high levels of corruption abroad should be in place in order to minimise 
corporate damage inflicted by engaging in corrupt practices abroad. 
7.9 Evaluation of the Study 
The importance of the theoretical contribution of this study rests on furthering 
knowledge regarding how corruption affects the attraction of FDI depending on the 
interaction between home countries with host countries considered highly corrupt. 
Also, this study utilises a combination of TCT and the OLI Paradigm in order to 
avoid an oversocialised or undersocialised account of the issue. In the first section of 






country what deters FDI. Instead, the distance of the corruption levels between the 
home and host countries, when the home country has lower levels of corruption, are 
responsible for the negative influence of corruption on FDI flows. However, the 
macroeconomic section of this study does not provide an explanation of why foreign 
investors are affected differently by corruption in the host country based on the levels 
of corruption of their home country. For that reason, a firm-level analysis was 
performed. 
The firm-level analysis helped clarifying and strengthening the role played by the 
institutional environment of the home and host countries on how MNEs deal with 
high levels of corruption abroad. This section of the study demonstrated that those 
firms located in highly corrupt home countries not only have developed knowledge 
of how to cope with high corruption abroad but also might not face pressures to not 
engage in corrupt deals in the host country. On the other hand, MNEs located in 
home countries with lower levels of corruption abroad might not have developed 
such knowledge and might face more pressures to avoid participating in illegal acts 
abroad. 
Moreover, the theoretical contribution of this study furthers to knowledge through 
integrating concepts from two seemingly opposing theories with the help of the OLI 
framework. Therefore, this study enhances the IB literature by demonstrating that 
scholars do not have to choose between the TCT and institutional theory but can 
utilise both to perform an enhanced viewpoint to study MNEs’ activities. 
7.9.1 Generalisation 
The recommendations provided for practitioners and policy makers resulted from a 
generalisation to the fact that FDI from MNEs located in home countries with lower 
corruption levels than a highly corrupt host country is negatively affected by 
corruption of the host country. Based on the nature of the study it is feasible to argue 






attraction of FDI to other highly corrupt host locations. Therefore, the conclusions 
provided by this research could be applied to MNEs investing in other locations with 
little changes to the original models. 
7.9.2 Evaluation of the Methodological Contribution 
This study made several methodological contributions to the IB discipline. Firstly, 
this study utilised panel data to analyse how corruption affects the attraction of FDI 
to an entire region, which might provide a better picture of the issue. Secondly, this 
study builds on Cuervo-Cazurra (1995) and Habib and Zurawicki (2002) by taking 
into account not only the corruption levels of the host country but also those of the 
home country. However, this study separates home countries as either more or less 
corrupt than the host country in order to see how corruption affected foreign firms 
based in their level of knowledge of how to cope with corruption. Thirdly, this study 
also took into account not only the corruption levels of the home and host countries 
but also the distance in such levels to obtain a better picture of how corruption 
affected FDI flows to a highly corrupt foreign location. 
At the firm-level this study also contributed to methodology in the IB discipline. The 
most important contribution is the utilisation of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods to understand how corruption affected not only the allocation of FDI but 
also the operations of foreign firms in a highly corrupt host country. The rationale to 
use both methods was to compensate for the weaknesses of each individual method 
and not to triangulate, since triangulation is not possible since both methods cannot 
study the same phenomena (Sale, et al., 2002). Instead, the qualitative method was 
utilised to provide a platform on which the quantitative method was build. Therefore, 
this research could be considered as the first attempt to analyse how corruption 









This study presents several limitations that result from the nature of the data 
presented.  Due to the availability of data the macroeconomic approach only 
analysed FDI flows to 12 Latin American countries from 2006 to 2009. Also, the 
FDI flows were not disaggregated at the industry level, which could show differences 
on how FDI is affected by corruption based on the industry on which foreign 
investors operate. This study relied on the perception of corruption as presented by 
the CPI published by Transparency International. The CPI is broad and does not 
capture the different forms that corruption has (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). 
Nevertheless, corruption has different dimensions (Rodriguez, et al., 2005), which 
should be taken into account when analysing how corruption affects FDI.  
The firm-level analysis also presents limitations. The main limitation of the firm-
level section of this study is that it relied on the responses of managers. This means 
that there is the possibility that the responses provided to the interviews and/or the 
questionnaire might not be entirely accurate. Also, this study relied on indirect 
wording to understand how corruption affected the decision-making process of 
investing in a foreign location as well as subsequent operations. This was made to 
prevent managers from implicating themselves but it might have also prevented 
managers from actually answering how often they participated in corrupt acts in the 
host country. Therefore, the results of this section should not be interpreted as a 
measurement of how much an MNE actually engaged in corrupt actions, but instead 
the pressures they faced to do so. 
7.9.4 Future Research 
The limitations of this study provide an opportunity to conduct further studies 
analysing how corruption affects the attraction of FDI. New studies should analyse 
how corruption and corruption distance affect FDI at the industry level. This 






might not be as affected by corruption than those assets that can be found at another 
location with less corruption levels. Also, a macroeconomic-level research analysing 
how corruption distance affects FDI should take into account the different 
dimensions of corruption in order to understand if such dimensions have different 
effects based on the levels of corruption of the home country. Further research 
should also analyse the issues by looking into motives of FDI, as different type of 
FDI may have different sensitivity of corruption. Research at the firm-level could 
also be enhanced. Scholars should study how corruption affects the decision-making 
process of beginning operations abroad as well as following operations in more than 
one country. This should be made in order to understand if a different institutional 
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This research relied on a semi-structured interview to obtain information regarding 
how corruption affected the decision-making process of allocating investment in a 
highly corrupt host country, and how corruption affected operations once the 
decision to invest was made. The interviews although semi structured, had a clear 
purpose that was based on the existing literature regarding corruption and its effects 
on FDI. 
The following interview guide was utilised to gather information in order to 
construct a questionnaire to be then handed to a larger sample of respondents 
regarding how corruption affected their investment process in Guatemala and 
subsequent operations in the country.  
The following is the guide used to conduct the interviews: 
Introduction 
This phase was used to gather basic information regarding the company, their main 
business and in which countries it operated. This section also included a description 
of the research and its implications. Also, due to the high sensitivity of the topic, 
during the introduction managers were made aware that their identities and responses 
would remain absolutely confidential. 
Interview 
After the introduction the interviews started by asking managers how they perceived 
the issue of corruption in Guatemala in general. After having discussed the current of 
how corruption affects ‘everyday’ life in the country the topic was stirred towards 
how corruption affected the decision-making process of the company. While 
discussing how corruption had affected the allocation of FDI in Guatemala, the 






in the firm. Finally, the conversation was guided to answer how corruption affected 































My name is Jose Godinez and I am interviewing you as part of my PhD research 
with the University of Edinburgh, UK.  The aim of my research is to better 
understand how the perception of corruption affects the attraction of foreign direct 
investment in Guatemala.  
Please answer the questions according to your own experience and understanding. 
Let me ensure you, all information you provide will be treated strictly anonymously 
and confidentially. Your name or your company’s will not be used in any 
documentation produced as a result of this survey. 




Section 1: Background Information 
 Location of the parent company  
a)  When was the parent company established?  
b)  When was the Guatemalan subsidiary established?   
c)  Ownership structure of the Guatemalan subsidiary?  
 a. Joint Venture        
 Percentage of ownership?     
 b. Acquisition of a local company (Brownfield)  
 c. Wholly owned subsidiary (Greenfield)  
 d. Other (Please specify in the blank)  
 e. Don’t Know     
d)  Sector on which the Guatemalan subsidiary operates?  
e)  Amount invested in Guatemala in the past 5 years? 
a. Up to US$5 million 
b. Between US$5 million and up to US$10 million 
c. Between US$10 million and up to US$20 million 
d. Between US$20 million and up to US$30 million 
e. More than US$30 million (Please specify) 
 
f)  Does the parent company have other subsidiaries in Latin America?  






             How Many?    
 Where?    
 b. No  
 
 
Section 2: Perceived corruption in Guatemala 
 
1. To what extent do the following institutions are perceived as corrupt where the 
company operates? (Five-point scale from 1 = very unlikely to 5 = very likely) 
 
   
a) National-level political leaders  
b) City and other local-level political leaders  
c) Civil servants at the national level  
d) Civil servants at the city level  
 
 
2. Uncertainty created by corruption. When doing business do you have enough 
information regarding the following (Five-point scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = yes. Please 
type 0 if not applicable) 
 
   
a) Advance knowledge of how much an unofficial payment for government 
services will be 
 
b) Advance knowledge of whether or not after making an unofficial payment 




c) Advance knowledge that after making an unofficial payment the service is 




Section 3: Perceived Bribery in Guatemala  
1. Please indicate how likely companies in Guatemala’s business sector in which your 
company operates are to pay or offer bribes to members of:  (Five-point scale from 1 = very 






   












Section 4: Structure of the investment in Guatemala  
 
1. The level of corruption in Guatemala affected (Five-point scale from 1 = not at all to 
5 = yes) 
 
   




 Please Explain 
 
b) Your strategy in the country (e.g. less R&D intensive, more market or 
natural resource seeking, less collaboration with local suppliers) 
 
 
 Please Explain 
 
 
Section 5: Operating in Guatemala  
 
1. Please rate the following questions (Five-point scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = yes) 
 
 
   
a) Is corruption part of the business culture in Guatemala? 
 
 
b) Have you ever seen anyone in your line of business give a bribe to a 
member of the government elite in Guatemala to ‘get things done’? 
 
 
c) Have you ever seen anyone in your line of business give a bribe to a 








d) Have you ever seen anyone in your line of business give a bribe to a 
bureaucrat in Guatemala to ‘get things done’? 
 
 
e) Has a member of the Guatemalan government elite ever asked for a bribe 
‘to get things done’? 
 
 
f) Has a Guatemalan legislator ever asked for a bribe ‘to get things done’  
g) Has a Guatemalan bureaucrat ever asked for a bribe ‘to get things done’  








j) Corruption among the government elite where the parent company is 
located has given you knowledge of how to cope with the level of 
corruption of the government elite in Guatemala? 
 
 
k) Corruption among bureaucrats where the parent company is located has 
given you knowledge of how to cope with the level of corruption of 
bureaucrats in Guatemala? 
 
 
l) Corruption among lawmakers where the parent company is located has 
given you knowledge of how to cope with the level of corruption of the 





End of the questionnaire 







Appendix 1: Macroeconomic Analysis Data tests 
1.1 Hausman Test for fixed or random effects 
 Fixed (b) Random (B) Difference (b-B) 
Sqrt ((diag (V_b-
V_B)) 
CPI -12.43085 -6.7703 5.6604 16.303 
Human 14.17453 122.836 -108.6619 1486.396 
Law 0.2222 0.46145 -0.43921 1.0728 
Bureaucracy 0.69912 0.11249 0.58662 1.0165 
EcFreedom -0.22053 -0.1567 -0.06375 0.31702 
Education 1.46174 -1.0288 2.49057 133.0215 
Inflation 0.75690 0.71076 0.04614 0.56220 
Infrastructure -0.30375 0.3598 0.05012 1.03482 
GDP 6.95472 6.65553 0.29937 171.2685 
Unemployment 1.685411 0.7223 0.96303 5.23361 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2 (10)   = (b-B) ‘ [ (V_b-V_B) ^ (-1) ] (b-B) 
                   = 0.70 























Mean VIF 4.495 
 
Appendix 2: Firm-level Analysis Data tests 
2.1 Variance Inflation Factor Test Multinomial Logistic Regression of FDI in 
Guatemala 
 
Variable  VIF 
Entry Mode 1.093 
Motive 1.033 
Subsidiaries 1.099 
Mean VIF 1.075 
 
2.2 Variance Inflation Factor Test Multinomial Logistic Regression Facing 
Corruption in Guatemala by Government Sector   
 
Variable  VIF 
Government Elite 2.779 
Judiciary System 2.565 
Bureaucrats 1.355 






2.3 Variance Inflation Factor Test Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Arbitrariness and Pervasiveness of Corruption in Guatemala 
Variable  VIF 
Knowledge of price of 
unofficial payments 1.716 
 
Knowledge if more 
unofficial payments 
will be needed 2.596 
 
Knowledge if service 
will be delivered after 
an unofficial payment 2.250 
Mean VIF 2.1873 
 
2.3 Variance Inflation Factor Test Multinomial Logistic Analysis Corruption, 
Entry Mode and Strategy in Guatemala from 2007-2012 
 
Variable  VIF 
Entry Mode 2.850 
Strategy 2.848 
Mean VIF 2.849 
 
2.4 Variance Inflation Factor Test Multinomial logistic regression Corruption 
and Operations in Guatemala from 2007-2012 
Variable VIF 
Is corruption part 





Have you ever 
seen anyone in 
your line of 
business give a 
bribe to a member 






Have you ever 
seen anyone in 
your line of 









bribe to a 
legislator? 
Have you ever 
seen anyone in 
your line of 
business give a 




Has a member of 
the government 




Has a legislator 




Has a bureaucrat 




How likely is your 
firm to do 




Mean VIF 2.3461 
 
 
